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Abstract
This thesis examines the feasibility of a motorized momentum exchange tether 
(MMET) system being used to perform commercial space launches. The MMET 
system is an on-orbit launch concept that could be used to reduce the cost of access to 
space, thereby catalysing a broader range of space-enabled business concepts. The 
research presented in this thesis assumes this cost of access to space for a reasonable 
launch system can be presented as the adverse financial risk of its operation. Under 
this assumption, the research concludes that an MMET-based system would be a 
feasible alternative to an equivalently capable conventional system if the risk 
associated with the system is less than that associated with the alternative. To 
illustrate the concepts and approaches presented within, this thesis presents an 
assessment of the proposed Lunar Staged MMET (LSM) mission, an assessment that 
indicates the MMET is a feasible alternative for completing such a mission under 
specific analytical and market conditions.
The expected financial risk is presented in this thesis as the product of the mission 
cost and the probability of mission failure. The cost of each mission is calculated 
from the perspective of the end customer, and the long-term price of such services is 
computed using publicly available data and the assumption that the commercial space 
industry can be modelled as an oligopoly. Support for such a model is contained in 
the literature and through this research, which compares the quarterly financial data 
published by the Boeing Company against the international commercial launch rate.
The probability of system failure associated with an MMET-based unconventional 
launch system must account for a number of factors. For the first, conventional stage 
of the system, assessing the probability of stage failure is found through an 
examination of observed failure rates relative to conventional engineering reliability 
estimates for conventional launch vehicles. Through this examination, a novel 
approach to calculating the rate at which the probability of failure for vehicles 
produced within a variant class changes as a function of time is presented, an 
approach that offers a valid technique for applying reliability growth across a series of 
vehicles that are best considered to be independent vehicles. The thesis goes on to
present the results of research into various component aspects that are vital to the 
design and analysis of a tether-based system. First, the research explores the strength 
of tethers modelled as braided aramid ropes, which supports claims of strain 
dependence regarding aramid fibre strength that can have significant strength benefits
111
and indicates that this phenomenon should be accounted for in any operational
architecture. Second, the thesis presents an empirical hypervelocity impact effects
equation calibrated for use with tethers, which indicates that the currently accepted
approach to oblique hypervelocity impacts may not be appropriate for tether analyses.
Thirdly, research into fractured impactor dispersion after a hypervelocity impact on
tether targets is presented, which indicates that the commonly accepted one-impact-
one-failure assumption employed for multi-line tether analyses may not be sufficient. i f
.TetherLife, an analytical program developed to calculate the expected lifetime of an
MMET system given various sub-span parameters, employs the products of these f
research areas to calculate the mean time to failure for a range of tether sizes and
orientations. §
After combining the probability of failure associated with the conventional launch 
vehicle component of the MMET-based unconventional launch system, the 
probability of failure associated with the MMET system, the probability or failure 
associated with handing a payload between systems, and the likely cost of deploying a 
suitable set of MMET systems, a comparison can be made between the financial risk 
associated with completing a specific mission using an MMET-based unconventional 
launch system verses completion of the same mission using conventional means. For 
the LSM mission examined within the research, an MMET-based system would be a 
reasonable option if an average of 85 missions per year are required, contingent on 
specific analytical assumptions. While such a number of lunar supply missions are 
not currently required, the conclusion that the MMET system can be an alternative to 
a conventional system under various circumstances offers support for continuing 
current research on system design and analysis.
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Preface
This thesis strives to analyse the design and cost conditions that would indicate the 
motorized momentum exchange tether (MMET) concept being developed at the 
University of Glasgow is a feasible alternative to a conventional launch vehicle 
concept. In response to concerns that the cost of access to space is too high, many 
novel launch concepts have been developed. The types of concepts vary widely from 
structures stretching all the way to a geosynchronous orbit, to rockets launched from 
balloons. All of these concepts offer hope for bringing down the cost of access to 
space. However, when resource allocation is required, some concepts may warrant 
immediate study, while others may require advancements in core technologies.
It is argued that, if a system reduces the cost of access to space, such a system will 
enable space-based commercial opportunities. For example, if the cost of transport to 
the moon were reduced, maybe a business concept would emerge that relies on this 
low-cost transport. If the rationalization is that a better system enables commercial 
achievement, it seems logical that a new technology like the MMET should be judged 
using proven metrics derived from the commercial launch environment.
The commercial launch market is both small and fluid. With companies such as 
Arianespace, Boeing, Chelomei, General Dynamics, Hughes, Korolev, Locklieed 
Martin, McDonnell Douglas, Mitsubishi, and Orbital Sciences, not only entering and 
exiting the market in various forms and performing various roles within the industry 
that range from simple manufacturing to launch operations; agencies and 
organizations such as the European Space Agency (ESA), the Japan Aerospace 
Exploration Agency (JAXA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), the United States Air Force (USAF), and the United States Navy (USN), 
varying and redefining their roles and oversight within space launch operations; and 
new organizations such as International Launch Services (ILS), Sea Launch, and 
SpaceX emerging to navigate niches within an industry that is rife with overcapacity, 
the task of defining a feasible launch system alternative is not a trivial proposition. 
Even with an ever evolving pool of suppliers and technologies, and a reportedly large 
potential market of customers, the number of commercial launches performed
throughout the entire world has rarely reached or exceeded fifty launches in any given 
year. With the current level of overcapacity reported in the market, the cost of access 
to space has already dropped significantly, and is likely to be well below the publicly 
stated prices.
Because the market is so small, any release of information is thought to remove the 
competitive advantage of an organisation. For this reason, it is very hard to find 
publicly available infoiTnation about the commercial market that is based on cuirent 
data. Furthermore, it is similarly difficult to find hard information on the contracting 
principles employed for the “average” contract, as each is developed on a case-by- 
case basis. With a history of less than 20 years, the commercial launch market is 
difficult to quantitatively analyse.
With an acceptance of the significant uncertainty associated with the industry data, 
combined with a task to assess a launch concept that has yet to be fully designed and 
tested, this thesis offers a guide for where future work should be focussed on the 
MMET system. The novelty in this research has been to integrate various, apparently 
disparate themes, in order to ereate an entirely new feasibility study and assessment. 
Very few assessments of this kind have been rigorously completed for unconventional 
launch system concepts, and, as far as the author knows, no other analysis has 
currently reached the level of fidelity achieved within for a tether-based space system.
This thesis lays out its fundamental approach, a process for implementing those 
fundamentals for the purposes of an on-orbit launch system concept like the MMET, 
and presents an application of those fundamentals for a specific mission. While this 
work focuses on assessing unconventional systems that employ tether-based on-orbit 
launch systems, the principles presented and the methods by which they are applied 
could potentially be applied to other systems.
The thmst of this work is in establishing a methodology that selects the better of two 
reasonable launch system choices. The analyses presented herein take a holistic 
approach to assessing a launch system option. In the same way risk accounts for more 
than reliability, launch system feasibility accounts for more than functionality. If a
system is cheaper, this decrease in cost may be offset by a decrease in reliability, a 
situation that must be identified and considered.
As defined within, the major aspects that must be accounted for when selecting a 
conventional launch system are identified in Fig 1. As evident from Fig 1, a 
conventional launch system is one that takes a payload from the surface of the earth to 
its final destination, without assistance from propulsive components or systems that 
are not present at the time of launch.
Part 1 : C osts Part 2: Reliability
Business
Analysis
Stage 1 
Operation
Payload
Deployment
Figure 1: Model of a conventional launch system operation.
On-orbit launch system concepts employ smaller conventional launch vehicles as a 
component of the overall launch system, as identified in Fig 2. To be considered a 
feasible launch system option, this work asserts that an unconventional launch system 
must undergo a holistic examination equivalent to that for a conventional system. As 
in the case of a two-stage MMET-based on-orbit launch system like that presented in 
Fig 2, such an analysis at the system stage level is significantly more complex.
Part 1 ; Costs Part 2; Reliability
Figure 2: Model of an unconventional launch system employing two staged MMET systems.
Caution is urged when navigating through this thesis as the terminology employed by 
conventional mission analysts and unconventional system designers does not always 
agree. Terms used in this document must be interpreted in the context of this 
document. For example, this work considers the entire operation of the conventional 
launch vehicle identified in Fig 2 to be a single stage. From the perspective of the 
unconventional system, this is valid. However, for an individual who is familiar with 
the term stage as it applied to a conventional space launch vehicle, this perspective 
may conflict with his or her inherent understanding.
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This thesis employs a commercial perspective to the analysis of the MMET, focusing 
on when it would become financially feasible. While every transaction in the 
commercial environment is complex, the research has worked to identify the core 
mechanisms in each transaction, so that a reasonable choice methodology is applied.
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Past Work
There exists a wide range of unconventional launch systems and launch system |
concepts. Many of these systems and concepts involve unique staging options 
designed to reduce the cost of access to space. One of these concepts is the MMET, 
which is currently undergoing development at the University of Glasgow.
1.0 Unconventional launch systems
An unconventional launch system is considered to be any that employs a mixture of 
dissimilar propulsive systems, any of which may require conventional chemical 
rocket propulsion, to take a payload from the surface of the earth to its final 
destination. According to this definition, there is currently only one unconventional 
launch system that is regularly employed for orbital launch missions, and this is the 
Pegasus launch system. The Pegasus launch system is composed of two stages, as 
previously defined. The first stage of this unconventional launch system is the 
Lockheed L-1011 aircraft, and the second stage is the Pegasus vehicle. For Pegasus- 
style architectures, earlier stages carry subsequent stages until they are required. 
Although only currently capable of completing suborbital missions, the Scaled 
Composites Spaceship One and its derivatives also employ this Pegasus-style 
architecture. In addition to unconventional systems like Spaceship One, many other 
concepts including various single-stage-to-orbit systems were proposed during the 
Ansari X-Prize competition. Many of the various concepts for such launch systems 
are discussed in documents such as DOT (2006) and Ashford (2002), or through 
examination of the relevant European Space Agency (ESA) or National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) websites.
In contrast to the Pegasus-style architecture, an on-orbit launch system does not 
require the initial stages to carry all later stages. An on-orbit launch system is a 
propulsive system that remains on orbit between missions, and propels any payload it 
receives either onto its final destination or onto another on-orbit launch system stage. 
Within this class of concepts are those that are tether-based. An overview of the 
general tether concepts and tether-based launch applications currently under
investigation can be attained through examination of Cosmo and Lorenzini (1997), 
Johnson et al. (1999), CaiToll (1986), Bekey (1983), or Forward and Hoyt (1999).
Tether-based systems are any space structure for which long, fibrous lines are an 
intrinsic component. Such concepts are primarily divided into the electro-dynamic 
tether, which is a system that uses conductive material within the tether span to allow 
the passage of current as it moves through the magnetosphere; and the momentum 
exchange tether, which is a long stmcture that transfers large tangential velocities to a 
payload at its tip by hanging, oscillating, or rotating about its centre of mass. The 
most widely considered studies of momentum exchange tethers, herein referred to as 
passive momentum exchange tethers, are those in which angular rotation is initiated 
through gravitational and inertial imbalances induced by a highly elliptical orbit. 
Examples of such systems are presented and discussed in Forward and Hoyt (1999) 
and also include hybrid systems like the MXER tether discussed in Sorensen (2003).
The main problem with passive momentum exchange tether systems is that, as the 
system releases its payload, it experiences a substantial de-orbit. Some current 
concepts, such as the MXER presented in Sorensen (2003), reorient themselves 
electrodynamically after de-orbit using energy gathered with their conductive tethers 
while the systems are passing through the magnetosphere. At present, systems like the 
MXER are still in the development phases, and require a great amount of further 
research, according to Sorensen (2004). Regardless of the current development state, 
many limitations inherent in passive momentum exchange tether systems are hard to 
overcome. Such limitations include their dependence on an elliptical orbit to force 
localised motion, which means that such systems lose their altitude advantage at the 
time they are undergoing their most rapid rotations. At the same time, the initial 
condition precision required for such systems, as identified in Eiden and Cartmell
(2003), is significant.
As a counter to the problems of a passive system, the motorized momentum exchange 
tether (MMET) system under development at the University of Glasgow allows 
mission planners to both take advantage of the altitude benefits associated with a 
highly elliptical orbit by retaining some reasonable independence between the local
angular velocity of the system and the orbital position, thereby increasing the 
mechanical advantage available to the system; and operate in an out of plane manner 
that allows for less costly plane changes, thereby opening up unconventional launch 
sites for use in conventional mission.
1.1 Motorized momentum exchange tether
The MMET concept has undergone significant development since its introduction by 
Cartmell in Cartmell (1996). System introduction was quickly followed-up by two 
feasibility studies presented in Cartmell (1997a) and Cartmell (1997b), which 
determined that the system concept could be dynamically sound. In short, the MMET 
concept attempts to conserve angular momentum by counter-rotating two sets of 
payload and counteiiveight assemblies. By conserving a high proportion of angular 
momentum, the MMET will not experience as much of a rapid, post-mission de-orbit, 
as is inherent in other concepts. Further, this dependence on a counterweight to 
produce angular velocities in the system makes its operation independent of orbital 
position. As mentioned, such independence allows the system to release its payloads 
with the maximum possible imparted tangential velocity while at apogee, as opposed 
to perigee where passive systems must release to achieve the same conditions; or 
place payloads onto out-of-plane trajectories, which is currently not proven to be 
operationally feasible for passive systems. Work since the initial feasibility 
assessment has focused on validating the initial models and increasing the MMET 
model complexity, such as implementing deployment constraints, orbit eccentricity, 
and oblate Earth models.
Such tether work has been presented within a range of Journals and conference 
proceedings. The first public introduction of the MMET system came in Cartmell
(1998), which introduced the system in terms of the general findings presented in 
Cartmell (1996-1997b). From there, an application of the concept was discussed in 
Cartmell and Ziegler (1999), which presented a further analytical study of the concept 
feasibility, with further studies of work supporting and developing these concepts 
presented in papers such as Ziegler and Cartmell (2000a), Ziegler and Cartmell 
(2000b), and Ziegler and Cartmell (2001).
The conclusions of these studies were supported by a testing regime discussed in 
Cartmell and Ziegler (2000), Cartmell and Ziegler (2001), Cartmell and Ziegler
(2002), and Cartmell et a i (2003). It is during these experimental tests that an ESA 
funded scale model of the MMET was constructed and demonstrated in Glasgow, the 
results supportive of the concept.
Building on from this experimental success is the dynamic modelling work of Ziegler
(2003), McKenzie et al. (2004), Cartmell and D’Anigo (2005), and McKenzie and 
Cartmell (2005). Such analytical works have assisted in the development of more 
complex and sophisticated mission proposals such as Draper et al. (2004) and 
Cartmell et al. (2004).
While such research offers strong support for the feasibility of the system dynamics, 
there is currently no complete and publicly available research concerning how an 
MMET system would interact with the orbital environment.
1,2 Analytical components required for this research
The conclusions to how an MMET system would react with the orbital environment 
presented herein arise from research that has developed a risk assessment 
methodology and analytical package that calculates the lifetime of an MMET system, 
within the constraints of the model and available data. In conjunction with this 
engineering risk assessment, the system is assessed in the context of the commercial 
market, with conclusions being presented as to its financial viability. A research 
remit of this complexity requires an investigation of many topics. The main topics 
required, and a discussion of the literature relevant to this research, is presented in this 
section.
1.2.1 Commercial launch market
To understand the viability of an unconventional launch system within the 
commercial market, the commercial market must be defined and understood. This 
work accepts the working definition of the commercial space launch industry 
employed by Gabier (1991). Such a definition, which is based on the amount of 
government controlled operational oversight and financial support, would include all
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space launches conducted for non-government customers by current operators such as 
Boeing Company, Lockheed Martin, Orbital Sciences, Sea Launch, and Arianespace. 
This is not an exhaustive list of commercial operators, and these operators are not 
exclusively involved in the commercial space launeh industry, with many also 
conducting launches for government organisations.
When examining the launch market, the commercial launch rate is of primaiy 
concern. In the United States, any launch that is not conducted on behalf of the 
government or one of its agents is considered a commercial launch that must be 
licensed by the Department of Transportation (DOT). In other parts of the world, the 
regulator framework is not in place to allow for such a clear distinction, a distinction 
that identifies the relationship of the end user to its respective government. When 
assessing the commercial designation of non-US launches, the DOT generally 
considers a launch to be commercial if it is internationally competed. For the i
comparison of international launch rates and market shares, it is the DOT designation 
of what is a commercial launch that is accepted for use within the research presented 
here. The recent history of all commercial launches and activities is obtained by 
examination of DOT (1998b-2006), with any launch dates and details further cross- 
referenced against sources such as Isakowitz et al (1999), Wade (2003), Chang
(1996), Chang (2000), Smith (2005a), and Smith (2005b).
While it is clear and verifiable when a vehicle launches and, in the case of a 
commercial payload, what the payload is and who owns it, the cost of that launch is 
very hard to determine, based on publicly available data. Gabier identifies this issue, 
citing the oligopolistic nature of the industry as the cause. Despite its likely 
inaccuracy, this research examines the only publicly available compilation of 
commercial launch vehicle cost estimates, which are presented in DOT (1998b-2004).
These estimates are compared against corporate financial filings submitted to the US 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) by US commercial space launch vehicle 
manufacturers. While it is reasonable to assume that the data provided to the SEC can 
be considered valid, as the legal reach of the SEC is significant and proven, the level 
of clarity offered by government mandated financial filings varies drastically between 
the different operators in the US. For example, almost no information can be inferred
16
about the launch activities of Lockheed Martin based on annual reports like Lockheed 
Martin Corporation (2003), with the figures presented those of Orbital Sciences in 
Orbital Science Corporation (2003) being marginally better. As a counter, the Boeing 
Company offers a significant level of insight into its commercial launch affairs, even 
if its investor-focused documents highlighting activities specific to each business line 
are neither externally audited nor offer a designation between internal and external 
revenues. In the context of the information that is commonly available in the public 
domain regarding the financial activities of commercial launch operators, a wealth of 
information is gained by examination of Boeing (1998a-2004d).
A further source of financial information, although the publicly available information 
is edited or censored by DOT in an attempt to remove the possibility that any 
competitive advantage could be lost, is obtained through an examination of Boeing 
(2002e), Boeing et a l (2000), Boeing et al. (2002), and Sea Launch (2002). These 
documents offer industry reaction to the regulations proposed by DOT around the turn 
of the century, and offer insight into projected costs associated with regulatory 
compliance and the operational mechanisms that drive such cost predictions. While 
these documents must be examined in the context of a persuasive argument, in which 
facts are presented in a light that is intended to lead the reader towards a desired 
response, the methodologies employed within these documents are informative.
These cost predictions and forecasts are only valid, though, in the terms of the 
projections from which the calculations are derived. Here again, two sides looking 
for funding within a competitive and political arena often dictate the arguments 
presented in the public literature. While it is evident that the commercial space 
industiy is not a highly recognized contributor to the world economy by the average 
person, nor is its history dating back to the 1960s widely known or understood, the 
DOT is responsible for regulating the affairs of the commercial space transportation 
industry, as they are conducted by US citizens. Within the political arena that the 
DOT must operate, the importance of an organization dictates the funding it receives. 
Without funding, organizations like the Office of the Associate Administrator for 
Commercial Space Transportation (AST), within the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) of the DOT, cease to exist. With the desire for self-preservation evident, DOT
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publishes market projections on a regular basis. These projections are contained in 
documents such as DOT (1998-2004), COMSTAC (1997-2004), and Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation (1995), which is the previous title for AST within 
DOT. The ensuing launch rates and commercial studies have repeatedly proven the 
projections of DOT, and its industry partnership organizations such as COMSTAC, to 
be wildly inaccurate when examined in retrospect against documents such as Decker
(2004), Smith (2005a), Smith (2005b), and Holtz-Eakin (2003). As with all 
predictions that are performed in the context of speculative markets, such as that of 
Johnson (1998), care must be taken in examining the source, its motivations, and the 
possible contribution of the work to the overall understanding of the market, actions 
that are taken during the course of the research discussed and presented herein.
When examining the motivations and subtleties associated with the launch industiy, 
this research calls primarily on historical works like those of Gabier (1991), Decker
(2004), Smith (2005a), Smith (2005b), and Holtz-Eakin (2003), and Krige (1999), 
with anecdotal insight from news sources at the time like Tully (1985), when 
examining the dawning of US regulatory policy towards commercial space launch 
activities; Wilhelm (2000), when examining the emergence of vehicles like the Delta 
III that were constructed in response to the anticipated needs of the commercial 
market; and Figier (2001) or Young (2001), when exploring the kinds of arguments 
that grab public attention, as did the inquiry by the city of Los Angeles as to whether 
satellites could be considered taxable under the mles governing terrestrial assets.
As discussed later, international activities have had a significant influence on the 
emergence and development of the commercial launch industry. The driving force 
provided by Arianespace in forcing the development of a transparent commercial 
market within the US is evident in documents such as Gabier (1991), Hennida (1997), 
Krige (1999), and Smith (2005a). Without the European influences discussed in these 
documents, it is clear that the international launch market would not be sufficiently 
developed for creating the currently emerging opportunities in space.
Because market forces acting on the commereial space transportation industry result 
in a competitive need for financial obscurity, proving how the industry really works
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with only publicly available infonuation is difficult. The research presented herein 
draws from a wide range of publicly available sources in an attempt to develop 
support for general trends on how the market would react to an unconventional 
system. Given the case-by-case nature dictating all financial decisions within an 
inherently risky industry, the predictions presented by this research must be viewed in 
the context of the uncertainty inherent in the available and employed data.
1.2.2 Risk-based decisions in the commercial market
As discussed later, this work makes the assumption that the commercial launch 
industry is risk averse. This assumption is made in the context of standard economic 
and financial assumptions highlighted in texts such as Stockman (1999), which offers 
a microeconomic perspective on the subject; Brealey and Myers (2003), which 
indicates that the concept is also accepted in finance texts; and Kotz and Johnson 
(1986), which address the concept as it applies generally within the study of 
economics. Nowhere in the literature, even though the industiy is founded on 
inherently ultra-hazardous teclinologies as identified by DOT (2002), are the business 
practices of the commercial launch industry reported to be more accepting of greater 
coiporate risk than organizations in other industries.
With such an assumption, this work then calls on the works of Guikema and Pate- 
Cornell (2002), Parkinson (1999), Smith et al. (1997), Weigel and Hastings (2004), 
and Livesey (1987), which identify methods that account for the measure and 
selection of systems based on the criteria of risk-minimization. As this concept of 
risk mitigation is supported within the literature, this work adopts a selection method 
consistent with the literature.
1.2.3 Launch vehicle costs
As discussed with regards to the commercial market, identifying the true cost of a 
commercial launch is difficult, given competitiveness within the commercial launch 
industry. While the aforementioned discussion of the commercial market to be 
presented in Chapter 2 of this work discusses the general trends and movements 
within the commercial launch industry, and how such movements are supported by 
the financial data available within the public domain. Chapter 3 compares actual costs
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as stated in DOT (1997-2004) with those presented in Wade (2004) to gain an 
understanding of the general cost associated with various vehicles of differing 
capability. The validity of each of these sources is assessed and suitably verified 
through a comparative examination of Gabier (1991), Decker (2004), Smith (2005a), 
Smith (2005b), Isakowitz et al (1999), and Holtz-Eakin (2003). The examination 
presented in Chapter 3 presents cost approximations under the assumption that the 
estimates presented in the literature are suitably valid.
1.2.4 Conventional launch vehicle failure rates
As financial risk is identified in the literature and discussed in Section 1.2.2 to include 
both cost and probability of failure, the probability of failure associated with 
conventional launch vehicles must be assessed. Assessing the probability of failure, 
however, is more complex than dividing the number of success a vehicle completes 
by the number of attempts it makes, as is done in Isakowitz et al (1999), Chang
(1996), Chang (2000), and other less sophisticated techniques discussed in DOT 
(2002b). Understanding how to appropriately calculate the probability of occurrence 
for an event with a small number of attempts is highly debatable, with significant 
financial implications discussed by Air Force Space Command (2004) and DOT 
(2002a) regarding launch approval.
■s;I
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There are a wide range of techniques that are commonly accepted to calculate the true 
probability that a launch vehicle will fail, the main techniques presented and 
discussed in Guikema and Pate-Comell (2004), Guikema and Pate-Cornell (2005), 
and DOT (2002b). While it is obvious that these calculations are in conflict with both 
the reliability engineering analyses and risk assessments conducted with conventional 
techniques like those presented in Lewis (1996) and Stamatelatos (2002), as identified 
by Fragola and Collins (2004), these top-down analyses based on observed flight data 
offer greater assurance that the public is protected to an appropriate level.
The problem with the analyses presented by Guikema and Pate-Comell is that they 
are both invalid, and proved to be invalid by their own conclusions. In these works, 
analysts employ an assumption that similar launch vehicles can be modelled as 
Bernoulli trials of a random event. McCartney et al. (1993), in conjunction with the
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will change throughout time, an approximation of the likely vehicle reliability for a 
conventional vehicle can be assessed as a function of time.
1.2.5 Tether rendezvous and handover
Assuming a successful launch, an unconventional launch system that incorporates an 
MMET must perform, at least, one successful orbital rendezvous. This could occur 
either when the MMET is fully extended, which is the basis for previous work by 
Cartmell and Ziegler; or when the system is fully retracted, which is the basis of 
Draper et a l (2004) and this research. However, rendezvous is not assured, as evident 
in the report of Berger (2005) on the 15 April 2005 failure of the Demonstration of 
Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) mission.
The orbital dynamics of a rendezvous are clearly defined for systems that can be 
suitably modelled as a point mass, an understanding of such calculations achievable 
through examination of texts such as Thomson (1986). For missions like the one 
proposed in Cartmell et a i (2004), the payload must not only rendezvous with the 
initial MMET system, but must then be released and rendezvous with a second 
MMET. With an examination of the system orbital dynamics of both MMET 
systems, initial conditions can be determined that would produce a perfect handover, 
without outside interference.
conclusions of Chang, clearly identify that this assumption is invalid, as do the 
conclusions presented in Guikema and Pate-Cornell (2005) that indicate that the 
probability of success associated with each launch increases with time and experience.
This research presents the first statistically valid method that accounts for this 
increase in vehicle reliability, while also drawing a connection between the 
probability that the vehicle will launch successfully (i.e., the observed success rate) 
and the reliability calculation for the vehicle (i.e., the designed success rate). This 
methodology is developed based on the assertions of Neyman, presented in Collani 
and Draeger (1999).
From this understanding of the current vehicle reliability levels, and how these levels i
'7
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Within the literature, Williams et al (2005) presents a discussion of how to improve 
the probability of a successful handover by shifting the mass within the tether system
■so as to modify the system rotation. Similar to Cartmell et al (2004), where optimum ■
handovers are discussed alongside possible corrective actions that may be necessary 
in the presence of mission error, this work does not examine the probability of 
occurrence associated with likely errors, nor discuss the likelihood that the system 
will be able to correct such errors. Unlike investigations like Cartmell et a l (2004) 
and Williams et al (2005) that focus on correcting errors in the tether-based systems, 
this research focuses on the equations needed to correct an improperly released 
payload, and offers a methodology from which the probability of failure for a known 
systemic error can be calculated. This methodology has not been previously 
presented for the MMET or other tether-based systems.
1.2.6 Orbital debris environment
While operational risks are inherent in any multi-component system, the orbital 
environment offers failure sources that may not be intuitively obvious. While first- 
order system concept investigations consider altitudes of greater than 100km to be 
part of a frictionless environment, Justus (1995) is just one of many sources that prove 
this characterisation is not sufficient for mission design and risk assessment.
There are currently tonnes of orbital debris fragments and disused rocket stages 
orbiting the earth. This man-made debris, combined with naturally occurring 
micrometeorites, present a dangerous environment where the significant relative 
velocities between orbiting objects result in frequent hypervelocity impacts. 
Understanding where these pieces of debris are most dense and most lethal to 
spacecraft as a result of hypervelocity impact has been a task originating in the 1960s 
with works like Cour-Palais (1969) and culminating in the recent publication of 
computer-based finite element models like ORDEM2000 and MASTER99, described 
in Liou et a l (2000) and Bendisch et al (2000), respectively. For the puiposes of this 
research, these models are considered the most sophisticated and accurate currently 
available to the public, with components built on the earlier modelling work such as 
that of Kessler et al (1988) and Kessler et a l (1991).
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IThe creation and validation of these models has been an extensive activity that is not 
addressed in this work. The research presented here assumes the models employed by 
the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European 
Space Agency (ESA) are sufficiently vetted and in agreement with published data. Of 
the multitude of work called on by these models is that presented in documents such 
as Goldstein (1998), Horz et al. (1999), Kessler et al. (1970), Kessler et al. (1988), 
Krisko et al. (2000), Levine (1991), Levine (1992), Levine (1993), Sdunnus et al.
(2000), Settecerri and Stansbery (1997), Settecerri et al. (1997), Settecerri et a l
(1999), Stansbery et al (1996), Stansbery et a l (1995), Stansbery et al (1994), and 
Zhang and Kessler (1993). These documents discuss a range of data collection and 
processing topics ranging from initial collection techniques to the Long Duration 
Exposure Facility (LDEF) analysis and results, and the Haystack observations to the 
debris growth models for predicting how the environment changes over time.
When comparing the output of ORDEM96 and ORDEM2000, Liou et al (2000) do 
not identify any significant differences in the calculated debris densities produced by 
both models over various inclinations and orbits. Although there will be a loss in 
fidelity as a result of the decreasing model complexity, the acceptability of the models 
presented in Tribble (2003) is assumed sufficient as there were no significant 
alterations made since the models presented in Tribble (1995), even with the 
introduction of new information, and the use of references by Tribble (1995) that were 
also employed during the creation of the methodology associated with ORDEM96. It 
is assumed within this research that comparisons between the output produced by the 
models presented in Tribble (2003) and the ORDEM2000 model outputs were 
conducted, and the differences were negligible within the context of the fidelity 
achievable via Tribble (2003). Considering the level of fidelity employed within 
Tribble (2003), it is assumed in this research that any model employing the equations 
presented in Tribble (2003) will produce a suitable engineering estimate of the orbital 
environment.
16
4
. . .
1.2.7 Spacecraft risk
The orbital environment poses significant risks to spacecraft, which have led to
various examinations of operational systems, research into proposed systems, and fE
design guidelines for mission planners. While the design guidelines may not be able 
to precisely model the effects identified in the historical studies, they are suitable 
engineering estimates that are accepted as sufficient analyses by practitioners.
Regarding historical studies, the Shuttle, the LDEF, MIR, and the Hubble space 
telescope have all made significant contributions to the collection and cataloguing of 
orbital environmental effects on spacecraft. Historical studies examining the 
observable effect of the orbital environment on an range of systems and missions are 
presented in the works of Christiansen et al (1997), Bedingfield et al. (1996), Burt 
and Christiansen (2001), Christiansen (1998), Cour-Palais (1985), Graham et a l
(2000), Hyde et al. (2000a), Hyde et al (2000b), Kessler (1993), Kuriki et al (1997), 
Levine (1991), Levine (1992), Levine (1993), Paul et al (1997), and See et a l (1990).
With the benefit of a significant historical background, sophisticated research 
analyses have been performed on theoretical systems in an attempt to gain a high 
fidelity understanding of how certain systems react to specific environmental 
elements. Such research studies add to the understanding of the environmental effects 
on spacecraft in their ability to improve the understanding of acceptable analysis 
techniques. Examples of these research studies can be found in works such as 
Christiansen et al (1992), Drolshagen (2002), Hyde et al (2001), James et a l (1994), 
Tribble (1995), Tribble (2003), Kessler (1981), Kessler et a l (1996) McBride and 
McDonnell (1999), Schonberg and Yang (1993), Rex (1997), and Robinson (1999).
By examining the level of fidelity attainable in the context of the analytical cost 
required, an understanding of what is a reasonable level of analytical complexity can 
be determined. As has been proven by various analytical applications, the appropriate 
level of fidelity is often present in a range of design guides published by NASA. 
These guides include Cour-Palais (1969), Frost (1970), Kessler et al (1972), 
Silverman (1995a), Silverman (1995b), NASA (1995), and Dooling and Finckenor 
(1999). As they have already been widely accepted and are cuirently promoted in
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NASA guidance, this analysis of the MMET will assume the fidelity associated with 
NASA proposed design guidelines are sufficient for the analyses performed within 
this research.
As a result of the currently available design guidance, this work focuses on failures 
resulting from orbital debris and micrometeorite impacts onto tethers. The cross 
sectional area of the tether is modelled to decrease as a function of time based on 
atomic oxygen (AO) degradation, calling on the equations presented in Tribble (2003) 
to produce the analytical results of this orbital effect, equations that are consistent in 
scope and fidelity to those recommended by NASA. By maintaining this focus, the 
core issue under investigation is how a tether system will react to a hypervelocity 
impact, and how often such impacts are expected to occur.
%
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1.2.8 Hypervelocity impact modelling
Hypervelocity impacts are typically considered those in which the speed of impact is 
greater than the speed of sound in both the target and impactor materials. Even 
thought the speed of sound in Aluminium is roughly 5.1 km/sec, Tribble (2003) 
identifies a hypervelocity impact to be one where the impact speed is greater than 
Ikm/sec, with impactor fracture and phase change occurring at impact velocities in 
excess of 2km/sec. As discussed in Davison et al (1996), the highly localized 
damage around a hypervelocity impact location is caused by the greater rate of energy 
delivery relative to the rate at which each material is able to dissipate energy. This 
imbalance renders the material strength insignificant at the time of impact and causes 
an initial hydrodynamic flow of material near the impact location. This 
hydrodynamic phase causes hypervelocity impact craters to generally resemble a 
water splash in thick, ductile materials.
There are two main approaches to modelling hypervelocity impacts, one employing 
hydrocode techniques, and the other empirical in nature. Hydrocode modelling is a 
finite element approach that applies fluid dynamic concepts to solids. Because the 
energy imbalance resulting from a hypervelocity impact causes a hydrodynamic phase 
near the impact, hydrocode techniques must account for energy and momentum 
transfers and balancing within the impactor and target when both are transitioning
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between solid and liquid states. An understanding of hydrocode modelling and other I’'E
finite element techniques as they pertain to hypervelocity impacts can be gained $
through examination of documents such as Anderson (1987), Campbell and Vignjevic y
(1997), Collins (2002), Eftis et al. (2001), Fahrenthold and Horban (1999),
Fahrenthold and Florban (2001), Fahrenthold and Koo (1997), Gerassimenko (2001), '
Hayhurst et al. (1995), Hiermaier et al. (1997), Pierazzo and Collins (2003).
:Empirical modelling of hypervelocity impact effects is widely used by spacecraft 
mission analysts for assessing the probability of failure associated with a spacecraft.
To construct empirical models, researchers rely on hypervelocity impact tests and 
examinations like those presented in Bernhard et al. (1995), Burchell and Grey
(2001), Burchell and Whitehorn (2003), Burchell et al. (1999), Burt and Christiansen
(2001), Christiansen et al. (1993), Cour-Palais (2001), Cour-Palais (1985), Dahl and 
Schultz (2001), Grey and Burchell (2004), Lamontage et al. (1999), Neish and Kibe
(1997), Orphal (1999), Orphal and Anderson (1999), Orphal and Anderson (2001),
Paul et al. (1997), Schonberg (1989), and Zukas and Gaskill (1996) to develop 
relationship concepts that can be reduced down to the kind of proposals presented in 
Baker (1995), Walker (2001), or Schonberg and Ebrahim (1999). Many of the ^
relationships, such as penetration depth in a semi-infinite target being directly related 
to the impact velocity to the 2/3-power, are incorporated in the equations most widely 
employed by spacecraft analysts and presented in Cour-Palais (1969), Frost (1970), 
and Elfer (1996) and investigated by Hayashida and Robinson (1991).
Both modelling approaches rely on test data for calibration, so neither can be 
considered fundamentally more accurate, even though hydrocode modelling is 
significantly more complex and computationally costly.
1.2.9 Tensile strength of aramid fibres
The strength of aramid fibres, called by their trade names of Kevlar and Twaron, is 
dependent on strain rate. This dependence is identified in Teijin (2005a) for strain 
rates associated with Twaron rope applications. However, considerably more interest 
has been in testing aramid fibres for use in ballistic shields. As a result, the bulk of 
literature on aramid tensile testing, such as that conducted by Allen et al. (1992),
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«Benhoulo et al (1997), and Wang and Xia (1999) focuses on significantly higher 
strain rates than those examined here.
While material strength is identified as a significant contributor to the empirical 
equations like the Rockwell equation presented in Hayashida and Robinson (1991) or 
the 1992C equation presented in Penson (2003), it is not clear that the tensile strength 
of a tether has a significant effect on the outcome of a hypervelocity impact, nor is 
such an idea supported by the discrepancy in results identified in this work and those 
of McBride and Taylor (1997).
1.2.10 Hypervelocity impact testing on tether fibres and ropes
The amount of hypervelocity impact test data for tether targets is quite small. Prior to 
this research, the literature contains tests as identified in Hayashida and Robinson 
(1993), Penson and Burchell (2003), Sabath and Paul (1997), McBride and Taylor 
(1997), and Van Noord and Robinson (2002). While all offer discussions of the tests 
performed and the damage observed, the works offer few conclusive results. Further, 
concepts or theories that may emerge from the literature cannot be proven without a 
more significant impact-testing regime than is conducted either in support of the cited 
literature or in support of this research.
When examining the results presented in Sabath and Paul (1997), it is identified that 
the lethal impactor diameter for a Kevlar target is greater than that of Spectra. When 
examining the results presented herein for Twaron against the results of McBride and 
Taylor (1997) for Spectra targets, this relationship that Kevlar is able to sustain 
damage from larger impacts is again supported. Wlien examining the impact site 
presented in both McBride and Taylor (1997) and presented herein, there are 
indications that the molten stage evident in metallic impacts and identified herein is 
also present in tether impacts. This difference in susceptibility could be the product 
of the lower melting temperature associated with Spectra. Such a conclusion is 
intuitively reasonable and in agreement with commonly accepted concepts of 
hypeiwelocity impact failure mechanisms. However, there does not exist enough data 
within the literature, nor was enough data produced during the course of this research, 
to fully investigate such a theory.
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1.2.11 Post-hypervelocity impact dispersion of impactors and ejecta
The secondary efïects of a hypervelocity impact, whether it is the dispersion of lethal
impactors borne of the shattered initial impactor or spallation from the backside of a I
semi-infinite plate, are well studies for perpendicular impacts down to highly oblique
impacts. Such investigations are the basis for bumper plate design, as the concept of
secondary lethality following impact with a flat plate is far from controversial.
Within the literature, a significant discussion of this issue can be understood through 
examination of texts such as Stilp (1997), Gardner and Burchell (1997), Christiansen Iet al. (1992), Christiansen et al. (1993), Cour-Palais (1985), Frost (1970), Orphal |
(1999), Orphal and Anderson (2001), Schonberg (1989), and Schonberg and Ebrahim
(1999).
.Ï
Prior to this research, no work has been publicly released that characterises the
secondary effects of a debris impact with a tether target. Conventional risk
assessment approaches like Hoyt and Forward (1998) do not consider secondaiy
effects, resulting in a one-impact-one-failure assumption that may be inappropriate if
significant debris dispersion is likely. Within the literature cited above regarding
secondary impactor dispersion, the angle of dispersion is stated to vary depending on 
.the materials and conditions present at impact. While this dispersion angle is 
characterised by Gardner and Burchell (1997) to be around 10-degrees for oblique 
impacts between 50-degrees and 75-degrees, an investigation of Stilp (1997) clearly 
identifies that these angles are not always so restricted.
1.2.12 Tether impact risk
The current literature on tether failure does not maintain a careflil distinction between 
the probability of impacting a tether, and the probability of failure. This is because 
most failure assessments are focused on hanging tethers, which remain oriented along 
the gravity gradient for the duration of their mission. This historical tendency to 
produce analytical solutions focussed on hanging tether systems is evident in NASA 
( 1995), which purports to offer a suitable solution for assessing the probability that a 
space tether will fail during a mission.
As a side note, while it reports to be relevant to the discussion of tether failure 
analyses, the corporate restrictions that have obviously limited the kind of data that 
can be presented in Strumfels (2001) render the work of little benefit. Possibly 
interesting from the perspective of an independent data point, so little is revealed 
about the underlying methodology that the work does not offer any indication of how 
to repeat the results presented within.
This research independently investigates both the probability that the system will be 
impacted, followed by the probability that the impact would result in a failure. Once
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Most tether analyses identify a threshold debris size, which is then considered the |
lethal impactor. After identifying what is a lethal impactor, the analysis seeks to 
characterize the debris flux associated with that debris size, and calculate the 
probability of failure from that, generally employing some form of the Poisson 
distribution. This is the fundamental theory employed in Gettins et al. (2004),
Anselmo and Pardini (1999), and McBride and Taylor (1997). This approach is not 
suitable for the MMET because the system is not stationary relative to the gravity 
gradient. Because it is not stationary relative to the gravity gradient, the impact 
velocity relative to the local impact plane is not uniform. If the velocity is not 
uniform, then the system is not equally susceptible at all instants, thereby invalidating 
the assumption that a single debris size can be considered lethal at all times.
Patera (2002) offers an analytical approach for calculating the probability that a tether 
will collide with another satellite. While this analysis is consistence with Collision on 
Launch Analysis (COLA) approaches described in DOT (2002a-2002b) and the 
literature it references, such a technique is only of value when the trajectory of both 
objects is known. For this research, it is assumed that a suitable COLA has been 
completed throughout the expected lifetime associated with the tether.’ Consequently, 
the significant contribution Patera (2002) makes to this analysis is the realization that 
the casualty area of the tether, which has a direct relationship with the probability of 
impact, includes the width of the impactor. While important, this is not unique to 
Patera (2002), as an equivalent assertion is also implied in the computational results 
presented in texts such as McBride and Taylor (1997).
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the average rate of lethal impact is known for a particular mission, the level of 
redundancy built into the tether system will dictate the system lifetime. |
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1.2.13 Tether mission failure analyses IThere have been numerous works published on the topic of tether system failure, but ÿ
.none have addressed the specific issues relevant to a MMET system, the fact that one 
impact may result in more than one failure, and the presentation of analysis 
techniques that can be repeatedly applied, within an analytical environment that 
employs commonly accepted orbital debris models. For example, even though 
Anselmo and Pardini (2005) employ accepted debris models and a redundancy 
approach that is mathematically logical, the use of non-dimensional constants that 
“cannot be easily estimated” and a reliance on general approximations for 
determining acceptable failure conditions would make the results difficult to replicate 
from their fundamental origin.
Similar arguments regarding repeatability can be supported after examination of work 
like that of Forward and Hoyt (1995) and Hoyt and Forward (1998). In Hoyt and 
Forward (1998), the analysis uses metrics that do not directly relate to conventional 
metrics, even though the system could be described in such terms, as it is in this 
research. In addition to these unique metrics, the issue of multiple failures per impact "’iis ignored, as with Anselmo and Pardini (2005). As demonstrated later, this condition 
of multiple failures per impact could have a significant effect on the failure 
calculations presented in Hoyt and Forward (1998) and Foiward and Hoyt (2005).
Disregarding issues of analytical repeatability, both the aforementioned analyses and 
those of Van Der Heide and Kruijff (2001) and Van Noord and Stuimfels (2001) all 
rely on the assumption that a tether system can be assessed by assuming a specific |
debris impactor is lethal at all times, and that each impact will only result in one 
failure. So long as these assumptions are present, the resulting analyses will not be 
applicable to all MMET systems or missions.
A final failure investigation examined by this work is that of Chobotov (1999) which 
addresses the issue of tether on tether collisions. It is assumed within this research
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that mission planning will prevent such a failure mode through the mission design 
process.
1.3 Lunar Staged M MET (LSM) mission; definition and overview
The LSM mission, as it is refereed to herein, is a two-stage Earth-to-moon mission 
proposed in Cartmell et a l (2004) at the Russian Academy of Sciences 2004 Summer 
School in St. Petersburg. The LSM mission employs two MMET systems, the centre 
of one located on a low earth orbit (LEO) and the other on an elliptical earth orbit. As 
presented, the orbital, operational, and system parameters for the LEO and EEO 
systems are as follows:
Table 1 Orbital, operational, and system parameters for the LSM mission.
LEO system EEO system
Orbital parameters
Perigee Altitude {Htp) 350 km 632 km
Eccentricity (^) 0.152 0.732
%
I
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Operational parameters
Angular velocity at centre {coop) -4. 37E-3 rad/sec 1.07E-2 rad/sec
System parameters
Propulsive sub-span length (L) 200 km 75 km
For the LEO system, the negative angular velocity at the central facility indicates that 
it is rotating in a retrograde manner. This retrograde rotation is required so that the 
linear velocity vector of the LEO system tip, relative to the Earth, is identical to that 
of the receiving EEO system tip. As presented in Cartmell et a l (2004), the LEO 
system is not changing the payload altitude by imparting a significant in crease in 
tangential velocity; it is, effectively, lifting the system from a lower orbit and handing 
it to the EEO system. After the payload is received by the EEO system, the system 
rotation imparts a significant tangential velocity to the payload at release that places
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the payload onto an appropriate trajectory for rendezvous with the moon. The stages 
associated with the LSM mission are graphically presented in Fig 1,
Stage 1 to 2 
Handover
Operation
Stage 2to 3 
Handover
PaylpodDepto^ent
Stage 2 
Operation
stages
Operation
Figure 1 Operational overview of the LSM mission.
This work examines the LSM mission only from the perspective of primary failures." 
A failed handover is discussed in Cartmell et al (2004) with a discussion as to how 
the payload would be recovered.’" The research presented in this thesis assumes that, 
if the LEO and EEO systems are out of synchronisation such that a handover failure is 
possible, retrieval as discussed is not sufficiently feasible.
The principles and techniques presented in this work will be illustrated using the LSM 
mission. This work will finish by determining if it is feasible for the LSM mission to 
be completed using a two-stage tether-based on-orbit launch system, or whether 
employing a single conventional launch system is more appropriate.
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Chapter 2
Selection Criteria
When presented with a wide range of launch system options for use in the commercial 
market, mission planners must employ a consistent, economically sound selection 
criterion. This Chapter discusses the factors and events that led to the growth of the 
commercial space launch industry, the economic theories this work assumes are valid 
when modelling the commercial market, and a selection criterion that is valid within 
such economic models.
2.0 The commercial space transportation market
The commercialisation of space activities in the United States began in 1962 with f
passage of the Communications Satellite Act, codified as Public Law (P.L.) 87-624.
Passage of this law enabled private sector organizations to engage in the commercial 
communications satellite business. Since passage, according to Smith (2005b),
“commercial communications satellites have been chiefly a private sector activity.”
While the business of satellite communications was becoming commercial, US 
companies could only secure launch services from the US government.
The recent emergence of a commercial launch market began around the time that the 
European Space Agency-developed (ESA) Ariane vehicle made its first flight in 1979, 
and began operational launches in 1982 according Smith (2005a). While its first eight 
launches delivered government payloads, the 1980s saw the emergence of an 
international commercial launch market. With regards to the US, deregulation of the 
commercial space launch industry began on 16 May 1983 with the issuance of the 
National Security Decision Directive No. 94. To further promote commercialisation 
of the space launch industry, the Reagan administration placed authority for the 
regulation of commercial space activities with the US Department of Transportation 
(DOT) on 24 February 1984 with Executive Order 12465 (49 FR 7211); provided the 
space sector with various tax incentives and benefits on 20 July 1984 through the 
National Policy on the Commercial Use of Space (White House 1984); and simplified 
launch licensing procedures with the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-
575, 49 u s e  2601-2603). Amid this fluny of activity, new companies began to enter 
the US commercial space transportation industry, as did Arianespace.
According to a number of sources, including Krige (1999), Hermida (1997), Gabier 
(1992), Smith (2005a), and Smith (2005b), while the Reagan administration was 
promoting commercialisation of the expendable launch vehicle (ELV) market during 
the early 1980s, it was also supporting a protectionist policy with regards to the 
Shuttle by pricing its commercial launch services at levels well below their 
commercial value. To grow its market share around the world and the US, Krige 
(1999) and Tully (1985) report that Arianespace began to systematically price its 
launch services below those of the Shuttle. While the pricing of the Shuttle for 
commercial payloads was preventing US commercial space launch suppliers from 
entering the market, Arianespace launched its first commercial satellite for a US 
customer on 23 May 1984. Two days later, Transpace Carriers Inc (TCI) of 
Greenbelt, Maryland, USA, filed a petition of unfair practices against Arianespace 
and its consortium of 11 backing governments with the Office of the US Trade 
Representative. According to Smith (2005a) and Krige (1999), it was claimed that the 
European governments were unfairly subsidising Arianespace.
After an investigation of the complaint by TCI, Smith (2005a) noted that all 
governmental parties agreed the financial assistance provided to Arianespace by ESA 
and its member countries was not any greater than that provided to the Shuttle. At the 
same time the Office of the US Trade Representative was engaged in an investigation 
launched by the TCI petition highlighting the impact of government subsidies on free 
trade in the commercial space transportation industry, Krige (1999) notes that the 
Reagan administration was in the process of approving the Phase III pricing policies 
that would set the fiscal year 1988-1991 prices for commercial launches on the 
Shuttle. After receiving urging from NASA Administrator James Beggs, claiming 
that the Shuttle was a “national asset” that would “not be able to compete effectively 
with the European Ariane launch vehicle,” Krige (1999) reports that Reagan approved 
a pricing of the Shuttle that would continue to undercut US ELV suppliers. With the 
US and the involved European governments agreeing to future discussions on 
commercial launch vehicle pricing practices, the TCI action produced neither an
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industry were agreed to in 1990, but only a single talk on the subject was held in 
1991.
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immediate nor a long-term resolution. As reported by Smith (2005a) and Krige 
(1999), talks on the entry of non-market economies into the commercial space
For TCI, which held the right to purchase Delta II vehicles for commercial 
applications, its petition does not appear to have produced the intended outcome. 
While its petition did cause both the US and the involved European states to admit 
that both offered financial assistance for the Shuttle and Ariane vehicles, respectively, 
the talks did not end these subsidies. Consequently, the competitive disadvantage 
impeding commercial suppliers like TCI from entering the launch services industry 
had not diminished. However, the failure of Challenger on 28 January 1986 shifted 
policy in favour of a more competitive commercial launch market.
In its infancy, Hermida (1997) identifies the full allocation of risk to the commercial 
launch service suppliers, combined with early Ariane and Shuttle-launched kick- 
motor failures reported by Tully (1985), as a driving factor for producing insurance 
costs that made ELV suppliers uncompetitive when compared to the Shuttle. While 
the exact cause is unknown, it is likely that both the Challenger accident and the 
AIAA lobbying effort reported in Hermida (1997) had significant roles in the policy 
and legal shifts that helped increase commercial launch activity through the 1990s.
In the wake of the Challenger failure, Hermida (1997) highlights that the Reagan 
administration “prescribed that the Space Shuttle would only be used for those 
payloads which require the unique characteristics of the NASA Space Transportation 
System.” In effect, this removed the Shuttle from the commercial market. In so 
doing, a significant entry barrier was removed for commercial launch service 
suppliers.
While the exit of the Shuttle from the commercial market removed subsidised 
competition from the US government, commercial launch service providers remained 
fully liable for the risk associated with their operations until 1988. In 1988, by 
amending the Commercial Space Launch Act, the DOT was authorized to administer
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a risk allocation scheme similar both to that proposed by the AIAA proposal cited in 
Hermida (1997) and to the system employed by NASA for its Shuttle program. As 
codified in the DOT regulations contained in Part 14 of the US Code of Federal 
Regulations, Chapter III, so long as the licensed commercial launch operator is in 
possession of a reasonably priced level of insurance greater than or equal to that 
required by the DOT for a specific launch, the US government will indemnify up to 
$1.5 billion worth of third-party damage in excess of that covered by the required 
insurance. The US Congress extended this indemnification in 2004 for a further 5 
years by passing P.L. 108-428. By extending this indemnification mechanism, as 
argued in DOT (2002e), the DOT believes such measures ensure US commercial 
launch sei*vice suppliers remain capable of competing in the world market.
I
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The changes implemented through the 1980s have produced an environment where 
non-government launch service providers are sourcing vehicles designed for the 
commercial market. This increase and change in the types of customers purchasing 
hardware and services from launch vehicle manufacturers has produced modified 
variants designed for the commercial market such as the Titan II; vehicles that are 
made of surplus government components such as the Taurus; and new variants and 
families specifically designed for the commercial market such as Pegasus, Delta 3, 
and Falcon. In this politically described “free market” environment of decreasing 
regulation, manufacturers are competing to design better, lower cost vehicles in an 
attempt to cater to commercial customers.
In the midst of the current and projected success in the late 1990s, the US Air Force 
attempted to make its EELV program a flagships for the possibilities of the 
commercial space launch market. Smith (2005a) identifies the beginning of the 
EELV program as a $30 million appropriation in 1995, with a goal to reduce launch 
costs by 25%. Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas were awarded development 
contracts worth $60 million each in 1996. As a side note, McDonnell Douglas 
merged with Boeing in 1997, with Boeing now listed as the operator for the Delta IV 
EELV program, while current Delta II launch licenses with the FAA are still held by 
McDonnell Douglas. In an attempt to take advantage of the cost saving projected via 
the commercial market, the US Air Force stated its intentions to interact with the
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EELV program as a commercial customer. To this end, instead of having the two 
EELV projects compete with the loser being down-selected, the US Air Force would 
offer minimal research and development funding to each, with all further development 
costs being recouped via future commercial sales. In 1998, both Boeing and 
Lockheed were each issued $500 million in research and development funding and 
received US Air Force orders of 19 launches for $1.38 billion and nine launches for 
$650 million, respectively, according to Smith (2005a). It is further reported in Smith 
(2005a) that this research accounted for approximately 20% of the Delta IV 
development costs.
With the collapse of the commercial launch market around the turn of the century, the 
original, commercial sales-based agreements reached between the US Air Force and 
the manufacturers became untenable. To this end, Wade (2006) reports that the 
launch price for each EELV vehicle was raised to $138 million in November 2004, 
Lockheed was allowed out of its contract agreements at Vandenberg, and the program 
violation of “Nunn-McCurdy” spending restrictions saw the US Air Force certify that 
further funding of the EELV program is essential for US national security. Smith 
(2005a) notes that this certification was given in agreement with the DOD “assured 
access” to space policy, a policy codified in P.L. 108-136. Even with the anti-trust 
issues concerning Boeing that publicly emerged in 2003, and House Report (H.Rept.) 
108-553 that questioned the need for two EELV programs, the Bush administration 
space transportation policy issued in December 2004 is reported by Smith (2005a) to 
support both programs. In support of the assured access policy, the 24 satellite 
launches that were to be competed for between Boeing and Lockheed were awarded 
evenly to the two companies.
-I
It is curt'ently unclear how the EELV program will be considered in terms of the 
commercial space industry. Currently, the outcome of a Space Exploration 
Technologies Corporation protest filed on 15 August 2005 and reported in BNA 
(2005b) regarding this non-competed award is unknown. Additionally, Lockheed and 
Boeing are currently planning to merge their respective EELV operations into a joint 
venture called United Launch Alliance (ULA), reported in sources such as Smith 
(2005a) and BNA (2005a), to save the programs considerable costs. Wliile it is clear
30
that the US Air Force, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin are not acting in an 
economically independent manner with regards to the EELV program, such an 
example does not discount the choice mechanisms governing private sector launch 
seiwice suppliers and customers. With Boeing publicly retreating from the 
commercial sector, even though Smith (2005a) further states that it may reconsider 
this decision, it is clear that the commercial launch market is capable of forcing out 
historically dominant organizations if they are not commercially viable, offering 
support for the theory that commercial operations are economically independent.
For the purposes of this work, the commercial space launch market includes all 
activities carried out under a license issued by the US Department of Transportation. 
Within this market, it is assumed that all launch vehicle suppliers and customers are 
acting in accordance with traditional Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Markets as 
discussed in Pass and Lowes (1992).
2.1 Modelling the commercial launch market
Within the Theory of Markets, it is important to understand which constmct best 
models an examined industry so as to better understand how decisions taken by one 
participant are likely to affect the market. Wliile the traditional Theory of the Firm 
states that all participants seek profit maximisation and price is adjusted to find 
equilibrium between supply and demand, knowing which model is appropriate for a 
certain market will allow analysts to predict how the market share of each participant 
will change as price changes, based on the supply and demand characteristics within 
the market.
' I
2.1.1 Previous work
After examining the commercial space transportation industry during its emergence. 
Gabier (1992) assumes that the market could be modelled as a non-collusive 
oligopoly. This conclusion is reached by examining the number of participants in the 
market, product variability, cost of entry for new participants, stability of publicly 
available prices, and the prevalence of price wars.
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With regards to the number of participants. Gabier (1992) mentions three launch 
service suppliers within the US, with four further organizations attributed to Europe, 
China, the former Soviet Union, and Japan, which are not examined here because of 
concern for data accuracy and the interpretation of a commercial launch within these 
countries. Within the US, the three launch service suppliers mentioned are General 
Dynamics Commercial Launch Services, McDonnell Douglas Commercial Delta, and 
Martin Marietta Commercial Titan. Orbital Sciences is briefly mentioned with 
regards to its first Pegasus launch, but is not considered a launch service supplier for 
the purposes of Gabier (1992). With regards to commercial customers for medium to 
large launch services, Gabier (1992) states that there were no more than 50 in 
existence at that time.
While Gabier (1992) discusses commercial suppliers and commercial customers, 
national governments are also discussed as participants in the commercial launch 
market. Wliile national governments may have been the most significant customer for 
most suppliers at the time of Gabier (1992), it is questionable whether including 
national governments as true commercial customers is valid. For example, the level 
of oversight provided by a government for a mission launched on a commercial 
vehicle is far more stringent than that provided by a commercial customer. As 
discussed in Krige (1999), national governments traditionally rely heavily on 
oversight to ensure mission success. In contrast, commercial customers ensure 
mission success through economic means such as those discussed in Gabier (1992), 
where the market price is discounted for a less reliable vehicle. Gabier (1992) also 
mentions that governments are often restricted from choosing international launch 
service suppliers as a result of national policies. For these reasons, it does not seem 
reasonable to consider launches conducted on behalf of national governments as 
commercial launches. However, as the amount of data analysis is minimal in Gabier 
(1992), his inclusion of national governments has no practical effect. With or without 
national governments, the number of suppliers is still quite small in terms of the 
number of customers, which is the first requirement for an oligopoly stated in Pass 
and Lowes (1993).
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The cost of entiy for new suppliers is discussed in conceptual terms within Gabier 
(1992). In 1992, all of the vehicles discussed in Gabier (1992) were derived from 
previously developed core technology. The only organization that was not relying on 
current core technology for its research and development was Orbital Sciences. 
While it is likely it was only able to secure its funding as a result of a contractual 
agreement with NASA, which appears to have culminated in a $35 million contract in
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'■'7Even with only seven suppliers worldwide, Gabier (1992) identifies 20 vehicles that
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are available through the commercial market. This high number of vehicles relative 
to the number of suppliers supports the concept of differentiated products discussed 
by Pass and Lowes (1993). In context, it must be understood that the first commercial 
launch conducted by a US supplier occurred in August of 1989. In three years, the #
commercial launch market expanded to include the 20 vehicles identified by Gabier 
(1992) with only 22 total launches occumng under DOT license by the end of 1992.
While there are significant environmental concerns that must be accounted for when 
selecting a launch vehicle, it could be argued that the commercial launch industry did 
not need so many options. If it is true that the number of different variants is higher 
than that required by the industry, the commercial space transportation industry is 
likely to share a trait of many oligopolies where product differentiation is driven by 
advertising and marketing.
I
Such a situation is highlighted by the differences between McDonnell Douglas and 
General Dynamics. By the end of 1992, McDonnell Douglas had launched 13 Delta 
II vehicles under DOT license and General Dynamics had launched six Atlas vehicles.
While the fairing size and solid rocket motor quantity and orientation vary. Delta II |
Ivariants are often considered sufficiently similar to be grouped into a single failure È
analysis as is done in Gabier (1992). While the validity of such a grouping is often 
questioned from a reliability standpoint, the fact that it is grouped together in Gabier 
(1992) offers an indication that the advertising and marketing of the Delta II vehicle 
focuses on the long-term success and flexibility of the vehicle. At the same time,
Gabier (1992) identifies four different Atlas variants available to the commercial 
market. As a counter to the likely Delta II marketing approach, the number of 
variants indicates the ‘imaginary’ differences discussed in Pass and Lowes (1993).
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1986 for the transfer orbit stage (TOS) vehicle, $50 million in research and 
development funding for the project was secured from private investors between 1984
■•7and 1985, according to Orbital (2005). In 2005, this amount would be equivalent to 
$84 million using the Price Producer Index for aerospace products and parts 
manufacturing. In addition to organizational start-up costs, such a financial burden 
could be considered a significant barrier to entry. However, what is not mentioned in 
Gabier (1992) is the lower cost of entry approach taken by Transpace Carriers, Inc.,
(TCI) in 1984. By being a distributor of launch services through its agreement with 
McDonnell Douglas, TCI entered the commercial launch market without the 
significant research and development costs experienced by Orbital Sciences.
However, as evident by the current existence of Orbital Sciences, it is debatable as to 
whether the method in which TCI entered the market could be considered equivalent %
to the methods used by the other organizations listed as suppliers in Gabier (1992).
With regards to price stability, or price stickiness, Gabier (1992) makes reference to 
the fact that the publicly stated prices are stable, yet does not offer a significant 
history to prove their stability over time. As previously stated, this is likely to be due I
to the fact that the commercial market was still in its infancy in 1992. However,
Gabier (1992) does offer reference as to the origin of the commonly accepted prices.
Gabier (1992) identifies that the price per launch for the Atlas and Delta families of 
vehicles in 1992 is very similar to the price per launch estimated for government 
flights of the same vehicle. This similarity offers an indication that the prices charged 
for government launches may be a likely source for the publicly stated prices 
presented to commercial customers.
While Pass and Lowes (1993) identify that participants are likely to avoid price wars 
because of the market share relationships explained using the kinked-demand curve,
Geroski et al. (1985), Porter (1985), Friedman (1983), Fellner (1949), and Eichner 
(1976), indicate that a desire to avoid price wars does not actually prevent price wars.
In the commercial market, Gabier (1992) employs the example of ArabSat 1C as a 
publicly disclosed price war occurring in the late 1980s. In this competition, a service 
that was anticipated to sell for $45 million was devalued by bids of $35 million and 
$25 mission from European and Chinese officials, respectively. The eventual contract
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was awarded to the Europeans, although the reasons for such selection are unclear, as 
is the cause of the price war. It is theorised by Gabier (1992) that the Chinese 
“cheated” the market equilibrium, as it is termed in Geroski et al. (1985) and others, 
for which the Europeans demonstrated that competing with prices below equilibrium 
would not be accepted by the industiy.
While the level of data analysis presented in Gabier (1992) offers indications that the 
non-collusive oligopoly was a suitable model for the commercial space transportation 
industry at the time of its emergence, such conclusions are not based on how the 
financial state of each company reacts to changes in the market. In an effort to 
detennine whether the financial implications expected for an organisation operating 
within an oligopoly exist in the current commercial launch market, this research 
examined the financial data presented by the Boeing Company in the context of the 
launch rate reported by the FAA within the commercial market.
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2,1.2 Examining Boeing market share
Boeing Corporation presents the most complete financial data set of all the current 
commercial launch participants. In its quarterly and annual reports, Boeing breaks its 
revenues and earnings into various segments, within which launch services are 
identified. This work compiled all reports for whieh the revenue and earnings could 
be partially attributed to a commercial launch. From an investigation of quarterly 
reports, the quarterly earnings as a percentage of revenue are presented in Fig 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 Boeing Commercial Launch Service earnings as a percentage of 
operating revenue for all quarters during which the revenue for a launch 
operation was presented.
It is useful to examine Fig 2.1 both in the context of important events at Boeing, and 
in the context of the launch market, described in terms of launches per quarter in Fig 
2.2. With regards to events at Boeing, the first Delta III failure occurred on 27 
August 1998, the second on 5 May 1999. Because the revenues associated with a 
particular launch cannot be directly related to a particular event, Fig 2.1 only indicates 
that these failures may have attributed to the drop in earnings observed in the later 
quarters of 1998. While the drop in earnings around 2000 likely results from the 
combined events of EELV development at a time of market cooling, the drop in 
earnings around 2003 is likely to have been driven by the legal action and launch 
reassignments taken by the USAF identified in sources such as Decker (2004), Smith 
(2005a), Smith (2005b), and Holtz-Eakin (2003). Such activities led to Boeing 
announcing it would pull its Delta IV out of the commercial market.
Not only are events at Boeing important to consider when examining the company 
earnings, Boeing market share must also be understood in the context of the world 
launch market. With regards to the international commercial market as a whole, there 
was a significant spike in activity between 1997 and 2000, which is mirrored in Fig 
2.1. After the second quarter of 2001, there is a large jump in the launch rate that is 
driven by non-US commercial launches. This trend of non-US commercial launches 
driving the launch rate generally continues to the present time. Following the turn of 
the century and into the present day, launch capacity has actually increased with the 
introduction of new vehicles and families. This increase in supply and identified
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decrease in number of launches indicates that the industry is again at significant levels 
of overcapacity, and indication that is supported by works such as DOT (2001a -  
2006) or Smith (2005b)
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Figure 2.2 Number of launches conducted by Boeing each quarter and the 
corresponding number of launches occurring within the entire world commercial 
launch market.
Figure 2.3 presents the market share and change in market share for vehicles 
attributed to Boeing, symmetrically smoothed over five months. While there does 
appear to be a decreasing trend over time, the average change in world market share 
between 1997 and 2004 is zero with a standard deviation of 20%. The average market 
share over this time period is 18% with a standard deviation of 13%. Further, the 
correlation between world market share and earnings is -0.05.
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Figure 2.3 Boeing world market share and change in World market share, 
symmetrically smoothed over five financial quarters.
Similar results are obtained when examining the Boeing market share relative to the 
US market. Because the US market is only 40% of the international market, on 
average over the time period, the Boeing market share relative to the US commercial 
launch industry is significantly more volatile. Even with this volatility, the average 
percentage change in US market share over the examined time period is again zero, 
but with a standard deviation of 55%. The average US market share is 48% with a 
standard deviation of 32%. The correlation between the US market share and Boeing 
earnings is -0.03.
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Figure 2.4 Boeing US market share and change in US market share, 
symmetrically smoothed over five financial quarters.
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Between 1997 and 2004, the commercial launch industry experienced a significant 
rise up until around mid-2000 before experiencing a steady decline. Because there are 
two distinct market models within the time period, the average market share relative 
to the world and the US market during this decline may be of note. Over this period, 
Boeing market share exhibited an average annual change of -2% with a standard 
deviation of 26% relative to the world market and -4% with a standard deviation of 
70% relative to the US market. The correlations between market share and earnings 
for these two reference markets are -0.15 and -0.22, respectively.
When examining these relationships it is important to note that the launches attributed 
to Boeing include both Delta vehicles and the Zenit 3SL by Sea Launch. Sea Launch 
is an international joint venture owned by Boeing and Energia, Sea Launch is 
included in the Boeing history because it is contributing to Boeing profits and it is 
assumed neither would directly compete with the other.
2.1.3 Boeing as support for the oligopoly model
As previously discussed, if the commercial launch industiy can be appropriately 
modelled as a non-collusive oligopoly, the number of launch service suppliers would 
be small so that the pricing of one participant would affect the market price, the 
barriers to entry are high, the change in price would tend to be minimal over time, and 
organisations would accept a decrease in profits in order to maintain market share. 
Indicators of these characteristics are observed through an examination of the Boeing 
financial data and market share history.
With regards to the number of participants, the average market share between 1998 
and 2004 captured by Boeing is 15% relative to the world market and 47% relative to 
the US market. With such influence, it is likely that the price adjustments Boeing 
makes would have significant implications for the other participants in the market. 
Therefore, the first condition of whether the market can be modelled as an oligopoly 
appears to be met.
The cost of research and development has not decreased in significance since Orbital 
Sciences entered the industry. As stated in Smith (2005b) and Krige (2003), Boeing
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is reported to have written-off $2 billion in development costs for the Delta IV. In 
addition to hefty research and development costs, P.L. 108-136 and its codifying of 
the assured access to space policy focused on the two EELY variants has hampered 
the ability of independent companies to win long-term government contracts. Such an 
issue is currently being debated in response to SpaceX filing a legal action against the 
USAF that is discussed in BNA (2005b) for awarding twenty launches evenly 
between the two EELY variants without a public competition. All of these factors 
indicate significant barriers to market entry.
By examining Boeing earnings in the context of market share, the data indicates that 
suppliers will decrease their price in an effort to maintain market share. While there 
was a small average decrease in market share during the current market downturn, the 
correlation between market share and earnings demonstrates an effective 
independence between the two. What is interesting to note is that this desire to 
maintain market share is not coming as a result of a traditional price war, in which 
Friedman (1983) asserts that the origins either lie in a desire to (i) attack a participant 
who has attempted to cheat the other participants in the market or (ii) to drive a 
participant out of the market. In this case, prices are being cut in response to 
overcapacity.
However, while a conventional price war ends when each losing participant leaves the 
market, market forces do not wholly govern the commercial launch industry. Because 
access to space is a policy adopted by the US, and because the other countries whose 
citizens are participants in the market as identified by the subsidies to Arianespace 
cited in the complaint by TCI, it is unlikely that traditional launch manufacturers, who 
are also currently operating as launch service suppliers, will ever be forced out of the 
market. While Smith (2005b) mentions the Boeing claim and supposed reassessment 
of its desire to remove the Delta lY from commercial competition, it is expected that a 
launch service supplier will continue to compete, even in the face of significant 
financial losses, because the probability of government support is high.
If such theories regarding strategic dependence on government support are valid, the 
oligopoly construct may not be a suitable model. Further, if the price stickiness
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observed in Gabier (1992) and identified in the next chapter accurately represents the 
actual pricing employed by commercial launch suppliers, it is unlikely that the current 
price decreases that would result in the severe decrease in earning during the market 
downturn would be expected. In an attempt to remain in an environment where 
demand is rapidly shrinking and supply is increasing, the market price for launch 
services is likely to drop much more quickly than that identified in DOT figures or 
projections.
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The largest inhibitor to clearly assessing the validity of the oligopoly model is the lack 
of clarity with regards to industry data. Uncertainty, as it pertains to the oligopoly, is A
discussed in Geroski et al. (1985). While the nature of the launch industry and the 
operational constraints associated with a series of launches cannot be overlooked, the 
volatility associated with the Boeing market share between 2000 and the present day 
could be examined relative to an oligopoly model with imperfect inforaiation.
2.2 Cash flow overview for the launch industry
While the monies and accounting practices associated with the commercial launch :
industry are large and complex, the basic cash flow associated with it is no different to 
that of any other transaction. It must be noted that, while the commercial space 
transportation industry includes space tourism, this work only considers orbital 
missions designed to deliver payloads onto either an Earth orbit or an escape 
trajectory. Payload delivery remains the bulk of commercial space launch business 
according to documents produced by the DOT. As the MMET system is intended for 
payload delivery, and may not yet be shown to be capable of achieving many of the 
stringent environmental requirements associated with human passengers, its 
feasibility will be assessed relative to the economic forces governing those 
commercial participants when purchasing and supplying payload delivery services.
Most commercial space launch operations begin because an organisation requires a 
commercial capability attainable through the use of a unique space-based asset. For 
an agreed price, the end customer pays a launch services provider to deliver this
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capability. For its services, the launch service supplier retains a portion of the price as 
profit. The cash flow associated with these transactions is presented in Fig 2.5.
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Figure 2.5 Illustration of the commercial space launch industry cash flow. The 
end customer (bottom left) pays a launch services supplier (top) to place a 
payload into orbit. O f the monies paid by the end customer, a portion pay for 
the launch (right) and a portion are retained as profit. The launch delivers the 
payload to its intended orbit for the end customer.
As a result of the Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988, Federal 
regulations (14 CFR, Chapter 3) require all parties to a US launch must agree to cross­
waivers that absolve all participants from liabilhy in the event of a failure. Further, as 
discussed by Holtz-Eakin (2003), there are indications that launch providers are 
moving away from re-flight provisions. In the early years of the commercial launch 
industry, Gabier (1992) comments that customers often purchased assurances from 
the vehicle supplier so that, in the event of a failure, the costs associated with a 
follow-on flight would be less significant. Such cost reductions could be as 
straightforward as a reduced price for the manufacture and launch of a second vehicle, 
or an indirect reduction in cost such as launch priority. In the case of launch priority, 
whereby the re-flight would have priority over other orders that the supplier is 
committed to completing, the adverse cost of the failure is reduced because the length 
of time that the end customer is without its asset is less than it would have been
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without the re-flight provisions. While contract terms for commercial launches are 
not publicly available, the discussion in Holtz-Eakin (2003), combined with the 
customer histoiy associated with the Delta 3 vehicle on its second and third launch 
attempts, does offer indications that the increases in reliability seen throughout the 
launch vehicle market is decreasing the likelihood that customers are requiring or 
purchasing re-flight provisions.
Another change in commercial space industiy practice is with regards to ownership. 
While the more traditional concept of space-based assets sees them purchased and 
owned by the end user, as is the case with XM Radio, organizations are beginning to 
move towards a service-oriented purchasing approach. In the same way the US Navy 
and Air Force are entering into agreements like those discussed in Holtz-Eakin (2003) 
where the government does not own the asset that is being launched, commercial 
customers are often purchasing exclusive use of the service provided by the satellite 
while another company retains ownership of the satellite. Such agreements were 
identified in the controversy reported by journalists such as Young (2001), Patsuris 
(2001) and Figler (2001) when Los Angeles County attempted to tax Hughes satellites 
as movable property owned by Hughes Electronics, even though the satellites were 
producing revenue for the legally separate, but wholly owned, entity called DirectTV. 
Hughes Electronics was formed in 1985 as a wholly owned subsidiary of General 
Motors (GM) when it purchased the Hughes Aircraft Company from the Howard 
Hughes Medical Institute. Since then, the satellite manufacturing operations were 
sold to Boeing in 2000, and the company was split from GM in 2003, allowing News 
Corporation to purchase over one-third of the company. The kinds of acquisitions, 
sales, mergers, and property ownership agreements prevalent in the commercial 
launch and space services industry require case-by-case analysis for most commercial 
launch transactions.
While the case-by-case complexity associated with a commercial launch agreement 
may be significant, there is no indication that the fundamental relationships identified 
in Fig 2.1 are invalid. This work assumes the validity of such a cash flow relationship 
between the generalised participants, regardless of the specific interactions and legal 
boundaries relating each.
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2.3 Perspective: on a mission for the generalised end customer
It is assumed that the generalised eommereial space launch industry is made up of end 
customers and launch service suppliers. Furthermore, as will be discussed later, it is 
assumed that the end customer has a right to choose any supplier. Therefore, for a 
system employed by a supplier to be deemed economically feasible, it must present a 
competitive advantage that would cause the customer to choose it.
As previously discussed, an individual or organization becomes an end customer 
within the commercial space launch industry when a capability it is seeking would 
only become available after the launch of a space-based asset. The end customer 
could take a number of organization shapes, and the product could be sold using a 
wide range of accounting devices, but the functionality of the agreement must remain; 
a payload must be functionally delivered. Therefore, no concern is given to the type 
of asset, the ownership of the asset, or the relationship between end customer, launch 
supplier, and system manufacturer.
2.4 Choice: presenting the options and the selection criteria
As it is assumed previously that all customers and suppliers are acting in accordance 
with traditional Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Markets as discussed in Pass 
and Lowes (1992), it will be further assumed that such theories also govern the 
choices of the generalised end user and supplier. While the Theoiy of Markets 
assumes the actions of participants are constrained by the market construct, the 
traditional Theory of the Firm enables an assumption that the participants are 
motivated by profit maximisation.
It is a fundamental principle in economics to assume that a rational person, when 
presented with a choice between multiple options, will choose the option with the 
greatest worth. While worth could be expressed in terms of any quality, economies 
has a tendency to make choices based on monetary approximations of worth. By 
projecting the worth of each option into the same time, a rational person will choose 
the option with the greatest monetary value.
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When projecting each option into the present, there may be significant levels of 
uncertainty associated with the worth of an option. In such cases, it is standard to 
examine the distribution of probable outcomes for each option multiplied by the 
corresponding probability distribution. The mean value of the resulting distribution is 
considered to be the expected worth. While a comparison of the expected worth for 
each option may be best examined in the context of the variance associated with each, 
it is commonly accepted that the expected worth is suitable for decision making 
purposes.
Since it is assumed that all participants in the commercial space industry are 
attempting to maximize profit, it is assumed that a rational participant, when faced 
with a choice involving many options, will choose the option with the greatest 
expected profit. As discussed later, the price of a product fluctuates within the 
constraints of its market so that the demand for the product, based on its price, equals 
the supply. Therefore, suppliers are incapable of independently pursuing profit 
maximization through price adjustments. Since the market defines the price of a 
launch service commodity, and that price is equal at any point in time for all options 
that provide an equivalent service based on our definition of the industry cash flow 
model, participants can only maximize profits independently by reducing the expected 
cost of an option.
'
The cost of a system is directly related to its adverse economic risk. The risk of an 
option is fundamentally equivalent to its expected worth. In engineering applications, 
though, risk cames the connotation of being associated with adverse outcomes. For 
the purposes of this work, the adverse economic risk of a system is equal to the 
relative price of the system multiplied by its probability of failure. Given the 
assumptions stated above, it is assumed that a reasonable participant in the 
commercial space industry will choose a launch system that presents the least adverse 
economic risk when compared against all other options.
When comparing two reasonable options, A and B, this work assumes option A will be 
chosen over option B if the following inequality holds true;
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(2 . 1)
Where:
p f ^  = Probability that option A will fail 
= Cost of option A 
Pf g = Probability that option B will fail 
Cg = Cost of option B
When comparing two reasonable options for which the risk of A is equal to the risk of 
B, it is reasonable to assume that one would choose the option with a lower 
probability of failure. This likely choice is assumed to be based on the risk-adverse 
nature of organisations. While the risk allocation scheme imposed by the DOT in the 
United States does remove legal exposure, a system failure is possibly more 
detrimental to the commercial fortunes of the company, if the assessment offered by 
Krige (2003) is valid.
It must also be clear as to what is a reasonable option. An option is reasonable if, 
assuming failure, the company is able to continue trading. If a launch option is so 
expensive or risky that system failure would bankrupt the organization, it is assumed 
to be an unreasonable option. Past history, however, has not always proven that 
companies only choose reasonable options. Especially in the commercial space 
industry, where novelty can tiirmp traditional business sense as demonstrated by 
Beale Aerospace or the Conestoga program, companies often appear to accept higher 
risks than traditional firms. However, such a conclusion that there is a corporate 
culture within commercial space organizations that make them less risk averse does 
not seem to have support within the literature.
•is;
2.5 LSM: examination of the options
Completing the LSM mission with a conventional launch vehicle could be costly, 
depending on payload mass, because of the required vehicle size. As proposed, the
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LSM mission would reduce this cost by using a small conventional launch system 
followed by two staged tether systems. However, the multiple handoffs and systems 
employed significantly increase the mission risk.
For a mission to succeed, all stages must succeed. For the LSM mission, the 
probability of failure associated with the mission is calculated as follows:' '^
'IMS 1 " i(l “ P f . L V  -  P j \ H \)(l -  P f j l  -  P f , H 2  )(l -  P f , T 2  )J  , (2.2)
Where:
Pf.RAs"  ^ Probability that the LSM 
mission will fail
Pf.Lv ^  Probability that the conventional 
launch vehicle will fail 
Pf.Hi ^ Probability that the handover 
will fail
Pf j j= Probability the tether system 
will fail
If the mission risk associated employing the two-stage MMET system is less than that 
for the same mission completed with a conventional launch vehicle, the conclusions 
of this thesis are predicated on the assumption that the MMET-based system would 
then be economically feasible for such a use.''
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Chapter 3
Launch Vehicle Costs
There is a wide range of conventional launch system options open to the customer. 
These all vary in cost and capability. This section presents the various vehicles 
available within the commercial launch market, and some of the various sources for 
pricing information on these vehicles.
3.0 Current commercial vehicles
This work is examining the economic feasibility of employing an MMET-based 
unconventional launch system for use in the US commercial launch market. As a 
conventional system is required for the first stage, it is assumed that the vehicle that 
would be chosen would come from those currently available within the commercial 
market, or from future vehicles that will emerge.
Data on the capability of, and publicly stated end user price for, all vehicles employed 
under a DOT launch license is published quarterly. This work cross-references the 
information provided by the DOT against that provided by Astronautix. Astronautix 
gathers its information from a number of sources, often from Jonathan’s Launch List 
or sources of similar reputation. Jonathan’s Launch List provides a mirror for the list 
of all United Nations registered orbital objects and mission insights published by the 
site author that are routinely respected and relied upon by the respective USAF and 
DOT launch safety organisations.
3.1 Vehicle capabilities
This work considers a vehicle to be available to the commercial launch market if that 
vehicle has previously been employed for a DOT licensed launch. Table 3.1 presents 
the maximum payload, as reported by Wade (2006), each vehicle that meets such a 
requirement could transport either to LEO or to a geosynchronous transfer orbit 
(GTO).
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Table 3.1 All commercial vehicles launched between 1 Jan 1997 and 1 Jan 2005.
Payload to LEO  (kg) Payload to G TO  (kg)
Athena 1 820
Athena 2 2,065 —
Atlas 5 401 12,500 5,000
Atlas 5 521 13,950 6,000
Atlas II 6,580 2,810
Atlas IIA 7,280 3,039
Atlas HAS 8,610 3,630
Atlas IIIA 8,640 4,055
Atlas IIIB 10,718 4,500
Delta 2 7XXX 5,089 1,818
Delta 4 Medium (4,2) 11,700 5,300
Delta III 8,292 3,810
Pegasus 1 375
Pegasus XL 443 - -
Taurus 1,363 431
Zenit 3SL 5,250
No information is given by Wade (2006) with regards to the lifting capability of the 
Zenit 3SL for LEO destinations. For this reason, the cell for this value is marked 
Based on its stated capability with regards to GTO, it is assumed that the vehicle is 
capable of lifting around 13 tonnes to LEO. For the Pegasus 1, Pegasus XL, Athena 
1, and Athena 2, it is understood that Wade (2006) does not state that these vehicles 
are sold on the commercial market for purposes of a mission requiring GTO injection.
Current research conducted at the University of Glasgow does not anticipate 
employing an MMET for missions with payloads less than one-tonne nor greater than 
three-tonnes. An investigation of Table 3.1 demonstrates that most vehicles are 
capable of performing such a task.
3,2 Price over time
Because of the time value of money, it is a fundamental concept in both economics 
and finance that a commodity, such as a commercial launch, will not cost the same in 
two different time periods. Further, it is a basic tenant of such a theory that the value 
of monies that will be received in the future is less than monies received today 
because equivalence is based on the opportunity cost of capital. Hence, if a launch
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that occun'ed ten years ago is of equivalent value to a launch that occurs today, the 
earlier launch would have been priced much less than the launch price stated today.
The DOT publishes the stated launch price for each commercial vehicle that is 
launched each year. Because of the competitive advantage that companies would lose 
if the actual contract price were known, the DOT either publishes a cost spread or a 
point estimator. Based on Boeing (2002a), as will be discussed in a later section, the 
amount of monies written off for a demonstration flight of the Delta III vehicle, plus 
15% of that value, equals the upper limit of the price spread stated by the DOT. 
When creating point estimators out of each price spread stated by the DOT, this 15% 
relationship is used to calculate a point estimate from the spread.
"1
.7!
I
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For all vehicles with more than two flights between 1997 and 2005, Fig 3.1 presents 
either the point estimate, or the calculated point estimate based on the data, presented 
in DOT (1997-2004).
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Figure 3.1 Price per launch listed by the DOT at the time of launch for each 
vehicle with more than two commercial flights between 1997 and 2005.
Examination of the graph shows the price for most vehicles rising until the turn of the 
century, after which the prices for most vehicles fall again. This rise in price 
corresponds to the increase in market demand and subsequent slowdown seen in the 1
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United States. While discussed in more detail in the next chapter, this rise and fall in 
the launch rate was due to speculation in the communications and technology market, 
speculation that led to a market crash just after the turn of the century.
Assuming the prices listed by the DOT are valid, Fig 3.2 presents these values in 
terms of dollars in 2005. The conversions made in this work employ the Price 
Producers Index values for aerospace products and parts manufacturing (PCU3364, 
based June 1985), published by the US Bureau of Labour and Statistics. l l
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Figure 3.2 Price per launch for the flights listed by the DOT for each vehicle with 
more than two commercial flights between 1997 and 2005, adjusted to reflect 
dollars in 2005.
Examination of Fig 3.2 relative to Fig 3.1 shows a more pronounced drop in price for 
the majority of vehicles after the technology market crash in the early 2000s. 
However, unofficial data obtained from sources in the DOT indicates that the actual 
price of vehicles between 2001 and 2003 fell well below that stated publicly in DOT 
data. While publicly unverifiable, it was reported from such sources that an exclusive 
launch on the Sea Launch Zenit 3SL in the summer of 2002 could be secured for as 
little as $45 million.
When examining data for the Athena 1 and Atlas IIIA in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the pre- 
2000 increase and the post-2000 decrease are clearly observed. While it is clear that
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there would have been a rise in price when demand was at an all-time high during the 
late 1990s, and a similar drop in price as the level of overcapacity in the launch 
market skyrocketed after 2000, it is unclear whether any of the price data offered by 
the DOT is valid, or whether that obtained through Astronautix is robust enough from 
which one could develop trends.
Table 3.2 Price data for the Athena 1 vehicle.
Vehicle: Athena 1 Destination Orbit: LEO
Astronautix 2005 Astronautix
Launch Astronautix DOT Price Price 2005 DOT Price Price
Year Price Year ($ 000 000) ($ 000 000) ($ 000 000) ($ 000 000)
1997 2000 15 17 18 19
1999 2000 17 17 20 19
able 3.3 Price data for the Atlas IIIA vehicle.
Vehicle: Atlas IIIA Destination Orbit: GEO
Astronautix 2005 Astronautix
Launch Astronautix DOT Price Price 2005 DOT Price Price
Year Price Year ($ 000 000) ($ 000 000) ($ 000 000) ($ 000 000)
2000 1999 105 105 118 122
2004 1999 75 105 75 122
An examination of Fig 3.1 and Fig 3.2 demonstrates that there are two vehicles that 
do not rise and fall in accordance with the commercial launch. These vehicles are the 
Taurus and Pegasus XL vehicles that were developed and introduced in the mid- 
1990s. Unlike the Zenit 3SL, though, both of these vehicles were either significantly 
altered users of surplus technology or new systems with no flight history. Because of 
this, it is anticipated that this consistent rise in price corresponds to an increase in 
consumer confidence with regards to these vehicles. Because Orbital Sciences is a 
company that was founded with an intention to service the commercial launch market, 
it is assumed by this work that its slow-growth pricing practices are driven by 
conventional approaches to new technology. The Sea Launch Zenit 3SL, being a joint 
venture of international organisations with long standing histories with government 
contracts employing proven launch technology, is likely to have established a pricing 
structure in line with other government employed launch vehicles. This difference in
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management and technological origin is likely to be the reason for the significant 
difference in price histoiy with regards to these vehicles over the examined time 
period.
3.3 EELV inconsistency
One of the more interesting inconsistencies in the DOT data and the Astronautix data 
is that seen when examining the Atlas V and Delta IV prices. While the originally 
intended price of both the Atlas V and Delta IV is consistent with that stated by the 
DOT, these prices do not take into account the well-publicised increase in price 
estimates corresponding to the commercial launch market crash.
One of the contract terms discussed in Holtz-Eakin (2003) is the “best-customer 
clause.” This clause states that neither Boeing nor Lockheed may sell their vehicles 
to commercial customers for less than the priee each is charging the government. As 
a result of the contract negotiations discussed in Smith (2005a) and Smith (2005b) 
that led to the price increase of $7.807 billion discussed in Decker (2004) for the first 
round of government EELV contracts, in addition to other cost overruns and 
recalculations, the price per vehicle increased significantly from the initial estimates 
of around $72 million per flight, likely to be equivalent to that stated by Wade (2006).
Table 3.4 Price data for the Atlas V, 401 vehicle
Vehicle: Atlas 5 401 Destination Orbit: GEO
Launch
Year
2002
2003
Astronautix 
Price Year 
2004 
2004
DOT Price 
($ OOP OOP) 
75 
75
Astronautix 
Price 
($ OOP OOP) 
138 
138
2005 DOT Price 
($ OOP OOP)
80
78
2005 Astronautix 
Price 
($ OOP OOP) 
138 
138
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Table 3.5 Price data for the Atlas V, 521 vehicle
Vehicle: Atlas 5 521 Destination Orbit: GEO
Launch
Year
Astronautix 
Price Year
DOT Price 
($ 000 000)
Astronautix 
Price 
($ 000 000)
2005 DOT Price 
($ 000 000)
2005 Astronautix 
Price 
($ 000 000)
2003
2004
2004
2004
85
85
138
138
88
85
138
138
able 3.6 Price data for the Delta IV, Medium (4,2) vehicle
Vehicle: Delta 4 Medium (4,2) Destination Orbit: GEO
Launch
Year
Astronautix 
Price Year
DOT Price 
($ 000 000)
Astronautix 
Price 
($ 000 000)
2005 DOT Price 
($ 000 000)
2005 Astronautix 
Price 
($ 000 000)
2002 2004 85 138 91 138
It does not seem logical that the price stated by the DOT is accurate if it does not 
reflect the changes in launch price discussed in the literature. Nor does it seem logical 
that the organization would openly violate a contract requirement for the purposes of 
making a financial loss if the cost estimates provided to the USAF are valid. For 
these reasons, it seems logical to view the prices stated by the DOT with some 
scepticism; a scepticism that could be carried forward towards other vehicle prices.
3.4 Price to cost comparison
The first two Delta III missions, launching with commercial payloads, failed 
catastrophically. Having failed twice on the first two missions, Boeing could not find 
a customer for the third launch. To try and gain future customers by demonstrating 
the vehicle problems could be corrected, a demonstration launch was conducted in 
August 2000. In Boeing (2002a) the amount written off for this launch was stated as 
$78 million. This write-off is teraied to be equal to the “costs” associated with the 
launch.
K:::1
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Table 3.7 Publicly stated prices for the Delta 111 on its first two launches
Vehicle: Delta III Destination Orbit: GEO
Astronautix 2005 Astronautix
Launch Astronautix DOT Price Price 2005 DOT Price Price
Year Price Year ($ OOP 000) ($ OOP 000) ($ OOP OOP)________ ($ OOP OOP)
1998 1999 90 90 105 104
1999 1999 90 90 104 104
Additionally, the motives associated with the DOT values could be questionable. As 
with its many reports that exhibit unrealistic launch projections such as those 
presented in DOT (1996 -  2004), the launch prices published may be compromise 
values borne of industry pressure. In addition to its safety role, the DOT is also 
charged with promoting the industry. In the case of published launch values, it is 
logical to believe that cost estimates that do not offer full clarity would allow the 
DOT to achieve its promotion objectives without compromising its safety 
responsibilities. Therefore, it would not be operating in opposition to its remit while 
still supporting, and gaining the support of, the commercial launch industry.
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As previously stated, the upper limit stated by the DOT is equal to this amount plus 
15%. At the same time, the lower limit is 95% of this value. There is no information 
available to verify whether these costs included intra-coiporation sales, which are 
counted into the quarterly revenue and earnings statements that Boeing publishes. If 
the write-off in 2000 accounts for internal sales, it is likely that such sales include 
profits earned by each department. If this is true, then the $78 million is likely to be 
similar to the actual minimum price Boeing would charge a commercial customer so 
as to ensure the company makes a suitable profit on the sale. If intra-company 
transactions are not accounted for, or these transactions do not produce profit margins 4%
equal to those the company would expect for sales to outside customers, then the 
point estimation methodology based on the 15% relationship is likely to be invalid.
3.5 Valid price estimates
An investigation of the numbers presented by the DOT, in conjunction with 
information available through other sources, raises serious concerns about their 
validity. While the numbers do appear to superficially correspond to the market 
movements between 1997 and 2005, there is little other support for their accuracy.
'  'V-/. ' -.Te   ;î
It is also interesting to note that the rise and fall of the prices as stated by the DOT, 
even when adjusting such values to 2005 dollars, still does not mirror the volatility of 
the market over a corresponding period. While the prices reported by the DOT 
demonstrate maximum changes from peak to trough of around 50%, the launch rate 
fluctuated by nearly 400% during that same time period. When accounting for the 
generalised industrial attitude associated with the likely market model governing the 
commercial space launch industry, such dampened price movements are expected. 
However, if the movements are theoretically expected, and there is the possibility that 
ulterior motives may exist with regards to reporting accuracy, serious questions must 
be asked about the validity of the price data provided by the DOT.
The DOT does have a political element incorporated into its role and remit; an 
element that independent repositories such as Astronautix do not have. For this
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reason, it is likely that the price estimates provided by Wade (2006) are the most |
accurate available in the public domain.
3.6 Future prices
As previously mentioned, the price of a commodity fluctuates in accordance with the 
constraints of the specific market model so as to equalize the supply and demand. To 
this end, there are many factors that affect the future price of each launch vehicle. 
However, so long as there exists a commercial market where the needs are not 
uniform across all customers, there will likely continue to be a range of prices and 
capabilities.
At the same time, the argument does exist that the cost reductions attainable with 
conventional, chemical-based propulsion systems are limited. Even as efficiency 
increases through optimised chemical types or mixtures; or chamber, tubing, or nozzle 
geometries; Sutton and Biblarz (2001) note that there are limits to the amount of 
energy that can be released using chemically propulsive means. With these 
limitations, there will always be a base price for conventional chemically propelled 
launch vehicles within the commercial space launch market.
3.7 LSM: completing the mission using a conventional launch system
All previous work at the University of Glasgow has focused on MMET missions with 
payloads of either 2.5 tonnes or less. Considering a suitable safety factor of 20% may 
be assumed to be a reasonable design requirement, it seems pmdent to select a 
conventional launch vehicle for incorporation into the two-stage tether system that has 
a rated capacity of around, but no less than, three tonnes.
3.7.1 LEO options for the first stage of the LSM mission
From Table 3.8, it can be observed that the two vehicles that satisfy such a 
requirement are the Delta II and the Atlas II.
Table 3.8 Commercial launch vehicles with a stated capability of launching to 
LEO payloads greater than two-tonnes but less than 10 tonnes
While the on-orbit dynamics of an unbalanced handover are still under investigation, 
it could be possible that a single MMET may be designed such that it is capable of 
delivering two payloads during one mission. If this is the case, the total payload mass 
for two 2.5 tonne payloads to LEO is five tonnes, which could be accomplished with a 
Delta II. However, for three-tonne payloads, an Atlas II would be required. 
Considering the Delta II is approximated by Wade (2006) to cost $70 million in 2005 
dollars while the Atlas II costs $107 million, first investigations seem to indicate a 
small change in individual payload mass could have significant cost implications.
However, while not discussed in full at this point of the work, the reliability of each 
vehicle must be taken into account. If the calculated reliability of the Atlas II is 
significantly higher than that of the Delta II, it could present the conventional launch
Payload to LEO (kg) Payload to GEO Transfer (kg)
Athena 2 2,065
Delta 2 7XXX 5,089 1,818
Atlas 11 6,580 2,810 1
Atlas IIA 7,280 3,039 ' 3:
Delta III 8,292 3,810 %
Atlas HAS 8,610 3,630 3
Atlas IIIA 8,640 4,055 'ft;
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optioii with least risk. In such a case, even though it is more expensive, it could be 
considered a better choice from a holistic mission standpoint.
3.7.2 Options for performing the LSM mission with a conventional vehicle
While it is clear that the Delta II and Atlas II are capable of carrying the payloads 
destined for operation to the first-stage MMET, the cost of putting each MMET 
system onto its working orbit must be examined. At this point in the work, the size of 
each MMET system is unknown. The size of each system is detennined by the 
desired system reliability, a factor that will be discussed later. Until the required 
MMET system size is calculated, an appropriate vehicle for lifting the system into 
orbit cannot be determined. The cost of deploying each MMET will be discussed in a 
later section after the size of each system is known.
As a conventional alternative to the two-stage MMET system, the only vehicle 
currently built that is capable of completing the LSM mission is the Delta IV-Heavy. 
Therefore, for comparative purposes, the cost of the vehicle required to complete the 
LSM mission is reported by Wade (2006) to cost $254 million per launch.
58
" 3
Chapter 4
Reliability of Conventional Launch Vehicles I
Calculating the probability that a future space launch vehicle will fail is of great 
interest, and the techniques employed for such endeavours are the source of great 
debate. By understanding the current probability that a specific launch vehicle can be 
launched successfully, and how that probability will change as a function of time 
using the methodology presented herein, probability of success estimates can be 
developed for conventional launch system components for the purposes of assessing 
the LSM mission.
I
4.0 Introduction
Space launch operations are inherently ultra-hazardous. Consequently, because all 
risk cannot be removed from such operations, the responsible safety organizations in 
the United States employ a regime of risk mitigation and residual assessment. After 
imposing operational requirements that reasonably minimize all known risks, every 
US space launch is then subjected to a quantitative analysis of all residual risk.
The United States Air Force (USAF), National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), and the Department of Transportation (DOT) all have the ability to impose a 
wide range of launch restrictions depending on this quantitative analysis, as identified 
in Air Force Space Command (2004) and DOT (2006). The quantitative metric used 
by these organizations to assess residual risk for operational purposes is termed 
expected casualty. An expected casualty computation for debris impact must be 
completed for eveiy military, scientific, and commercial launch. The expected 
casualty of an entire launch is the aggregation, over the entire mission, of the risk at 
any instant. The contribution to expected casualty resulting from the risk associated 
with impacting debris at any instant is expressed, mathematically, as follows:
.ft
I
ft;:ft':'
(h 2 ) P p j j (4.1)
Where:
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Ec (/, y ) = expected casualty 
contribution of the location at the 
instant.
Pjj .  = probability of impacting the 
location at the 3'^  instant.
Ppj.i ^ population density of the y‘*’ 
location at the instant.
^ j .  —  i^ a o u a i iy  a i c a  i c i a i i v c  uu m c j  ^Ar j i = casu lt re rel t e to the y'^ ’
location at the 3’’ instant.
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A discussion of the concepts and current applications of expected casualty are 
provided by Philipson (1995), which also discusses the expected casualty 
requirements for toxic release and blast overpressure analyses. While the routines and 
algorithms required for implementation of these two risk sources are not presented 
within, it is understood that they, too, share a similar relationship with probability of 
failure. The use of geometric probability employed by Kiureghian (2001) also applies 
to the Maximum Probable Loss (MPL) insurance metric, which has significant DOT 
licensing implications, as discussed in DOT (2002a). 3
By examination, it is clear that expected casualty for debris impacts is directly 
dependent on the probability of impact estimate, which is directly dependent on the 
probability that the vehicle will fail a certain time prior to impact. While an 
acceptable value for Pp j . is directly dependent on the fidelity and timeliness of the 3
employed data, the launch vehicle casualty area multiplied by the probability that 
debris will impact an examined area is a function of (i) the vehicle break-up analysis,
(ii) the fidelity and timeliness of the employed weather data, and (iii) the probability 
that the launch vehicle will fail at the f '  event time. There are acceptable metrics for 
a sufficient vehicle break-up analysis and accepted standards for weather data.
However, detei-mining a launch vehicle’s probability of failure is generally a topic 
that is fiercely debated by many competing interests. In this environment where 
program costs are measured in billions of dollars, government safety organizations
must adopt metrics for assessing expected casualty that are not only fundamentally 
and computationally valid, but must also be fair, understandable, and repeatable.
Engineering reliability analyses employ a wide range of stochastic techniques for 
assessing the probability that a system will fail over a particular span of time. The 
literature on such techniques is vast and well researched, an overview available 
through examination of textbooks or practitioner guides, such as Lewis (1996) or 
Stamatelatos (2002). While mathematically valid, results of launch vehicle reliability 
analyses that rely solely on component or sub-system test data are identified by safety 
organizations and academics, as in DOT (2002) and Fragola and Collins (2004), to be 
in conflict with observed flight histories, as presented in Chang (1996), Chang (2000), 
or Isakowitz et al. (1991); or analyses of such flight history, like those presented in 
Guikema and Paté-Comell (2004) and Guikema and Paté-Comell (2005).
Given the conclusions of Chang (1996), which do not fault vehicle design on a 
general level while identifying infancy failures in the propulsive system as the 
primary cause of vehicle failure since 1958, this discrepancy is likely to be due to 
unforeseen interactions between the launch vehicle, its components, its operational 
processes, and the launch environment. An example of an unforeseen operational 
failure mode is evident when examining the Atlas/Centaur (AC) failures on missions 
AC-70 and AC-71. McCartney et al. (1993) present the findings of the AC-71 failure 
investigation, identifying a change in operational practice borne of efficiency driven 
modifications initiated as early as AC-62, six years prior to the investigated failure, as 
the root cause for the performance anomalies which resulted in the loss of both AC-70 
and AC-71. Such an example demonstrates that a sound vehicle design can be 
operated in a manner that produces an unforeseen failure mode. As an example of 
uncertainty regarding how a component behaves under launch conditions, Chang 
presents a discussion of the Titan 34D mission that failed on 18 April 1986. As 
identified by Chang, the cause of this failure is attributed to a crack in the solid rocket 
motor propellant. While analyses indicated that the crack would not cause a failure, 
Chang (1996) identifies that burn-through occurred and resulted in vehicle loss. In 
combating such failures, an organization must be capable of collating and 
disseminating past experiences for application on future missions. Indicating the
.Ï
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—importance of knowledge collation and dissemination, of the nineteen 
recommendations for launch vehicle reliability enhancement identified in Chang 
(2000), only four were design specific.
The persistence of these unforeseen failure modes is likely due to the relatively small 
amount of operational data available for launch vehicles. While systems that are 
traditionally analyzed with the conventional reliability engineering techniques 
presented in Lewis (1996) are capable of being developed in identical batches and 
repeatedly tested in sufficiently identical environments under operational conditions, 
the financial risk associated with launch vehicle programs, identified in Parkinson 
(1999), is a factor that severely limits the number of operational tests that can be 
conducted for each program, often limiting operational datasets to less than tens of 
flights per variant. However, as evident through examination of the cause associated 
with the AC-70 and AC-71 failures, significant design modifications occur after every 
launch, regardless of outcome. Consequently, it is likely that a significant number of 
potentially catastrophic failure modes remain undetected for long periods of time, as 
did the failure mode associated with both AC-70 and AC-71; and various operational 
characteristics of a component or system may not be fully understood, as identified on 
the Titan 34D mission discussed by Chang, resulting in significant performance 
uncertainty. To combat the component and sub-system uncertainty that produces 
significant errors when predicting launch vehicle reliability using bottom-up 
techniques, DOT (2002b) states that safety organizations employ top-down 
probability of failure assessments that incorporate observed flight histories.
There are a number of documents in the current literature that offer representations of 
the kind of top-down analytical approaches that are identified in DOT (2002) as 
traditionally acceptable to safety organizations. Because of the operational or design 
modifications made after each launch, the number of flights made by traly identical 
vehicles is rarely more than one. Despite this fact, most analytical techniques group 
vehicles to increase dataset size. The first of these techniques requires the analyst to 
group similar vehicles, often based on family or variant designation, and assess the 
probability of failure for each group over that composite data set. Guikema and Paté- 
Cornell (2004) presents an example of this commonly accepted approach using both
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ïfrequentist-based and Bayesian-based calculations. Regardless of statistical 
technique, the analyst must assume that each launch vehicle is sufficiently identical 
such that the obseiwed flight history can be considered a realization produced by a set 
of Bernoulli trials. The problem with this assumption is that, not only does the 
discussion presented in McCartney et al (1993) indicate that this assumption is 
invalid, later investigations completed by Guikema and Paté-Cornell, and presented in 
Guikema and Paté-Cornell (2005), offer indications that reliability growth is an 
observable phenomenon within launch vehicles. If true, such a phenomenon 
invalidates the fundamental assumption of identical vehicles that is required for the 
earlier analyses presented in Guikema and Paté-Cornell (2004) and cited by safety 
organizations in DOT (2002).
The analysis of vehicle flight history intended to investigate the prevalence of infancy 
failures performed in Guikema and Paté-Comell (2005) indicates that improvements 
in the average failure rate of vehicles that DOT considers similar, as per DOT (2002), 
can be observed through the mean estimate of a frequentist analysis, although the 
Smith-Satterwaite /-test indicates such movements are not statistically significant; or 
through Bayesian-based Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) analyses, which offer 
more conclusive results. In addition to a variant-specific analysis over all tested 
flights, the inter-generational analysis performed by Guikema and Paté-Cornell 
indicates the existence of intra-family changes in variant success rate. Both of these 
conclusions are consistent with the results presented in Chang (1996), Chang (2000), 
and McCartney et al (1993), and offer conceptual support for DOT guidance 
presented in DOT (2002) that “operator learning" (i.e., reliability growth) should be 
accounted for in a top-down analysis performed for launch safety purposes. However, 
such agreements offer further indications that the simplifying assumption of Bernoulli 
trials intrinsic to most conventional launch vehicle analyses is invalid. While 
indications of reliability growth are identified and discussed in Guikema and Paté- 
Comell (2004) and Guikema and Paté-Comell (2005), which, if verifiable, would 
invalidate the assumption of Bemoulli trials employed in their work, neither proposes 
a method for applying such observations to a specific vehicle, variant, family, or 
operator.
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Reliability growth modeling is widely employed when assessing developing systems. 
A recent overview of generally accepted reliability growth models for repairable 
systems is discussed in Walls et al. (2005), and an investigation of the general 
framework, traditional reliance on logarithmic relationships, and benefit of Bayesian 
implementation techniques discussed by Jewell (1984). While the benefits to 
reliability growth estimation in software analysis and general engineering analyses are 
discussed relative to the assumptions of logarithmic and monotonie growth 
relationships, as in Quigley and Walls (1999), Quigley and Walls (2003), and Walls 
and Quigley (2001), a body of work on removing such assumptions also exists, 
including Anseli et al. (1997) and Ansell et al. (1999). Consistent with the 
conclusions of McCartney et al. (1993), which indicate that not every design 
modification leads to a reliability improvement, Ansell et al. (1997) and Ansell et al. 
(1999) discusses how innovations (i.e., system modifications) affect the local system 
reliability profile. However, the definition of a repairable system stated by Lugtigheid 
et a l (2004) clearly excludes expendable launch vehicles, invalidating a direct 
application of these techniques.
It may be logical to try and draw parallels between expendable launch vehicle 
reliability growth and either Shuttle or nuclear deliveiy systems. However, Shuttle is 
a repairable system, as identified in Kaplan (1990), and reliability conclusions gained 
through an examination of repairable systems cannot be directly applied in a valid 
manner to expendable systems, as per the conclusions of Lugtigheid et al. (2004). At 
the same time, while not repairable, the analysis of weapon systems identified in Fries 
and Easterling (1999) require expert guidance for producing the prior modification 
function used to model system degradation. While computationally accurate, and 
even with research into techniques for selecting objective priors like that presented in 
Vaurio (1992), many analysts raise concerns about the selection of prior and update 
functions in Bayesian analyses.
For Bayesian risk-assessment techniques, the selection of a prior is an issue that is 
specifically raised with regards to launch vehicles by Philipson (1995), and is an issue 
which applies not only to his previous work contained in Philipson (1989) that is 
specifically identified in the critique, but is a contentious point with various
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mitigating approaches and explanations, with only a small segment of this voluminous
discussion identified in works such as Koop (2003), Poirier (1995), and Spiegelhalter
et al. (2003). This contention is not unique to the launch industiy, and is widely 
.discussed in general texts on Bayesian analysis, and specifically highlighted in the 
practitioner guide developed by Spiegelhalter et al. (2003) for the WinBUGS 
software, the package that was used to develop the results presented in the works of 
Guikema and Paté-Comell.
The reason Bayesian analysis techniques are contentious is because the prior 
distribution, which is set by the analyst, is highly influential for small datasets. Since 
the number of flights that make up a standard dataset for a launch vehicle analysis is 
quite small, the prior set by the analyst has the ability to dominate the results. To 
correct for such influence, many turn to a range of non-informative analytical 
techniques, like those identified in Guikema and Paté-Cornell (2004), Guikema and 
Paté-Coriiell (2005), Koop (2003), or Poirier (1995); or other, less sophisticated 
launch vehicle probability of failure computations within the literature, like those 
discussed in DOT (2002), which rely primarily on the ratio of observed successes to 
attempts, thereby diminishing analytical subtleties. While this decrease in analytical 
subtlety may be undesirable, Philipson (1995) highlights that such subtlety is only as 
valid as the methodology with which the prior is selected.
Even though Philipson identifies elements that make it debatable to claim any failure 
analysis is objective, based on the accepted limitations of commonly accepted 
frequentist forecasting techniques like those presented in Guikema and Paté-Comell 
and the intrinsic subjectivity of selecting appropriate priors, government safety 
organizations regulating commercial launch operations require such analyses for 
launch approval, as discussed in Air Force Space Command (2004) and DOT (2006). 
While a fully objective launch vehicle failure probability analysis with low 
uncertainty based solely on the outcome of observed attempts is not achievable, 
supplemental analytical metrics can be developed that are stochastically valid.
In these top-down analyses, factors such as “learning” are specifically highlighted in 
DOT (2002). To account for this phenomenon of increasing reliability that is
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indicated by the results presented in Guikema and Paté-Cornell (2005), it is the 
responsibility of the safety organizations to minimize subjectivity as much as 
possible. In an effort to reduce subjectivity, DOT (2002) identifies the government 
proposal to account for learning by examining the 65% confidence interval for the 7
true probability of failure calculated with the binomial distribution given the total ^
number of successes observed out of the total number of attempted flights. While this 
use of the Clopper-Pearson confidence intervals does produce a moving midpoint as a I
result of the narrowing confidence boundaries, these movements are a function of 
decreasing uncertainty. To state that the change in midpoint estimator is an indication f
of reliability growth is invalid and arbitrary. However, while the Department of
■Transportation approach is clearly invalid, it is just as invalid to apply the results of 
Guikema and Paté-Cornell because they are obtained under the simplifying model that 
each vehicle is a Bernoulli trial relative to its data set. Because the frequentist and 
Bayesian techniques that are described in DOT (2002) violate the analytical 
requirement for Bernoulli trials, a stochastically valid method must be proposed that 
allows safety organizations to increase the predicted probability of success associated 
with each launch, in accordance with commonly accepted reliability growth theory, 
while maintaining the validity and objectivity of the probability growth technique.
This work proposes a methodology that assesses the organizational capability of a ft
launch vehicle operator to learn from past experience based on the obseiwed flight 
history of its launch vehicle variants. This work begins by presenting the core 
methodology, followed by an approximation for this methodology using a 
logarithmic, monotonie simplification that retains its fundamental validity. After 
presenting the approach and discussing its applications, the results of an investigation 
into the learning rate exhibited by current commercial vehicles is presented that uses 
this simplified model, leading to a concluding discussion that identifies the benefits of 
employing the presented methodology.
4.1 Learning Methodology
Considering the vast differences in scale between the data sets used by launch vehicle 
analysis practitioners and those typically used by reliability growth practitioners, the 
two analytical paradigms seem to share few similarities. While traditional reliability
J
.growth models focus on repairable and mass-produced systems, launch vehicle 
operators manufacture statistically unique vehicles that share little more than general 
design parameters. In the context of the conclusions presented in Chang (1996) and 
Chang (2000), no group of orbital launch vehicles could be selected out of all flights 
conducted since 1958 that are sufficiently identical so as each could be considered a ''i
Bernoulli trial. Because stochastically characterizing the reliability growth of a space
launch vehicle in a valid manner is not possible under current manufacturing I
limitations, this work proposes a shift in focus with regards to launch vehicle failure
probability estimation.
Instead of examining the probability that a launch vehicle will succeed, this work 
shifts the emphasis to calculating the probability that the next vehicle an operator 
launches will successfully complete its mission. This is a subtle, yet vital, distinction 
to ensure analytical validity. By shifting the analytical landscape in this manner, 
greater justification can be developed for prior distributions employed within 
Bayesian analyses, thereby diminishing the current concerns of subjectivity raised in 
work such as Philipson (1995). At the same time, under such an analytical paradigm, 
the contributions of Guikema and Paté-Cornell (2004) and Guikema and Paté-Cornell 
(2005) become far less significant than the work presented in papers such as Garber 
and Paté-Cornell (2004), Souder et a l (2005), McManus et al (1993), and Walls and 
Quigley (2001), which focus on characterizing the knowledge collation and 
dissemination capabilities of an organization by objectively quantifying the 
effectiveness of its managerial and communication processes. Where such an
approach offers significant benefit is in its application to range safety requirements. ;o
IDOT (2002) identifies that range safety organizations currently consider both (i) the j
reliability analyses performed by operators and (ii) the top-down analyses performed }
by range safety organizations to be valid and accurate approaches to calculating the 
probability that a vehicle will fail, even though the two methodologies produce 
significantly different results. The shift in analytical emphasis presented here would 
remove that logical inconsistency.
In accordance with the observations and concepts of non-monotonic reliability growth 
presented in the literature, identified in works sueh as Chang (1996), Chang (2000),
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McCartney et al. (1993), Ansell et al. (1997), and Ansell et al. (1999); this work 
proposes a learning parameter that is applied to the operator. This learning 
parameter, under investigation at the University of Glasgow, applies to each vehicle 
based on the number of flights for that variant, the date of the next attempt, the date of 
the original attempt for that variant, the number of variants developed prior to the 
current variant, and the total number of prior flights over all variants. Multiplying the 
operator developed engineering reliability calculation by this learning parameter 
would produce the probability that the operator will complete its next launch in a 
successful manner. By accounting for these factors, the learning parameter could 
model the demonstrated ability of an operator to learn during the development of a 
variant, an ability that may be greater after the development of prior variants. Such 
capabilities would be consistent with the indicated requirements identified in 
Guikema and Paté-Cornell (2005).
4.1.1 Relating the probability that each mission will succeed to the calculated 
vehicle reliability
The fact that many analyses assume the flight history for a variant can be considered a 
set of Bernoulli trials, as is done in conventional launch vehicle analysis literature 
such as DOT (2002), Guikema and Paté-Comell (2004), Guikema and Paté-Comell 
(2005); allows the flight sequence to be ignored. However, ignoring the sequence of 
successes and failures is proved to be invalid and is to be identified in Guikema and 
Paté-Cornell (2005), Collani and Draeger (2001), and Kotz and Johnson (1986), as the 
reason the confidence bounds for a frequentist analysis are so wide. By accounting 
for the realization corresponding to the observed flight history, relative to all the 
possible realizations for that number of trials, a Neyman acceptance region approach 
can develop relatively narrow boundaries that contain the tme probability of success 
for that realization. By removing the assumption of Bemoulli trials and solving for 
the acceptance region in a manner that is identical to that employed when solving for 
the Clopper-Pearson confidence intervals, an acceptable inteiwal bounding the tme 
probability of occurrence for each attempt can be found for each proposed learning 
parameter.
68
When removing the assumption of Bemoulli trials, the analysis relates the probability 
that the operator will complete the next mission successfully to the vehicle reliability 
calculated for that mission via the learning parameter. For each launch attempt, the 
tme probability that the attempt of the / ' ’ variant employed by that operator will be 
successful, . j , is related to the vehicle reliability for that launch as in Eq. 4.2.
f
Ps,iJ -  ^ + iV Va-=1 y
(4.2)
Ï
Where:
L -  learning parameter
= date of the f*’ launch attempt
j = date of the first launch of the y*
variant
= number of launches preformed 
by the A:*'’ variant
Rf j = design reliability calculation for 
the attempt of the variant
Based on this relationship, which is capable of modelling the true probability that the 
next launch conducted by an operator will be successful, the observed histories of all 
variants relevant to a specific operator can be used to calibrate the teaming parameter 
for that operator.
4.1.2 Calibrating the learning parameter for an operator using only observed 
flight history
As discussed, the Clopper-Pearson confidence intervals that are widely cited by 
frequentists depend on the aggregate outcome of all relevant realizations representing 
the observed launch vehicle success sequence, not the specific order of failures and 
successes. This aggregation results in very wide confidence intervals that are 
incapable of distinguishing between a series of events that represent failures on the
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first three attempts and successes thereafter, a series of observations that would offer a 
strong indication of meaningful operator learning; and a series that exhibits three 
random failures, a scenario that would not indicate learning.
= (4.3)
IÎ
To account for order, calibration of the operator learning parameter proposed herein T
relies on the Neyman concept of acceptance regions as they were further investigated, 
and termed prediction regions, in Collani and Draeger (2001). Like the Clopper- 
Pearson technique, the Neyman concept of acceptance regions proposes a method that 
calculates an interval containing the true probability of success for an examined event, 
where the probability that the interval contains the true probability of success for the 
vehicle, is set by the analyst. Collani and Draeger (2001) presents the concept §
driving the technique as follows:
“ 1. There is a quantity of interest p  with unknown actual value p  e F . |
2. There is a random variable of interest X  with uncertain outcome x  g {0,1}"
This approach dictates that the aim of the first requirement above is to find the actual ;
value o fp  by defining a set C c  \p ,p \, and the second aims to make inference about
the uncertainty of the observed outcome, x , by using a set A a  {0,l}". As these two 
requirements are fundamentally interlinked, one finds a measurement interval C (i.e., 
a bounded set most similar to a confidence interval) by first computing acceptable
prediction regions, A^^'"\p), and then sequentially solving from the null set of {0,l}" 
to the final realization.
A prediction region is acceptable when the error associated with the inteiwal is at its 
minimum and the probability that the interval will contain p  is greater than or equal to 
the selected p  level, a value that is similar to the Clopper-Pearson confidence level. 
These requirements are defined mathematically as follows:
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Where:
(4.6)
i= j+ \
This approach of summing over all relevant realizations is functionally identical to the 
approach used to compute Clopper-Pearson confidence intervals. While the 
assumption of Bernoulli trials allows the Clopper-Pearson approach to use aggregate 
realizations, Collani and Draeger (2001) identifies that there is no statistical
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= marginal measure
A = ^-prediction region for the 
random sample
. 3:p  = true probability of occurrence
-  conditional distribution of the
random sample 
p  = confidence level
In practice, finding the Neyman measurement procedures requires the practitioner 
examine the observed realization, x , relative to the other 2" permutations possible for 
those n trials. Each permutation, x . , has a probability of occunence, P^^ (x. ) , equal
to the product of occurrence for its constituent events. To find the lower limit, ,
and the upper limit, , respectively, of the measurement procedure (i.e., the
numerical range within which the true probability will be contained with a probability 
equal to or greater than P), the following inequalities must be solved for p\
(4.5)/ = 1
requirement that either this assumption or the ensuing simplifieations be 
implemented. While the Neyman approach is employed herein to account for the 
order within a set of trials where the probability of oceurrence associated with each 
event changes between each trial, enacting the simplifications present in the Clopper- 
Pearson method would cause the Neyman approaeh to produce the same results. For 
each proposed learning parameter, whether proposed as a step in a MCMC analysis or 
within an iterative process, the acceptance region approach outlined above verifies 
whether a proposed learning parameter produces valid results that agree with the 
observed flight histories, and rejects any that do not.
4.2 Approximating learning using logarithmic and monotonie simplifications
In accordance with commonly accepted reliability growth theories, like those 
presented in Jewell (1984), Ansell et al. (1997), and Ansell et al. (1999), this work 
assumes that the probability of success for each launch can be related using a 
logarithmic relationship that is unique for each variant. As the unique logarithmic 
relationship for each variant can be defined using a pair of shape and size parameters, 
this approximation assumes the ability of an operator to learn can be represented 
using a joint-distribution constructed with the shape and size parameters calculated 
for each of its vehicle variants. Therefore, this model assumes that the operator is 
most capable of displaying an ability to learn that is consistent with the rate most 
frequently observed when examining the flight history of all its variants.
For each variant, the probability that the launch operator will successfully complete 
the mission is presented in Eq. 4.7, below. The probability of success for each 
mission is presented in terms of the maximum probability of success, , attainable 
for that variant. When solving for acceptable shape and size parameters, the model is 
calculating interval boundaries around this maximum probability of success value. As 
per the learning model presented above, this maximum value would generally be 
restricted by an upper boundary equal to the engineering reliability estimate for the 
variant. Since this examination does not consider the reliability estimate for any 
variants, the model solves for this maximum probability of success with no prior 
knowledge, thereby using unity as an upper boundary.
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(4.7)
The a  and k constants are the shape and size parameters, respectively, defining the 
rate of learning exhibited by the observed flight history of each variant.^' These 
parameters are related to, and only valid for, a reference time, 7^, that is set by the 
analyst, which may or may not correspond to a specific launch date. 7
4.2.1 Important considerations for the presented simplifications
While an improvement over traditional techniques that are fundamentally invalid, 
such as those identified and presented in DOT (2002), Guikema and Paté-Comell 
(2004), Guikema and Paté-Comell (2005); this approximation does not offer the 
flexibility required to model reliability changes like those observed by Chang (1996), 
Chang (2000), or McCartney et al (1993); or the eoncepts discussed by Ansell et al 
(1997), because it does not model the mechanics of operator leaming. This 
approximation is only capable of modeling movements that are consistent with the 
average change in system reliability resulting from design or operational 
modifications, using approximations that are presented as acceptable within the 
literature, as presented in Lewis (1996) and Jewell (1984). Additionally, the approach 
presented within does not account for the intra-generational invalidity inherent in the 
research presented in Guikema and Paté-Comell (2005), where neither changes in 
learning rate nor changes in technological maturity are considered. However, by 
limiting the dataset to those vehicles that were initially designed and constmcted 
primarily for commercial purposes, or those that underwent significant modifications 
after 1980 in response to the needs of the commereial market, it is assumed that this 
issue is suitably mitigated. This assumption is supported by an examination of the 
learning parameters for all variants produced by Orbital Sciences, which indicates that 
the shape parameter dependence on the introduction date for each variant is 2%, while 
the dependence is 7% for the size parameter. Such levels of dependency support the 
assumption that significant analytical effects caused by intra-family leaming are 
mitigated herein as a result of restricting the investigation to commercially developed 
vehicles introduced within the examined time period.
73
" ' f
After accounting for model limitations, various functional aspects of the model or its 9
results must be considered. First, an analyst must ensure that the reference date is
consistent for all variants under investigation throughout a multi-variant examination, »or when applying the results to an analytical forecast. The shape and size parameters
are tied to this reference date, making any conclusions erroneous if they are applied to 
an analysis based on any other reference date. The reference date for analyses 
presented herein is chosen to make the ratio of launch date to reference date less than 
one, so as to maximize the number of valid combinations produced for each analysis.
An appropriate reference date and its effect are specific to each analysis, however, 
and must be considered on a case-by-case basis.''”
Secondly, like conventional approaches such as the Clopper-Pearson confidence
intervals, the intervals containing the probability that an operator will successfully
complete a mission will narrow as the flight history for a variant increases and, if the 
.size parameter is positive, the midpoint of this interval will increase as the number of f
flights increases. This increasing midpoint is incorrectly interpreted in government 
texts, such as those presented in DOT (2002), to be an indication of learning. Such a 
conclusion is invalid in most cases because the assumption of Bemoulli trials 
identified within the Clopper-Pearson approach means that the boundaries are 
narrowing around a probability of success estimate that has been identical for all 
flights. Unlike this erroneous conclusion that one can model leaming by examining a 
set of Bernoulli trials, the probability of success for each flight within the model 
presented herein will be changing. However, the probability of success on any 
attempt cannot be found by direct investigation of the changing confidence 
boundaries associated with an increasing dataset.
Such an application of the model is inappropriate and invalid. The primary problem 
with such an application is that the performed computations require the full dataset.
Comparing a partial dataset to a whole dataset offers no benefit. The second major 
problem is that the model is solving for the maximum attainable probability of 
success for that operator calculated with the current flight history. Conceptually ÿ:
identical to the Clopper-Pearson approach that produces boundaries about a single 
value, the narrowing interval observed within the methodology presented herein
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represents a decrease in uncertainty regarding the maximum probability of success 
term. While the magnitude of this value may fluctuate with new data as a result of 
decreasing skewness, comparing the maximum estimate from a less informed dataset 
offers no gain in understanding regarding the vehicle. To calculate the probability of 
success for any flight, shape and size parameters that most appropriately represent 
that variant must be used in conjunction with the maximum value estimate.
The third note of caution regards the use of the joint-distribution for each variant and 
the interval bounding the maximum probability of success estimate for the operator. 
Each probability of success inteiwal is directly dependent on a specific pair of shape 
and size parameters. It is not valid to directly equate the 95% level of the shape and 
size joint distribution to the 95% level of a probability of success distribution 
aggregated over all variants. Relationships between shape and size parameters, and 
the ensuing probability of success boundaries relevant to each parameter pair, are 
found herein by performing a regression analysis. When using a third order 
regression in both shape and size parameters for vehicles within the examined dataset 
presented herein, as demonstrated later, such a regression accounts for up to 97% of 
all variations in the interval boundaries.
Finally, as with any other analytical method, very little information regarding changes 
within a vehicle can be attained if the vehicle has exhibited no failures. Unless a 
variant exhibits a launch failure, the shape and size parameters for the logarithmic and 
monotonie approximation will have mean and standard deviation values that account 
for all possible leaming combinations. This general result would remain until a 
significant flight history is developed, after which the size parameter would begin to 
be narrow. This narrowing would not be the result of increasing information, though, 
but would be borne of the fact that the number of leaming parameter combinations 
that can validly express the observed flight history would be shrinking based on the 
length of time between the first launch and the most recent launch. Considering the 
fact that the current flight histoiy for most commercial variants examined herein is too 
small for this narrowing phenomenon to be reasonably observed, variants with no 
failures offer little benefit to this examination.
1
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4.2.2 Example for a fictitious operator with multiple variants
To demonstrate this simplified model, this sub-section will examine an operator with 
three hypothetical variants to determine the shape and size parameters for this 
logarithmic and monotonie simplification of the leaming parameter. The first vehicle 
of interest will have conducted two launches, the first on 11 August 2004, which is 
38210 Julian, and the second occurring on 20 November 2004, which is 3831 1 
Julian.''"' For the analysis, the selected reference date is 40000 Julian. On these 
hypothetical launch dates, the first launch is observed to fail, while the second 
succeeds. As with the other two fictitious variants used in this example, the shape and 
size parameters will be examined over the intervals 0 < <% < 1 and -1  < A: < 1 with a 
certainty of 95% that the probability of occurrence is contained within the calculated 
interval.
By incorporating the fore stated data and parameters relevant to this example, Eq. 4.5 
and Eq. 4.6 can be presented as in Eq. 4.8 and Eq. 4,9, below. Iteratively solving Eq.
4.8 for a defined pair of shape and size parameters will produce the lower boundary of 
an interval containing the maximum attainable probability that the operator can 
produce a successful launch, conditional on the those parameters being valid. Solving 
Eq. 4.9 in the same manner will produce the equivalent upper boundary.
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Using 10,000 uniformly distributed combinations of the shape and size parameters, 
and checking the solution obtained with each sample pair to ensure it does not violate 
the laws of probability, a quantitative and qualitative assessment of all valid leaming 
parameter combinations for this variant are found to be joint-normally distributed
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with a mean value for a of 0.583 with a standard deviation of 0.284, a mean value for 
A: of 0.134 with a standard deviation of 0.081, and a correlation of 0.405.
IAs a note of caution, it must be remembered that the leaming parameters developed
'"3’are dependent on the reference date. In the example presented above, the reference |
date is 40000 Julian. However, if this date were changed to 20000, the mean value of Û
a would become 0.657 with a standard deviation of 0.265; the mean k would become
0.285 with a standard deviation of 0.21; and the conelation between the two would
become 0.554. This represents a change of over 10% in both leaming parameters,
which could have a significant impact on any predictive calculations for which this
technique could be applied.
In addition to this variant with two flights, the other two variants flown by this 
hypothetical operator have shape, size, and correlation values of 0.468 (0.187), 0.352 
(0.189), and 0.376, respectively, for the first vehicle; and 0.564 (0.094), 0.287 
(0.250), and 0.631, for the second vehicle, with the standard deviation for each 
applicable parameter contained within the parentheses. With an even weighting 
between these three variants, the shape, size, and correlation for the operator, with the 
relevant standard deviations in parenthesis, are 0.576 (0.204), 0.258 (0.208), and 
0.260, respectively. For predictive calculations, these values would be assumed 
indicative of operator leaming, offering an understanding of how rapidly the operator 
is capable of improving the probability that each of its launches will be successful. 
As previously mentioned, regressions of the probability intervals against the shape 
and size parameters must be performed to draw predictive conclusions regarding the 
probability that a manufacturer will succeed on a specific launch. Such calculations 
are performed for some of the variants examined in the following section.
4.3 Results for current commereial variants and operators
This section examines launch vehicles introduced after 1980, calculates the joint- 
distribution of shape and size parameters associated with each, and presents failure 
and operator data for selected vehicles. This analysis varies the shape and size 
parameters between zero and one, with a reference date of 40000 Julian (i.e., 6 July 
2009). The number of parameter combinations used for each vehicle varies based on
77
31'.
the number of flights, and was selected to minimize the number of computations
while retaining a suitable level of accuracy. Accuracy was ensured through a k
qualitative examination of the cumulative distributions for each of the parameters.
The number of divisions per parameter is listed, the number of combinations being 
this value squared.
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4.3.1 Identification and discussion o f examined vehicles
The analysis discussed herein examined all commercial launch variants that first
launched in an operational manner after 1 January 1980, and that underwent 20 or
fewer launches before 7 December 2003. All vehicles from that dataset that exhibited 7
one or more failures are listed in Table 4.1. The number of shape and size parameter
divisions used for the analysis of each vehicle is presented in the third column from
the right. The second to last column is the number of flights, N, and the final column
is the number of failures for that variant. : |
As previously mentioned, for every vehicle that experiences no failures, the joint j
distribution defining its learning has standard deviations associated with each mean 
value that make the distribution uninformative. For these trivial data sets, the mean of 
each parameter is 0.5 with a standard deviation of 0.28. For this reason, such vehicles 
are not presented in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Shape and size parameter mean and standard deviation for each 
variant, correlation between the shape and size parameters, the number of  
divisions for each parameter used to develop the joint-distribution, the number 
of launch attempts per variant (N), and the corresponding number of failures 
(r)."
Vehicle a mean a std k mean k std correl a/kdiv N r
Ariane 5G 0.5863 0.2988 0.3477 0.2083 0.4042 17 16 3
Pegasus XL 0.5982 0.3172 0.3839 0.2035 0.4067 7 20 3
Ariane 1 0.5635 0.2878 0.1950 0.1185 0.3331 89 10 2
Atlas E 
Extra 0.5744 0.2888 0.0837 0.0465 0.3718 47 8 2
Atlas I 0.5713 0.2860 0.0986 0.0599 0.3642 111 11 2
Titan 34D 0.5693 0.2863 0.0373 0.0207 0.3571 111 7 2
Ariane 2 0.5678 0.2865 0.1164 0.0707 0.3509 111 6 1
Ariane 3 0.5749 0.2858 0.0221 0.0104 0.3818 93 11 1
Ariane 42P 0.8205 0.1147 0.0255 0.0000 0.0000 39 15 1
Athena 2 0.5783 0.2848 0.0634 0.0381 0.3893 113 3 1
Atlas G 
Centaur 0.5731 0.2903 0.0177 0.0082 0.3903 111 7 1
Pegasus
HAPS 0.5716 0-2861 0.1202 0.0738 0.3660 111 2 1
Taurus 0.5808 0.2850 0.0419 0.0243 0.3996 111 5 1
Titan 401A 
Centaur 0.5844 0.2957 0.0113 0.0039 0.4920 111 9 1
Titan 401B 
Centaur 0.5792 0.2852 0.0414 0.0239 0.3941 111 7 1
Titan
402B/IUS 0.5781 0.2848 0.0631 0.0379 0.3886 111 5 1
Titan 403A 0.5745 0.2861 0.0399 0.0226 0.3779 111 5 1
Titan
II/SLV 0.5770 0.2873 0.0302 0.0143 0.3889 68 13 1
Zenit 3SL 0.6235 0.3123 0.0502 0.0227 0.5015 31 14 1
From Table 4.1, the likely learning exhibited by the operators on various programs 
can be compared. For example, the higher W alue for the Pegasus HAPS variant 
indicates that its operators learned qualities that allowed it to more significantly 
improve the probability that each successive launch would be successful than did the 
team operating the Atlas G Centaur. This seems intuitively reasonable since the Atlas 
was, theoretically, calling on more mature technologies than the Pegasus system at the 
respective time of each program.
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It must also be noted that the A:-value is not directly related to the number of failures. 
While vehicles with a high number of failures are likely to produce a situation where 
the program faces more opportunities to learn about its vehicle than programs with 
fewer failures, this increased leaming is not always observed. For example, although 
the Titan 34D has had more opportunities to learn from its failures than the Ariane 2 
vehicle, the larger size parameter presented in the table indicates that the organisation
operating the Ariane 2 vehicle more completely incorporated the lessons learned from 
its past experiences.
Additionally, it must be noted that the sequence of vehicle failures has a large role in 
the development of these shape and size parameters, a quality that can be observed by 
examining variants with only one failure. For example, the Ariane 2 experienced its 
only failure on the first of six launches, while the Ariane 42? experienced its only 
failure on the seventh of 15 launches. These sequences, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, indicate that the failure on the Ariane 42? was likely a random failure.
while the Ariane 2 failure could have been the result of inexperience. This is further y|
supported by the fact that the Ariane 42? came after the Ariane 2, which indicates that 
lessons learned from the Ariane 2 could have been employed on the later variant.
While an examination of all variants across all vehicles does not offer strong 
quantitative support for such intra-family changes in leaming rate, an examination of 
the Ariane leaming parameter calculations for all vehicles with one or more failures 
indicates that 12% of the shape parameter calculation can be attributed to the 
introduction date of the variant, with the size parameter having a 19% dependence on 
the introduction date. These values do offer support for an application of the intra­
family results presented in Guikema and Paté-Comell (2005) and discussed in DOT 
(2002) to the Ariane variants. Wliile a limited mechanism for applying such results 
could be accomplished using simple regression, this is not examined here.
4.3.2 Probability of success interval regressions for specific variants
The shape and size parameters, by themselves, do not offer insight into the probability 
that an operator will conduct a successful launch. For every combination of shape 
and size parameters, there will be a unique maximum attainable probability of success 
interval, calculated using Eq. 4.5 and Eq. 4.6. Consequently, it is not only important
— —
to understand the learning rate of a specific operator, but also the relationship between 
the learning parameters and the maximum probability of success inteiwal.
This work uses a multi-variable, third order linear regression to relate the shape and 
size parameters associated with a specific variant to its corresponding maximum 
probability of success inteiwal. Table 4.2 presents these regression coefficients for the 
Ariane 2, the Ariane 42P, Atlas G Centaur, and Pegasus XL. These vehicles were 
chosen for further analysis based on the distinguishing qualities discussed above 
regarding their rate of leaming and overall success rate. For all regressions presented, 
the regression constants are valid for the 95% confidence level and there is no 
significant F-statistic for the regression as a whole. A third-order regression, with 
respect to both shape and size parameters, was chosen to minimize the non-linearity 
and heteroskedacity obseiwed in lower order regressions.
Table 4.2: Regression coefficients defining the upper and lower boundaries of the 
probability interval within which the probability that an operator will 
successfully complete a mission with the identified variant for any launch, based 
on the currently observed flight history o f each variant
Vehicle int a a-^ 2 S i '^ 3 k k^2 k^3 R^2
Ariane 2
ub 0.953 -0.012 0 . 013 -0.009 0.897 -5.295 9.847 0. 923
lb 0.074 -0 . 049 0 .000 0 . 000 0.724 0.000 -2.218 0.966
Ariane 42P
ub 1.000 0 . 000 0 . 000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
lb 0.793 -0.019 -0.005 -0.005 1.001 -1.476 0. 697 0. 946
Atlas G 
Centaur
ub 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 . 000 0 . 000 1.000
lb 0.577 -0.051 0 .181 -0.215 0.000 80.459 -1993 0.895
Pegasus XL
ub 0.783 -0.106 0.000 0 .000 0.810 0.000 0.000 0. 960
lb 0.087 -0.163 0 . 000 0 .000 0.853 -0.370 0 . 000 0.964
Examination of Table 4.2 offers some veiy interesting insights. When examining the 
intercepts, the Ariane 2 and Pegasus XL both exhibit a very low lower boundary 
intercept, while, for the upper boundary intereept, the Ariane 2 is very high relative to 
the Pegasus XL. While further supported by examination of Table 4.3, this is likely
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the result of (1) the greater size parameter for Pegasus XL and (ii) the wider interval
for Ariane 2 resulting from a less significant flight history.
82
5  V
Also interesting are the results of the Ariane 42P and the Atlas G Centaur. Both have
similar shape and size parameters, both have one failure each, and both have an upper I
boundary that is defined by a single value. What is interesting is the fact that the
maximum attainable probability of success for the Ariane 42P operator is bounded by
unity, while that of the Atlas G Centaur is slightly less. While the quantitative
difference is minimal, it is still interesting to note that the number and order of
failures has a noticeable impact on these calculations, as is expected. Compared
against the Ariane 42P flight history, discussed above, the Atlas G Centaur
experienced its single failure on the second to last flight in its history. As previously
discussed, the sequence of observed failures is what causes the decreased upper
boundary observed in Table 4.2, and offers an indication that the random failures
associated with the Atlas G Centaur may have farther reaching consequences than
those associated with the Ariane 42P. T
From these regression coefficients, the expected upper and lower boundaries of the 
interval containing the maximum probability that an operator will conduct a 
successful launch can be found for each variant by solving the regression for the mean 
values of the shape and size parameters. The results of this calculation are presented 
in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Average shape and size parameters for each variant identified and 
the upper and lower boundaries containing the maximum probability associated 
with an operator successfully launching its variant, based on the currently 
observed flight history of each variant
Vehicle a mean k mean correl ub - inf
lb - 
inf
Ariane
2 0.5678 0.1164 0.3509 0.9975 0.1269
Ariane
42P 0.8205 0.0256 0.3509 1.0000 0.7956
Atlas G 
Centaur 0.5731 0.0177 0.3903 0.9961 0.5813
Pegasus
XL 0.5982 0.3839 0.4057 1.0303 0.2629
When examining Table 4.3, the calculated upper boundaiy for the Pegasus XL 
operator violates the laws of probability theory, a mathematical issue that is common 
with confidence interval computations. Identical to current practice in binomial and 
Bayesian problems where this exact situation occurs, the Pegasus XL would have an 
upper boundary of unity, as opposed to the presented value of 1.0303.
From Table 4.3, a few very important conclusions could be drawn. First, although the 
Atlas G Centaur was most likely designed and assessed to have a probability of 
success on each mission no less than 99.7%, this computation implies that its cunent 
flight history indicates there is less than a 2.5% chance that its operator could achieve 
such a level of success. At the same time, while the examined flight history for the 
Pegasus XL indicates that its operator could still achieve a probability of successfully 
launching a mission that exceeds 99.7%, it is possible that this probability could be as 
little as 26%.
When comparing worst-case scenarios, there is only a 2.5% chance that the maximum 
probability of success attainable for the Pegasus XL operator is less than 26%. At the 
same time, it is equivalently unlikely that the Atlas G Centaur operator will exhibit an 
ability to launch its vehicles with a probability of success less than 58%. While this 
worst-case scenario is less than 2.5% probable, the worst-case scenario for the Atlas 
G Centaur is much better than that of the Pegasus XL. This difference in worst-case 
scenario is likely a function of the number of failures relative to the number of flights
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for each variant and the order of the failures within the flight history. This same 
relationship between the number of flights and uncertainty is seen using classical 
binomial and Bayesian analytical approaches, while the order of the failures has 
already been identified as a cause for prolonging the convergence of the interval 
containing the probability that an operator can successfully launch its vehicles.
In addition to future predictions, the learning parameter approximation can be used to 
look backwards at intervals bounding the probability associated with an operator 
successf-illy launching the first vehicle within an examined variant. For the Pegasus 
XL, the figures above predict that the true probability associated with its operator 
successfully completing the first mission to be less than 70% but greater than -6%. 
As with the previous situation where the maximum attainable probability is calculated 
to be greater than unity, this negative number would be raised to zero. Therefore, the 
revised estimate associated with the probability that the first Pegasus XL launch 
would have been successful was less than or equal to 70%.
4.3.2.1 Accounting for operators with multiple variants
Calculating the shape and size parameters that approximate operator learning for a 
specific variant using the logarithmic and monotonie assumptions presented within is 
a straightforward and objective exercise. For an operator of a single variant, such an 
analysis is both valid and significantly more objective than analyses that currently 
claim to achieve the same goals. However, when an operator is responsible for 
multiple variants, the analytical complexity and subjectivity increase significantly.
4.3.2.2 Orbital Sciences
Orbital Sciences operate a number of variants, six of which were examined for this 
study. These six vehicles are the Pegasus, Pegasus FI, Pegasus HAPS, Pegasus XL, 
Pegasus XL/HAPS, and Taurus. Of these six, the examined histories of three variants 
did not exhibit an unsuccessful mission. These three are the Pegasus, Pegasus H, and 
Pegasus XL/HAPS variants. For each of these variants that had not exhibited a failed 
mission, both the shape and size parameters have a mean of 0.5 and a standard 
deviation of 0.28. How these vehicles are treated in an analysis of the rate at which 
Orbital Sciences learns will have a significant effect on the results.
84
Table 4.4 presents three different groupings of the variants operated by Orbital 
Sciences. The first line presents the calculation for operator learning if all variants are 
considered and equally weighted in the calculation. Because half of the variants 
operated by the company have not failed, the parameters estimating organizational 
learning produce results similar to the trivial case discussed earlier. When examining 
just the Pegasus vehicles, where three out of five variants have exhibited no failures, 
the results are just as trivial. It is not until the analysis excludes all variants without 
one or more failures that the organizational leaming approximation begins to vaiy 
significantly from the trivial case.
Table 4.4: Average values for the shape and size parameters calculated using 
various groupings of Orbital Sciences launch vehicle variants
Group mean a std a mean k std k correl
Orbital (all 
vehicles) 0 .55 0.30 0.34 0.29 -0.02
Pegasus (all 
variants) 0 . 54 0.30 0.40 0.29 0.00
Orbital (all
variants that
exhibited at 0.59 0.30 0 . 18 0.19 0.22
least one
failure)
Examples such as this for Orbital Sciences highlight the importance of examining the 
knowledge collation and dissemination mechanisms employed within an organization. 
Such an examination is required to assess whether all variants are equally 
representative of a single operator, or whether operations within a single organization 
are so different for specific variants that the inclusion of a specific variant would 
invalidate the results of the analysis. For example, both Lockheed Martin and Boeing 
each own the intellectual property rights associated with a range of vehicle variants. 
However, it may be reasonable to argue that designating either Lockheed Martin or 
Boeing as an operator may offer little analytical benefit when assessing specific 
variants produced by each organization. How variants are attributed to an operator is 
open to debate and, based on the conclusions of Chang, should depend on the level 
and rate at which infomiation is shared between variant programs.
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4.4 Knowledge collation and dissemination systems
The concept of using organizational knowledge collation and dissemination processes 
as a characteristic for delineating launch vehicle operators was raised earlier in this 
work, with use of such a metric supported by the accepted recommendation for 
improving on launch vehicle failure rates, given the observation and analysis of 
launch failures occurring after 1958. As discussed earlier, learning is an activity that 
requires not only the acquisition of past experiences, but also an ability to apply the 
lessons learned from these experiences to future situations. Within an organization, to 
ensure lessons are recognized, retained, and applied, a system must exist that collates 
and disseminates data about past projects. If two programs have equal access to a 
shared information repository, it can be argued that the variants produced by those 
programs could be considered to have the same operator.
There is a large body of literature on the topic of qualitatively and quantitatively 
assessing the functionality of an organization, a small segment of it available through 
examination of Garber and Paté-Comell (2004), Souder et al. (2005), McManus et al. 
(1993). As identified in these works, there are statistical methods that are cunently 
being applied to characterize the effects organizational stmctures have on the 
retention and dissemination of knowledge within an organization. If the conclusions 
of Chang (1996) and Chang (2000) are valid, the complexity of a launch system may 
not be as important a consideration when assessing the probability that an operator 
will conduct a successful launch as the rate at which an organization is able to leam 
from its mistakes. As only four of the 19 recommendations for launch vehicle
reliability enhancement identified within Chang (2000) were design specific, this 
issue of knowledge collation and dissemination appears vital for future space launch 
assessments.
4.5 Recent developments and analytical implications
Of greatest note with regards to recent launch vehicle history is the initial Delta 4- 
Heavy demonstration launch on 21 December 2004. While Boeing considered the 
flight a success from the point of view a mission demonstration, this research would 
consider the flight a failure. Due to underperfomiance early in the flight, the vehicle
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failed to reach its intended orbital parameters. While the intended final destination 
was a circular, 36,350 km orbit, the vehicle reached an elliptical orbit of 19,035 km at 
perigee and 36,413 km at apogee. From a commercial mission perspective, this 
would be considered a failure.
The number of flights for both the Delta IV and the Delta IV-FIeavy is not significant 
enough to be able to draw long-term conclusions. Many vehicles, such as those 
developed by Orbital Sciences, have experienced early failures from which the 
vehicles have gone on to exhibit exemplary reliability. There is no conclusive proof 
that such a situation cannot again occur with the Delta IV-Heavy. Therefore, as it 
cannot be proven otheiwise, it is assumed that the probability of success associated 
with the Delta IV and its variants is at the US Air Force mandated level of 0.997.
4.6 LSM mission: conventional risk
Given the limited number of vehicles that are capable of carrying out the LSM
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mission for both a 2500 kg and 3000 kg payload, and the cost per vehicle for the
required orbits as discussed in Chapter 3, the most cost effective vehicles are found to 
be the Delta IV-Heavy if the LSM mission is to be completed using just conventional 
means; and the Delta II, for the conventional component of the tether-based
unconventional system. As the Delta II is not examined herein because it has not ÿ
t.experienced any failures, this work assumes that it, as well, has a probability of |
success per mission of 0.997, as per the design.
With this information, the values for the risk assessment of each option are presented 
in Table 4.5. If a value camiot be calculated at this point based on the information 
cuiTently presented in this work, the cell is left blank.
_______
Table 4.5 Values currently calculated for the LSM mission risk assessment.
Conventional MMET-based
C.
c MMET, Ï  
^MMET,2
P f . L V
Pf,H\
P f , T \
Pf,H2
P f , T 2
$254M
0.003
$70M
0.003
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Chapter 5
Successful Handovers
When examining rendezvous operations that involve tether systems, only Draper et a i 
(2004) addresses the probability of failure associated with random operational errors. 
While other papers such as Williams et al. (2005) and Cartmell et al. (2004) identify 
the issue of errors at the time of handover, both assume that the location and 
orientation of the tether at release or rendezvous is nominal. Williams et al. (2005) 
assumes the orientation of the tether can be coiTected by changing the location of a 
mass located on the tether, thus correcting initial errors in tether orientation so that the 
system becomes properly oriented at the time of rendezvous to produce system 
success. Unlike the tether errors examined in Williams et al. (2005), Cartmell et al. 
(2004) only accounts for operational handover failures, but does not account for 
failures caused by misalignment of the tether systems, nor does it address the issue of 
tethers that are unsynchronised.
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With staged MMET systems like that proposed for the LSM mission, understanding
the probability that a handover will be accomplished successfully is vital when |
■ ■performing a reliability analysis of the whole system. This work offers an indication 
of the inherent insertion accuracy for conventional vehicles and provides a f;
methodology for calculating the probability of a successful rendezvous between two 
MMET systems that are staged as they are in the LSM mission.
5.0 Handovers in staged systems
All multi-stage unconventional launch systems that do not incorporate a Pegasus-style 
architecture must handover a payload from one system to another. Despite precise 
orbital dynamic models, space launch missions are not free of error. While the orbital - $
dynamics governing most conventional space systems are known, Berger (2005) 
identifies that even conventional systems executing a traditional rendezvous are prone 
to failure, ^
.'■r
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While it does seem intuitively likely that a payload handover between the tips of two 
rotating structures with radii on the order of hundreds of metres may not occur as 
planned, as identified in Cartmell et al. (2004), it does not seem reasonable that the 
cause of failure would not be attributed to errors in system orientation. Wliile a 
precise estimate of accuracy is not possible without a greater understanding of the 
control systems that would be incorporated, it is reasonable to believe that the ideal 
orbit associated with a missed handover like that presented in Cartmell et al. (2004) 
may rarely be achieved. More likely is the situation where both the releasing and 
receiving systems are not ideally aligned at the time of handover. As an example of 
the causes associated with such random failures, the deorbit and reboost of the 
systems following each mission may put the MMET systems on un synchronised 
orbits. Or, as a mission begins, the MMET systems may take longer than expected to 
spin-up, or the systems may start spinning up at the wrong time. Such random errors 
could be defined to within known tolerances, based on the currently unknown control 
systems that will be employed, these tolerances possibly being expressed in terms of 
the error in orbital position or system orientation. Regardless, it is likely that a small 
motor would be needed to ensure a significant probability of success when handing 
over payloads within a staged MMET system. Such a motor could place the payload 
onto a transfer orbit, given the velocity vector of the payload at the time of release, 
and would ensure a successfiil rendezvous with the receiving system.
5.1 Conventional rendezvous
It is rare that a conventional launch system will directly insert a payload into its final 
orbit. Whether a kick motor is employed for significant orbital changes, or spacecraft 
motors are used for small corrections, the insertion accuracy of conventional vehicles 
is not currently sufficient for ensuring rendezvous. This fact is obvious through 
examination of the insertion accuracies achievable with conventional launch vehicles. 
Launch vehicle manufacturers often provide performance data for their vehicles, 
which includes estimates of insertion accuracy. For the Delta II vehicle, Boeing 
(2000a) provides the following information with regards to its insertion accuracy.
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Table 5.1 Insertion accuracy for a conventional Delta II mission
3-sigma limits at 3-sigma limits at 3-sigma limits on 
Number of Stages Insertion Orbit Perigee Apogee inclination
2 LËÔ -25/4-9.3 km -9.3/4-9.S km -0.05/+0.05 deg
3 GTO -9.3/+9.3kin -  -2/4-6 deg
With the normal parameters presented in Table 5.1, rendezvous with an MMET would 
be highly unlikely without the assistance of a small motor. Assuming a payload could 
be successfully caught by a MMET if the payload is within 0.5 km and 0.5 degrees of 
its intended destination, there is only a 4.38% chance that the Delta II would produce 
a successful rendezvous. These tolerances are far greater than those accounted for in 
Cartmell et al. (2004), further illustrating the problems associated with the cunently 
envisioned handover failure mode. While Cartmell et al. (2004) was not intended to 
be an exhaustive study of handover failure modes, the principles associated with the 
mission design do offer an indication of the tolerances required to complete the 
mission.
Considering the capabilities of a standard vehicle like the Delta II, to successfully 
rendezvous with the MMET system, a small motor would be needed. After separating 
from the conventional launch vehicle that brought the payload from the surface of the 
Earth, the payload would be on its insertion orbit. To travel from this insertion orbit 
so that it may rendezvous with the MMET system, the motors attached to the payload 
must place the payload onto a suitable transfer orbit. The insertion orbit may be so 
close to the MMET that this transfer orbit could appear functionally equivalent to 
small orbital corrections. At the same time, as identified through examination of 
Table 5.1, the insertion orbit could be so significantly different from the MMET orbit, 
on which the payload is intended to be, that a more obvious transfer orbit would be 
required. To both enter and exit horn this transfer orbit, the payload motor must have 
sufficient propellant to produce the required impulses.
Calculating the impulse burns required to rendezvous given the spread of orbital 
conditions in Table 5.1 would require a use of the general orbital dynamic equations 
for intercept and rendezvous. As the information provided in Table 5.1 is quite broad.
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a full analysis of all possible errors is computationally cumbersome and expensive, 
and will not be accomplished within this research or presented herein. The following 
section identifies a likely failure mode associated with the mission discussed in 
Cartmell et al. (2004), and presents a methodology for calculating the probability of 
success associated with such an operation, if the error distribution associated with 
orbital position and system orientation at the time of the intended handover is known. 
As previously stated, these errors are a direct product of the employed control 
systems, which are not cuiTcntly known, making approximations of their accuracy 
speculative in nature.
5.2 M MET handovers
A payload is handed from one system to another by means of a successful 
rendezvous. When an MMET-based unconventional launch system only requires a 
single MMET, the only handover is between the conventional vehicle and the MMET 
system. If the location of the MMET tip with which the payload must rendezvous is 
known as a function of time, as well as the insertion orbit onto which the payload was 
delivered by the conventional launch vehicle component of the system, a transfer orbit 
and the required impulse bums for completing a successful rendezvous can be 
calculated in a straight-forward manner using texts such as Thomson (1986).
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For the MMET deployment concept where rendezvous occurs when the tethers are 
fully retracted and the tethers are deployed during operation, calculating an 
appropriate transfer orbit only requires an understanding of the Keplerian orbits 
representing both the insertion orbit and the orbit of the MMET system. However, 
examining a staged handover where the tethers are fully extended and rotating at the 
time of handover produces non-trivial payload velocity vectors relative to the 
Keplerian orbit of each MMET central facility.
5.2.1 Staged handovers
For staged systems like those discussed in Cartmell et a l (2004), handover between 
two MMET systems occurs instantaneously, such that the payload being released by 
the first system is instantaneously received by the second system. To successfully 
complete such a mission, the tip of the releasing MMET is functionally rendezvousing
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with the receiving tip. Considering the MMET systems typically examined by 
Cartmell are on the order o f hundreds o f kilometres in length, it must be understood 
that small angular errors relative to the central facility will produce significant 
distances between the tether tips. For an instantaneous handover, as required by the 
mission presented in Cartmell e t a l  (2004), handover is planned to occur when the 
two systems are aligned as presented in Fig. 5.1.
B .O
(0)
Figure 5.1: Illustration of an ideal handover between two momentum exchange 
tether systems, the releasing system identified as system A (left) and the receiving 
identified as system B.
As identified in Fig. 5.1, handover occurs at a specific orbital position relative to the 
orbit o f each system, identified in the figure for both systems as 6 „ . This location is 
represented for each MMET system as the angle between the location o f handover 
and the perigee associated with the orbit for MMET system A  and system B  as q
and Q, respectively. To gain the greatest altitude advantage achievable with each 
MMET system, 6^  ^ is likely to correspond to apogee for system the lower altitude
system; and perigee for system B,  the higher altitude system.
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Given the radius from the centre of the Earth to the central facility of system A and B, 
expressed as and , respectively; the length from the central facility of system A 
and system B to the tip of its respective system, expressed as and ; the radius 
from the centre of the Earth to the releasing tether tip at the time of handover, r'^  ; and 
the radius from the centre of the Earth to the receiving tether tip, zero seconds after 
the payload is released from the releasing tether tip, r^{o); a number of important 
equalities can be derived, expressed in Eq. 5.1.
Cl ^  A ~  ~  “ C i ~  ^B ( ^ )  ( 5  • 1 )
The radius from the centre of the Earth to the receiving tether tip is expressed as a 
function of time after release in this situation to highlight the fact that, when 
calculating a suitable transfer orbit in the presence of location errors at release, the 
position of the receiving tether at release is not as important as its location after the 
transfer orbit is capable of being completed. As presented later, the radius from the
centre of the Earth to the receiving tether tip at any instant is expressed as , the
same radius at the time of release is expressed as r^(o), and the radius from the centre 
of the Earth to the receiving tip a time t after release is expressed as (/).
Ensuring each payload is released at the proper time and location is a daunting task, 
especially when the system size prevents rapid corrections in position or velocity. 
When considering the lower altitude MMET discussed in Cartmell et a l (2004), a 
one-degree error in tether orientation relative to the central facility will produce a tip 
displacement of nearly 3.5 km relative to the intended handover location.
Considering the altitude of each mission, it is assumed that missions such as those 
discussed in Cartmell et al. (2004) will employ a combination of ground-based 
resources to synchronise the beginning of each mission, and on-board sensors that 
would ensure proper release. While there are many errors that could arise when 
synchronising the systems with ground-based systems, this work on handovers is only 
concerned with errors associated in positioning at release. As evident through 
examination of an error such as the one-degree orientation error discussed above.
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whose magnitude may be considered minute in conventional engineering systems, the 
unique qualities intrinsic to the MMET concept mean that traditionally minute errors 
can have significant implications for mission success.
5.2.2 Non-optimal release
Considering the types o f control systems that are likely to be employed for an 
MMET-based mission, this research anticipates that the two most likely errors with 
regards to handover would be observed in (i) orbital position and (ii) system angle. 
As identified in Fig 5.1, an ideal handover occurs when both systems are aligned with 
the gravity gradient at a designated handover location, Ofj. Errors in orbital position 
and system angle are identified in Fig. 5.2 for systems A  and 5 , with the orbital 
position error, relative to for each system identified as and A^g,
respectively; and the tether orientation error for each system identified as A^  ^ and 
A^g, respectively.
A <9,
fi.O
Figure 5.2 Errors in orbital position and system angle
It seems intuitively reasonable to assume that there is a high probability that such 
errors will exist. If such errors exist, a payload that is released in the presence o f such
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errors must be able to put itself onto a transfer orbit that will allow it to rendezvous 
with the receiving tip o f  the second tether, identified above as system B, to enable 
mission success. Based on the orbit o f  each MMET system, assuming the central 
facility o f each will travel around the Earth in a Keplerian manner, the orientation of 
each system at release, and the time between release and recovery, /; a transfer orbit 
can be calculated that would allow the payload to successfully rendezvous with the 
receiving system.
Figure 5.3 The three orbits required for a non-optimal handover: the releasing 
MMET (orbit A), the receiving MMET (orbit B), and the transfer orbit (orbit T)
In Fig. 5.3, the eccentricity and radius at perigee for the Keplerian orbit associated 
with the central facility o f system A ,  the central facility o f system 5 , and the transfer 
orbit are identified as and , eg and r^ g , and €j. and r ^ j , respectively. As
discussed earlier, the time between release and recovery o f the payload, /, is vital. 
Also important is the angle between the orbital location on the transfer orbit at
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payload release and recovery, . This angle will be important later in this derivation 
when solving for suitable transfer orbit parameters.
Since it may not be immediately clear why the time between release and recovery is 
vital to these calculations, Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5 highlight the position o f  systems A  and 
B  both at release and recovery. By examination o f Fig. 5.4, both systems are shown at 
the time o f payload release, in the presence o f positional and orientation errors. As 
discussed earlier, the time dependent notation for the radius between the centre o f the 
earth and the receiving payload tip is employed.
Figure 5.4 System A and B at the time of payload release.
After release, with the assistance o f the motor discussed earlier, the payload will enter 
a transfer orbit, identified in Fig. 5.5 as in Fig. 5.3 with a thick dashed line. As the 
payload is travelling along this transfer orbit, it is assumed for the purpose o f this 
research that both MMET system will continue to both travel along their respective 
orbits and rotate about their central facility. While the releasing payload will actually 
deorbit after release, the orbit o f system A  for the purposes o f this methodology is 
only relevant immediately prior to release. The position o f systems A  and B  after a
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time t is identified in Fig. 5.5, as are both the release and recovery positions o f the 
payload. As identified in Fig. 5.3, yj. is measured from the radius o f the payload at 
release to the radius o f the payload at recovery, both radii being measured from the 
centre o f the Earth.
Figure 5.5 System A and B at the time of payload rendezvous, after it has 
traversed the transfer orbit.
Unlike conventional spacecraft, because o f the size and rotation o f the MMET 
systems, the velocity vector o f the payload at release and o f the vector that must be 
attained to ensure successful rendezvous at recovery are not defined solely by the 
Keplerian orbital parameters associated with the central facility o f each system. 
Given the location, orientation, and operation o f both MMET systems, the orbital 
parameters for the payload at release, and those required for the payload to ensure a 
successful rendezvous can be calculated.
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5.2.3 Payload parameters at release and recovery
The orbital parameters o f the payload at release and recovery can be presented in 
terms o f the inertial reference frame. The velocity vector relative to the inertial frame 
for the tip o f each MMET system is the sum o f (i) the inertial velocity vector at the 
central facility and (ii) the local velocity o f the tip relative to the central facility. The 
inertial velocity vector o f the releasing tip o f system A  and its heading angle, and 
, respectively; and the velocity vector and heading angle for the receiving tip o f 
system B, Vg and /3 g , respectively; are presented in Fig. 5.6.
Figure 5.6 Initial orbital conditions for release from system A, and orbital 
conditions tbe payload must achieve at system B to ensure a successful 
rendezvous.
These velocity vectors for system A and B represent (i) the velocity vector that the 
payload will have at the time o f release and (ii) the velocity vector that must be 
attained by the payload as it arrives at the receiving tip to ensure successful
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rendezvous. As previously mentioned, these velocity vectors and heading angles are 
the sum o f the velocity vector at the central facility o f each system and the local 
velocity vector at the system tips. The velocity vector relative to the central facility 
for system A  and B  is identified in Fig. 5.7.
AO.
AO,
Figure 5.7 Conditions associated with the central facility of each MMET, 
assuming each travels along a Keplerian orbit, at the times of release and 
recovery.
The magnitude o f the velocity vectors identified in Fig. 5.7 and their respective 
heading angles can be calculated based on the orbital position o f the central facilities 
and the parameters o f the orbits. Using the notation employed within Thomson 
(1986), the velocity and heading angle o f  the central facility o f system A  can be found 
as in Eq. 5.2 and Eq. 5.3, respectively. The velocity and heading angle for system B  
is calculated in an identical manner. While represents the radius from the centre o f  
the Earth to the central facility o f system A  at the time o f release, there is no problem 
with substituting either or into Eq. 5.2 and Eq. 5.3, so long as is the radius 
at a time, /, after release. In Fig. 5.7, a desire to emphasise the fact that payload 
recovery occurs a significant amount o f time after release is the reason (/) is used.
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v , = . \ K 2 (1 (5,2)
f3  ^ -  arccos r.v/I (5.3)
In these equations, K  is the universal gravitational constant multiplied by the mass of 
the Earth, which is approximately equal to 3.985io’'*. While Eq. 5.2 and Eq. 5.3 are 
cuiTently expressed in terms of the radius to the central facility, relating these radii to 
orbital position is a straight-forward exercise, employing Eq. 5.4, which is presented 
in terms of system .4. As with Eq. 5.2 and Eq. 5.3, system B would be treated in an 
identical manner to system A, when the orbital parameters are presented relative to the 
time of payload recovery.
1
l + e c^os(0^^„ + A ^ J (5.4)
While calculating the magnitude of the velocity vector and the heading angle for the 
central facility of system B at the time of recover is straight forward once the orbital 
location of the central facility is known, identifying this location for elliptical orbit 
requires an iterative treatment of the Kepler equation. The Kepler equation defines 
the motion of an object around a Keplerian orbit in terms of the variable ^  . As 
discussed in Thomson (1986), the variable y/ is related to the radius from the centre 
of the Earth to the orbiting body, r, in terms of one half the major axis, a, and the 
eccentricity of the orbit, e, as in Eq. 5.5.
cos^ a - rae (5.5)
1 0 1
4For system B, this relationship can be expressed at the time of release and at the time j;rof recovery, which occurs at a time, t, after release, as in Eq. 5.6 and Eq. 5.7,
. -4respectively.
Of. -  (o)=     (5.6)
= —---- —  (5.7)
With these relationships, for an object travelling along a Keplerian orbit for a known 
time, the relationship presented in Eq. 5.8 will hold.
K { l - e J¥ b ^  (5.8)
By iteratively solving Eq. 5.8, the position of the central facility at the time of 
recovery, t, can be calculated. Once known, the position at any t will allow for the 
direct solution of the magnitude of the velocity vector and the heading angle 
associated with the central facility of system B,
While the velocity vectors associated with the central facilities of system and B is 
assumed here to be defined by the Keplerian orbit of each, the local velocity vector of 
each tip is a function of the angular velocity of the system about its central facility and 
the sub-span length of each system. It is further assumed for this analysis that the 
angular velocity of the sub-spans about the central facility in an MMET system is 
functionally independent of orbital location. Current research into the MMET system 
does continue to support the initial indications of Cartmell (1996) that the orbital 
dynamic equations contain significant non-linear, inter-coordinate coupling.
However, once these orbital dynamic equations are more fully derrived, independence 
could still be achieved through facility power variation. Further, the research 
presented herein assumes that the angular velocity of the tether spans about their 
respective central facilities is constant thioughout the handover operation. Even if
1 0 2
' ■ _____ : ;;v
further research into orbital dynamics indicates that ensuring such operational 
conditions are inefficient to meet, the core methodology presented here would remain 
valid. While the core methodology o f finding a suitable transfer orbit for the payload 
given an accurate release and recover position would remain as presented, the 
equations for locating the facility and determining the orientation o f system B  would 
need to be modified so as to incorporate future results.
Figure 5.8 Local velocity vector at both the payload and the receiving system tip 
as a product of angular velocity and sub-span length
Given a constant angular velocity for the sub-spans o f both system A  and system 5 , 
the magnitude o f the local velocity vector normal to the sub-span length for system A  
is equal to the product o f the angular velocity at which the sub-spans are rotating 
about the central facility, , and the sub-span length, . This product is identified 
in Fig. 5.8 for both systems A  and B .  Given the system orientation relative to the 
radius from the centre o f  the Earth to the central facility, the sum o f the local velocity 
at the tip and the velocity vector o f the central facility can be characterised in terms o f
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the sum of all radial components, ^  , and all tangential components, , for
system as in Eq. 5.9 and Eq. 5.10, respectively.
Z  sin -  co^L^ sin (5.9)
cos^^ + o)^L ^  cosA^, (5 . 10)
With these velocity components, the magnitude of the resulting vector and its heading 
angle, relative to the central facility, can be found using Eq. 11 and Eq. 12, 
respectively. It is important to note that the magnitude of this velocity vector is equal 
to the inertial velocity vector of the payload at release, but the heading angle is 
presented in terms of the radius from the centre of the Earth to the central facility. To 
ensure this is highlighted, this heading angle is represented as . As previously
employed, variables that are presented in terms of the payload or the span tip are 
noted with an apostrophe.
I
{5.11)
p .  =arctan (5.12)
To convert this heading angle into one that is applicable to the payload at release, the 
angle, (p^ , between (i) the radius to the central facility of system A, , and (ii) the 
radius from the centre of the Earth to the payload at release, , must be calculated. 
This angle is found for system A as in Eq. 5.13:
(p^  = arcsm LfsinA^^ (5.13)
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Using this angle, the heading angle for the payload at release from system A, Pj , is 
found as in Eq 5,14.
(5.14)
While fundamentally equivalent, care must be taken when solving Eq. 5.9 through Eq. 
5.14 for system B as the reference defining is not the same as that defining the
same angle for system A, This change in reference modifies the negativity in Eq. 5.9 
and Eq. 5.10. If ignored, the end results would be incorrect.
As with the earlier equations, it must be noted that finding the equivalent angle for 
system B requires the sign to be reversed.
With these initial conditions, the eccentricity and radius of perigee for the orbit 
associated with the payload at release can be calculated with Eq. 5.15 and Eq. 5.16, 
respectively.
Ï
W A v 'J  5 cos^ p'  ^ +sin^ p \K J (5.15)
p , A
(r>;, c o s P j  y (5.16)
Through an understanding of the payload orbit at release, and the location at which 
the payload must be after a time t to ensure rendezvous with the second MMET 
system, a transfer orbit can be calculated. Depending on the payload motor size, the 
payload will either be capable of making the bums required to both enter and exit 
form this transfer orbit, or the lack of adequate propellant will cause the errors present 
at the time of release to result in a handover failure.
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5.2.4 Defining a suitable transfer orbit
As discussed, a non-optimal payload release can be successfully received by the 
second MMET system if the payload is placed on a suitable transfer orbit. Knowing 
the radius from the centre of the Earth to the payload at release, , and the radius 
from the centre of the Earth to the payload at the time of rendezvous with the second 
MMET, /'g, and the angle between them, / j , the eccentricity, e .^, and the orbital 
location at release relative to perigee,  ^ , for an appropriate transfer orbit can be 
found by iteratively solving Eq. 5.17 and Eq. 5.18, simultaneously.
When solving Eq. 5.18, y/ .^ and are defined as in Eq. 5.19 and 5.20.
ÜT - ncos^^, =-2:— d. (5.19)
Üt ~cosy^^, = - : ----^  (5.20)aj6j
Once a suitable transfer orbit is found, as with the central facility of each MMET 
system, the parameters of the transfer orbit will dictate the magnitude of the velocity 
vector and the heading angle at any location on the transfer orbit. Upon release from 
the first MMET system, the motor must provide an impulse such that the velocity 
vector plus the imparted velocity provided by the motor produces the magnitude of 
the velocity vector and heading angle as identified in Eq. 5.21 and Eq. 5.22. At 
rendezvous with system B, Eq. 5.21 and Eq. 5.22 will calculate the velocity and 
heading angle for the payload on the transfer orbit at the location of rendezvous.
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a
- K (5.21)
P ,T ;
p i A = arccos (5.22)
At the time of release, the velocity vector and heading angle produced by system A, 
and calculated using Eq. 5.11 and Eq. 5.12, must be modified using an impulse to 
achieve the vector magnitude and heading calculated using Eq. 5.21 and Eq. 5.22. At 
rendezvous with system 5, the velocity magnitude and heading calculated using Eq. 
5.21 and Eq. 5.22, using parameters that appropriately correspond to system B, must 
be modified with an impulse to produce the velocity magnitude and heading 
associated with the receiving end of system B, as calculated using Eq. 5.11 and Eq. 
5.12.
These required impulses for entry onto and exit from this transfer orbit are identified 
in Fig. 5.9, as well as the velocity vector produced by system A at release and required 
by system B at rendezvous. Upon entry and exit, an impulsive thmst with a 
magnitude of Av  ^ at release, and Avjj at rendezvous with system B, must be applied 
to the payload at a heading angle of p ^  and p ^ , respectively.
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Figure 5.9 Diagram of the impulses and their directions required to enter, and 
then exit, the transfer orbit
The magnitude o f the velocity vector and the heading angle o f the impulse bum must 
be sufficient upon release such that the Eq. 5.23 and Eq. 5.24 agrees with Eq. 5.21 and 
Eq. 5.22.
(vx cosy?;+Av^ cos^Ax)'+ 
'(vx sin^' +Av  ^sin^A^y (5.23)
/^r,A = arctan Vx sin/?; +Av^ s in ^ ^  cos/?; +Av^ cosyg^ (5.24)
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When exiting the transfer orbit, the impulse and direction must be such that Eq. 5.25 
and Eq. 5.26 are consistent with Eq. 5.11 and Eq. 5.12, when solved for system B.
i^ r,B cos^y. g + Av  ^c o s /? ^ ) + 
siiiy^;  ^ +Avyj sin /?^y (5.25)
W,B P t,B ^^B /^Afi
'^T ,B  P t ,B ^  P bB
(5.26)
To properly size the motor required for a sufficient level of mission assurance, the 
payload, M , and the initial motor mass, ^, must be capable of producing all
impulses required for the mission. This total impulse is equal to the sum of the 
impulses at both entry and exit. Using the rocket equation, the relationship between 
total impulse required for completing the rendezvous and the payload and initial 
motor mass are related as in Eq. 5.27, assuming ail propellant is burnt after both 
operations, and assuming the motor characteristic is represented by the variable v .
Av  ^ + Avy, = ylog (5.27)
With the rocket equation, which offers a relationship between change in propellant 
mass and impulse, the number of attainable orbits for a given motor size out of the 
number of possible orbits within reasonable parameters could be determined. From 
here, a probability of success could be developed per motor size.
It is unlikely that this probability of success estimate could be appropriately modelled 
with a standard normal distribution. For example, if the error in orbital angle is 
negative for the releasing system while it is positive for the receiving system, the 
probability of success is likely higher for a set motor size than it would be if the angle 
were reversed. Examining a sufficient number of combinations such that a 
probability of success for each motor size can be computed would require
109
T - îV v :-
development of an algorithm specifically designed with the equations presented 
above. Such an analysis has not been performed in support of this research.
5.3 LSM mission: handover risk
For the LSM mission, it is assumed that the analyst has appropriately sized a kick 
motor based on the errors specific to the employed MMET systems. If such a sizing 
has been conducted appropriately, it is assumed that the probability of successful 
rendezvous is in line with all other systems, being a probability of 0.997 that 
rendezvous will succeed at each stage.
Table 5.2 Values currently calculated for the LSM mission risk assessment.
Conventional MMET-based
C,
CMMETA
c^ MMET,2 
P f , L V
Pf,H\
P f , T \
Pf,H2
P f , T 2
$254M $70M
0.003 0.003
0.003
0.003
1 1 0
Chapter 6 
MMET Reliability
Chapter 6 through Chapter 10 address the probability of failure associated with an 
MMET system. Chapter 6 through Chapter 9 describe the experimental and analytical 
work that was done to develop a sufficient reliability estimate for the system. Chapter 
6 presents an examination of the strength of aramid fibres like those that would be 
employed in space tether structures; Chapter 7 presents an empirical equation for 
predicting the outcome of hypervelocity impacts with tether stmctures; Chapter 8 
presents work performed in the hypeiwelocity impact facility at the University of 
Kent, work that was performed to examine both (i) whether secondary debris clouds 
form as a result of an initial debris impact with a tether target and (ii) how such clouds 
propagate; and Chapter 9 discusses a Monte Carlo-based analysis approach for 
employing these previous elements to calculate reliability estimates for a momentum 
exchange tether system. Chapter 10 uses this analytical framework to assess the 
reliability of various tether configurations that could be employed for the LSM 
mission.
6.0 Background on aramid fibre strength testing
Of the researched tether concepts, Kevlar fibres are often a main structural 
component. While aramid fibres are reported to be extremely strong relative to their 
weight, this strength is identified in works such as Allen et al (1992), Benhoulo et a l 
(1997), and Wang and Xi a (1999), to vary as a result of factors such as loading rate or 
environmental conditions. Representative samples must be tested in order to 
understand how much, and under what conditions, this strength varies. Aramid fibres, 
such as Kevlar and Twaron, are increasingly popular for a wide range of uses. From 
bulletproof vests to space vehicle structures, these fibres exhibit properties that are 
uniquely beneficial to each intended use. Apart from its various benefits, one of the 
rare qualities aramid fibre possesses is its variation in strength as a function of load- 
rate.
I l l
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The strength of a rope is often characterized by its break strength, which is the tensile 
force required to break the rope. For aramid fibres, it has been observed that the |
strain-rate has a significant impact on the break strength. In many cases, this 
difference could be on the order of 20% or more. If an aramid fibre strand, or rope 
composed of aramid fibre strands, is loaded at its optimal strain-rate, the observed 
break strength will be at a maximum. However, there are a number of factors 
affecting this optimum strain-rate, not all of which have been fully investigated or 
have become understood.
For the design of systems relying on aramid fibres to provide stracture, understanding 
this optimal strain-rate could be significantly beneficial. By optimising a system so as 
to ensure aramid fibre members are loaded most effectively, significant increases in 
performance could be seen. This investigation provides a number of important data 
points for assessing how break-strength varies with strain-rate in aramid fibres, and 
how multi-strand braided rope performs as the number of constituent strands 
increases.
6.1 M aterial specifics: Twaron
The aramid fibre examined during this work was Twaron, produce by the Teijin 
Twaron Company.^ The Teijin Twaron Company has classified each strand that made 
up the tested rope samples as Twaron 1680 dtex. Each strand of Twaron is a bundle 
of individual fibres, those fibres being oriented mostly parallel to each other.
Yarns and fabric stiands are measured using two main types of linear density: a tex 
and a denier. A tex is the mass, in grams, of a piece of yam or fabric strand that 
is 1000 metres long and a denier is the mass per 9000 metres. The abbreviation dtex is 
short for decitex, and one decitex is the mass, in grams, of a yam or fabric strand that 
is 10 000 metres long (i.e., one dtex is equal to 10 tex). For the Twaron tested during 
these experiments, while they are labelled as being 1680 dtex, Teijin Twaron 
measures its actual linear density to be 1730 dtex, as presented in Table 1. Table 1 
also presents a number of other material characteristics reported by the manufacturer.
Table 6.1: Properties for the Twaron used in this work, as provided by Teijin 
Twaron on the data sheet designated as 04-007.
Mechanical Characteristics
Linear density (Named) 1680 dtex
Linear density (Measured) 1730 dtex
Break strength (N) 350 N
Tenacity (mN/tex) 2023 mN/tex
Elongation at Break 0.0355
Cord-Moduius (ASTM, GPa) 71 GPa
Properties
Density o f the polymer 1440 - 1450 kg/m3
Limiting Oxygen Index (LOI) depending on application 29, 36 % (powder, rope)
UV stability Not good, needs protection
Hydrolysis (water or steam) Depending on temperature, severe 
strength loss occurs
Decomposition temperature > 450 °C
Heat resistance at 200°C , 48 hrs (residual strength) 90% %
Linear coefficient of thermal expansion (axial, lateral) -3.5, +2 ppm/K
Moisture content (dependent on stock circumstances) 4 ,7 % (high, low)
Specific heat 1.42 J/gK
A quality of Twaron that is not noted in Table 6.1 is the strain-rate dependence of 
break strength. Such dependence is observed using charted results provided by Teijin 
Twaron and presented in Fig 6.1. This chart shows, for fibre strands that are twisted a 
stated amount, the break strength of those strands as a function of strain-rate. From 
Fig 6.1, it appears that the material break strength reaches a local maximum when the 
strain is increased at a rate between 9% and 20% per minute. While this rate seems to 
shift with the differing amount of twist experienced by the strand, it is assumed that 
each will have a local maximum that is not significantly greater than 100% strain per 
minute.
It is also important to note that the equipment used for this experimentation at the 
University of Glasgow was unable to replicate the results presented in Fig 6.1 because 
of equipment load-rate limitations. As the tensile testing machine used during these 
experiments was not capable of achieving an extension per minute of greater than 200 
mm, and the minimum sample length required by the clamps is around 300 mm, the 
available equipment was not able to exceed the theoretical limit of 66% strain per
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minute. As seen later in the presented results, the maximum strain rate used for this 
investigation was just less than 26%.
Another item of note when examining Fig 6.1 is that the break strength increases as 
the amount of twist increases before falling back significantly after the maximum 
presented at 80 rotations per metre. While it is not known what causes the increase in 
break strength for samples that are twisted less than or equal to 80 rotations per metre, 
it is assumed that the significant decrease after a certain threshold, a threshold that is 
believed to be at or around the 80 rotations per metre based on the information 
provided by Teijin Twaron and presented in Fig. 6.1, is due to inter-fibre (i.e. intra­
strand) friction.
The final item that may be of interest when comparing the results presented in Fig 6.1 
to the data presented in Table 6.1 is the coirespondence of the maximum break 
strength cited for Twaron as being equivalent to an approximation of the local 
maximum for a Twaron strand subjected to a twist rate of 80 rotations per metre. 
Noting this is important in any future work that may be attempted with regards to 
modelling the Twaron rope. While it is assumed that there is no significant twist in 
the strands as they are braided into rope, as discussed below, a more accurate model 
of the manufacturing process would need be incorporated into any model of the rope 
strength and internal interactions.
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Figure 6.1: Twaron 1000, 1680 dtex, graph of break strength (N) verses strain 
rate for varions amounts of material twist. This figure is supplied courtesy of 
Teijin Twaron, document number “Y4644+6649+6650+6962-Rate.xls / FigRate”.
6.2 Manufacturing Twaron rope
The Twaron ropes examined in this work were manufacture by Culzean Fabrics o f  
Kilmarnock, Scotland, using Teijin Twaron 1680 dtex Twaron strands. Two 
variations were examined for this work, one composed o f four braided strands and 
one composed o f eight braided strands. The strands were not pre-twisted before they 
were braided, nor were they intentionally twisted during the braiding process. The 
braiding process employed a standard over-over technique. A picture o f a four-strand 
braided specimen is presented in Fig 6.2, separated so the braiding pattern can be 
observed. Also o f note from the picture is the fact that the strands do not appear 
twisted relative to the braiding.
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Figure 6.2: View of Twaron strands, spread to illustrate the braid pattern used 
in both the four-strand and eight-strand rope samples.
The eight-strand braid, which is not pictured, is identical in pattern to the four-strand 
rope.
6.3 Test apparatus
The four-strand and eight-strand Twaron ropes were tested using a Lloyds 10000, 
50kN tensile testing machine. While the machine capability included loads up to 
50kN, a 5kN load cell was used for these experiments, as its capability was more 
similar to the anticipated maximum loads. The test apparatus did not include 
feedback sensors, so each tensile test was conducted under a uniform extension rate 
set at a specific millimetre per minute rate for each test.
The Twaron rope samples were held during the tests using a split-cylinder clamp 
system, manufactured at the University o f Glasgow. Each clamp is composed o f a 
cylinder post, which is fastened to the base; and a split cylinder, which is not attached 
to either the base or the cylinder post. These components are identified in Fig 6.3. 
This split-cylinder design is not unique, as it is readily available within the yam 
testing and manufacturing industry. The split-cylinder clamp manufactured by the 
University o f Glasgow incorporated a free split cylinder (i.e., one that was not 
attached to the cylinder post when not in a test configuration) because o f cost and 
manufacturing complexity considerations. This design did not produce any adverse 
effect on the results because all specimens were loaded into the clamps such that 
sample slack was removed prior to the specimen being pre-loaded. Once loaded, the
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tension in the test specimen holds the split-cylinder clamp together, effectively self- 
securing the test specimen within the clamp. When placed together, the cylinder post 
and the split-cylinder are termed the cy lin d er  within this work.
For these tests, each test specimen was wrapped around the cylinder for three full 
turns. As the free end o f the specimen is clamped between the cylinder post and the 
split-cylinder, these three turns are counted from where the specimen exits this flat 
clamp face. Three turns were used because (i) it was observed that the free end did 
not noticeably slip in this configuration and (ii) every test that was conducted with 
fewer than three turns resulted in the specimen failure occurring outside the guage 
length, often somewhere on the cylinder and generally at the edge o f the flat clamp 
face.
Cylinder 
post
Splitcylinder
Sampleexit
Clamp base
Sampleorigin
Figure 6.3: Illustration of the split-cylinder clamp securing a specimen in the test 
configuration.
To aid in the observation o f sample slip around the cylinder and between the flat 
clamp faces, after loading the specimen into each clamp, the samples were marked at
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the flat clamp face. These marks can be seen in Fig 6.3 just below the free end, called 
the sa m p le  o rig in  in the picture. By marking all three loops on both sides o f the flat 
clamp face, it was also observed that elongation occurred in the specimen for all 
locations along the cylinder and that the free end did not significantly slip from its 
original position.
After securing and marking the specimen using both split-cylinder clamps, the clamps 
were loaded into the tensile testing machine. A picture o f the loaded machine is seen 
in Fig 6.4. Also in Fig 6.4 is a full view o f the specimen loaded between the two 
split-cylinder clamps, with the gauge length identified. The gauge length is the 
distance between where each specimen begins to leave the split-cylinder clamps. For 
each test reported in this thesis, the specimen broke within this gauge length.
Gauge
Length
Figure 6.4: View of a sample in test configuration (left) and a close-up view of the 
specimen within the split-cylinder clamps, identifying the gauge length.
Once each specimen was loaded into the Lloyds machine, it was preloaded to 20kN, 
with a standard deviation o f around 3kN, and the test conducted until failure. The test
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finished when a significant portion of the specimen had failed due to tension in the 
strands.
6.4 Test results and discussion
Each test was named as per the designation system presented in Table 6.2. This
naming system was used to aid in the data analysis by identifying the test conditions
within the name.
Table 6.2 Naming system used to identify each test.
X = Material type (T = Twaron, D = Dynema)
Y = Number of strands composing specimen (Numeric)
W = Structure (S = Independent Strands, B = Braided)
Z = % elongation per minute, multiplied by 100 (4-digil numeric)
Using the naming system identified in Table 6.2, 13 successful tests were carried out 
on the rope specimens. A successful test was one where the specimen failure 
occurred within the gauge length. More tests were conducted with the four-strand 
braided rope because the distribution of results was not as expected. Since the eight- 
strand braided rope testing occurred after the data analysis of the four-strand results 
was completed, fewer tests were conducted on the eight-strand because the results, as 
they were obtained, were in closer agreement with the properties observed from the 
four-strand testing.
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Table 6.3: Test Results
Stress
Test
Guage
Length
(mm)
Total
Length
(mm)
Pre-
Load
(N) Extensionmm/min
Strain
/min
Break
Force
(N)
at
Break
(MPa)
T4B0860 94 814 22 70 0.086 858 17861
T4B0915 45 765 27 70 0 .092 1035 21528
T4B1261 81 801 20 101 0.126 1072 22306
T4B1414 93 813 20 115 0 .141 961 19996
T4B1514 86 806 18 122 0.151 1080 22465
T4B1776 91 811 19 144 0.178 941 19583
T4B2026 75 795 22 161 0.203 1040 21647
T4B2555 63 783 20 200 0.256 886 18432
T8B0994 65 795 20 79 0.099 1451 15102
T8B1246 73 803 24 100 0.125 1849 19234
T8B1499 91 821 24 123 0 .150 1723 17932
T8B1746 112 842 23 147 0.175 1443 15011
T8B1983 57 787 21 156 0.198 1046 10879
I
Using the results presented in Table 6.3, a second order polynomial was fitted to each 
data set using normal linear regression techniques. These regression lines are 
identified in Fig 6.5 and Fig 6.6, along with each data point.
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Figure 6.5 Break strength, in Newtons, as a function of percentage elongation per 
minute for ropes composed of four, simply braided Twaron strands.
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Figure 6.6 Break strength, in Newtons, as a function of percentage elongation per 
minute for ropes composed of eight, simply braided Twaron strands.
With this regression line, the standard deviation of the dataset was calculated based on 
error relative to this regression line. This use of the regression line in the calculation 
of standard deviation is assumed to be valid because the regression technique assumes 
the data points are noraially distributed around the true values. After calculating the 
variance and standard deviation, a qualitative check for heteroskedacity did not raise 
concerns about the data fit.
The maximum break force observed during the testing of each rope, the maximum 
break force calculated using the regression curve, and the standard deviation 
associated with the regression curve are presented in Table 6.4. Of note, the 
maximum break force observed for the four-strand braided rope is well within one 
standard deviation of the calculated maximum break force, while the tested maximum 
for the eight-strand rope is barely within the one-sigma level. This is likely to be 
dependent on the number of tests, and is not an indication of greater variability in the 
eight-strand braided rope caused by an unknown mechanical explanation.
1 2 1
3-'
MTable 6.4 Tested and calculated maximum performance for each rope.
Max Break Standard
Max Break Force Force Deviation
Tested (N) Calculated (N) (N)
T4B* 1080 1028.79 67.87
TBB* 1849 1788.45 51.92
Also based on the calculated regression curves, Table 6.5 presents the strain per 
minute at the maximum calculated break force for each of the four-strand and eight- 
strand rope. While inconclusive based only on the limited number of data points 
presented in Fig 6.1, the results of Table 6.5 could be used in a model of the rope 
specimens to determine how much effective twist is present in each of the specimens. 
Understanding the amount of twist that is produced by the braiding process could 
allow for an optimisation of the braiding machine (i.e., the strands could be loaded 
with a certain pre-twist that produces an optimised amount of twist after that inherent 
in the braiding process is applied).
Table 6.5: Strain rate at calculated maximum break strength.
strain per 
minute at Max 
Break Strength
T4B* 15.96%
T8B* 13.72%
From previous observations, it was noted that the fibres within each braided strand do 
not appear to be twisted relative to the longitudinal axis of the strand. This would 
imply that the effective twist within each strand relative to the longitudinal axis of the 
rope is directly dependent on the number of strands present in the braid (i.e., for fewer 
strands, the twist is greater). This conclusion of effective twist, relative to the rope, 
seems to be supported by the decrease in the optimum strain per minute as the number 
of strands increase. From Fig 6.1, it is clear that the optimum strain rate increases 
with an increasing amount of twist for relatively low twist levels. While a qualitative
1 2 2
_ _ _   _.  _ .........................
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assessment of the eight-strand rope calculates the twist to be on the order of 50 
revolutions per metre, thus placing both the four-strand and eight-strand rope into the 
low twist levels where a direct correlation is seen between optimum strain rate and 
twist, more research must be done in this area before these results of a twist/braid 
relationship can be accepted as anything more than anecdotal evidence.
6.5 Conclusions
The results presented in this chapter support the assertion that the maximum break 
strength of aramid fibres is directly related to strain rate. For many applications, 
understanding the quantity of this effect and the factors that would allow designers to 
maximise the potential of this effect is vital. As an independent assessment of the 
assertions made by Teijin Twaron about their product, the results of this work are 
very important to the materials community.
While important, this work is only a first step of the many required in the 
development of suitable models of aramid fibre interaction and performance when 
aramid strands are oriented into braided ropes and applied in space tether design. As 
an example of further work that must be completed for space tether applications, an 
important consideration examined by Wang and Xia (1999) is the effect of 
temperature on aramid strength. Consistent with the majority of available literature, 
while Wang and Xia (1999) focuses on research intended to offer insight into the 
ballistic properties associated aramid fabrics, the extreme temperature variations 
experienced by spacecraft offers cause for concern that the temperature relationships 
identified in Wang and Xia (1999) may significantly influence structural tether 
elements. While the dataset presented herein is too small to offer any more than 
circumstantial conclusions, this work does also offer evidence that (i) the strain rate 
produced during an MMET operation and (ii) the amount of twist in a braid has a 
direct effect on the break strength of an aramid rope. After further testing, this insight 
can be used to optimise manufacturing processes and MMET operations.
Chapter 7 
Empirical Impact Equations
In the previous chapter, it was verified that the strength of a tether depends on the rate 
at which it is loaded. Further, with such a significant variability based on load, it 
must be assumed that the strength of the tether is not suitable for use as an input 
within empirical models. Such an assumption has significant consequences with 
regards to the empirical hypeiwelocity impact equations that would then be available 
to a tether-based system analyst, so a new equation must be developed for such a 
purpose.
7.0 Introduction
As mission planners look for systems to further reduce the cost of access to space, 
tether-based propulsive systems have gained considerable interest. However, the 
unique size and nature of space tether systems raises new analysis issues. While the 
failure equations, and their application, for assessing conventional on-orbit systems 
are known and widely accepted as suitable for traditional spacecraft, many of the 
assumptions and calibrations these equations employ are not suitable for tether-based 
systems.
All publicly available failure analyses of space tether systems have focused on 
environmental failures caused by particle impact, the most hazardous of such potential 
impactors being orbital debris. While it is always recommended that unconventional 
systems be tested in flight configuration to ensure analytical predictions are suitable, 
past tether failure analyses have employed empirical equations that approximate the 
results of a hypervelocity impact. While experimental tether impact analyses, such as 
those done in Hayashida and Robinson (1993), McBride and Taylor (1993), and 
Penson and Burchell (2003), perform predictions using equations such as the Fish- 
Summers and 1992C equations, respectively, and hypervelocity impact tests to 
experimentally assess the damage to tether strands, none have directly compared the 
result of experimental work with the predicted results in a manner that is more 
scientifically rigorous than qualitative observation.
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This work takes a fresh look at the issue of empirically modelling hypeiwelocity 
impacts in the hopes of finding an equation that is better suited to analysing a tether- 
based space system.
7.1 Past work
The focus of this research is to aid risk analysis practitioners in their assessment of 
space tether systems. To this end, this research focuses on all known, empirically 
derived hypervelocity impact equations that have been applied either during a 
spacecraft development program or a space tether system lifetime assessment. 
Therefore, this work investigates the semi-infinite forms of the Fish-Summers, 
Schmidt-Holsapple, Rockwell, Cour-Palais, Modified Cour-Palais, and 1992C 
equations.
Starting in 1964, NASA began issuing space vehicle design criteria to offer designers 
unifomi guidance with regards to the unique issues and challenges posed by the space 
environment. Such guidance was contained in documents such as Cour-Palais (1969) 
and Frost (1970), which offer guidance on protecting spacecraft from hypervelocity 
debris impacts through the use of empirical, environmental, and shielding models that 
were stated in these documents as being acceptable to NASA at the time. Later 
examination of these impact models by Hayashida and Robinson (1991) and the f
subsequent use of the Fish-Summers equation within the researched presented in 
Hayashida and Robinson (1993) indicate that these models are still acceptable to 
NASA.
During the Apollo program, NASA independently developed two impact equations, 
both of which accounted for material hardness. The first presented here was the 
Rockwell equation. The second is the Cour-Palais equation, as it is commonly 
referred to today, which was modified in the in the late 1980s and subsequently 
termed the Modified Cour-Palais equation.
It may be reasonable to note that none of the following equations are dimensionally 
balanced, although some do use dimensionless terms. This is not unusual for
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empirical equations since they model effects and rarely employ a representation of the 
governing mechanism.
7.1.1 Fish-Summers
The Fish-Summers equation for semi-infinite targets was first introduced in May 1970 
by V.C. Frost and is based on the hypervelocity impact studies conducted by R.H. 
Fish and J.L. Summers of NASA Ames Research Center. For application of the 
equation, Frost (1970) describes a semi-infinite body as one where “the depth of 
penetration [is] a small fraction of the plate thickness.” Frost (1970) states that, if the 
penetration depth, relative to the target thickness, is limited to “25 percent or less, the 
plate may be considered semiinfinite [sic].” The semi-infinite form of the Fish- 
Summers equation is defined as in Eq. 7.1.
1 2 (7.1)
Where
p = crater depth (cm)
-  material constant for target 
m = projectile mass (g)
Pp = projectile density (g/cm^ )
= normal component of impact velocity (km/sec)
For the semi-infinite form of the Fish-Summers equation, the material constant is 
again defined by material properties and temperature. In Frost (1970), it is 
recommended that any unknown material constants must be found using 
hypervelocity testing, and the only two known constant values at the time of 
publication are reported to be 0.42 for Aluminium alloys and 0.25 for stainless steel. 
The results using the semi-infinite form of the Fish-Summers equation are considered 
by Frost (1970) to be “satisfactory” if not “somewhat conservative at the higher 
meteoroid velocities” since the experimental data was obtained at velocities at or
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below 8 km/sec and extrapolated out. While deemed suitable for ductile metals, Eq
7.1 is identified in Frost (1970) to be of little use for low-ductility metals and 
“generally unsuitable for nonmetals [sic].”
According to Hayashida and Robinson (1993), a tether does not only fail when it is 
severed, but fails when it becomes incapable of canying its designed load. 
Depending on mission design, any degradation in performance could be considered 
failure. In Hayashida and Robinson (1993), the authors consider a failure to have 
occurred when a tether is cratered such that the impact removes half of the cross 
sectional area at any point on the tether. For this reason, the authors are not as 
concerned with the ballistic limit, which would conespond to a severed tether, as they 
are the minimum crater resulting in failure. Consequently, assuming the tether can be 
modelled as one target of uniform density and known thickness, failure is best thought 
of as a crater past an allowable threshold within a semi-infinite body.
The calculations in Hayashida and Robinson (1993) employ the Fish-Summers 
equation for a semi-infinite material, presented above, even though the failure 
criterion used in the work violates the definition of semi-infinite, as presented in Frost 
(1970). For the material constant required by the Fish-Summers semi-infinite 
equation, Hayashida and Robinson (1993) employs a linear interpolation using 
previously studied materials to find any target’s material constant as a function of its 
density. By placing the density dependent function of material constant into the Fish- 
Summers equation as used in Hayashida and Robinson (1993), the penetiation depth 
for an impactor into a semi-infinite plate is as follows:
i  2p  = ( 0 . 5 1 2 9 6 - 0 . 0 3 3 2 0 3 / 7 , ( 2 - 2 )
Where
p  = crater depth on target (cm)
= projectile mass (g)
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= projectile density (g/cm^) 
p, -  target density (g/cnf )
-  normal component of impact velocity (km/sec)
Using a linear inteipolation, when indications support a theory that only two known 
data points were available, seems questionable. Further, considering the views of 
Frost (1970) with respect to applying the Fish-Summers equation to non-metal targets, 
one could argue that Eq 7.2 has an unacceptable level of uncertainty associated with 
it. However, considering the extensive work both researchers had previously 
performed on hypervelocity impacts, and since Cour-Palais (1969) and Frost (1970) 
are both referenced in Hayashida and Robinson (1993), it is only fair to assume the 
calculations and assumptions made in Hayashida and Robinson (1993) are 
appropriate. There is no indication identified in Hayashida and Robinson (1993) that 
the experimental results did not correspond to the anticipated results using the Fish- 
Summers equation for semi-infinite bodies. For these reasons, although there is 
reasonable doubt about the applicability of Eq 7.2, one cannot immediately rule out 
the work and results presented in Hayashida and Robinson (1993) without further 
investigation.
7.1.2 Rockwell
Hayashida and Robinson (1991) state that the Rockwell equation was developed using 
aluminium impactors and targets with impact velocities up to 8 km/sec. Using 
material hardness, target density, and projectile density, the Rockwell equation is 
presented in Hayashida and Robinson (1991) as in Eq. 7.3.
p  = 1.386/''^77^
=1.8p  (7.3)
L = 3.0jd
Where
p  = crater depth on target (cm)
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//j = target thickness for ballistic limit (cm)
= target thickness for spallation limit (cm) 
d = projectile diameter (cm)
= projectile density (g/cm^ ) 
p, -  target density (g/cm^)
BH = Brinnell hardness for target
y, -  normal component of impact velocity (km/sec)
7.1.3 Cour-Palais
At the same time as the Rockwell equation, NASA developed a second equation 
called the Cour-Palais equation. While similar to the Rockwell equation, the Cour- 
Palais equation has a stated restriction, identified by Hayashida and Robinson (1991), 
that the ratio of projectile density to target density must be less than 1.5 to ensure 
valid results. While the purpose for this limiting density ratio is not explained in 
Hayashida and Robinson (1991), and any justification for this limit would be 
speculative in nature without input from the experimentalists involved in the creation 
of the equation, it may be reasonable to assume that the non-linear regression trends 
discussed in Yu e/ al. (1994) began to dominate the results and became evident to 
experimentalists after this ratio was exceeded. As the Cour-Palais equation employs 
the normal velocity term raised to the power 2/3, as discussed in Yu et al. (1994), this 
explanation for the reason a limiting density ratio is presented for the Cour-Palais 
equation is reasonable. Hayashida and Robinson (1991) presented the Cour-Palais 
equation as in Eq. 7.4.
Where
p = crater depth on target (cm)
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-  target thickness for ballistic limit (cm)
L -  target thickness for spallation limit (cm) 
d = projectile diameter (cm)
= projectile density (g/cm^) 
p, -  target density (g/cm^)
BH = Brinnell hardness for target
E = Young's modulus for target (GPa)
y, = nonmal component of impact velocity (km/sec)
7.1.4 Modified Cour-Palais
The Cour-Palais equation was modified and released in 1991 as the Modified Cour-
Palais equation, presented as follows;
p^52A d^^B H  
C = 2 2 p
-0.25
\ P t  J vC y (7.5)
Where
p  -  crater depth on target (cm)
C -  target thickness for ballistic limit (cm) 
y = target thickness for spallation limit (cm) 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
pp = projectile density (g/cm^)
p^  = target density (g/cm^)
BH = Brinnell hardness for target
y, -  normal component of impact velocity (km/sec)
E -  Young's modulus for target (GPa)
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C = speed of sound in the target (km/sec)
c =  IÏ
\P ,
As one can see by examination, the Modified Cour-Palais equation appears to have 
adopted some aspects of the Rockwell equation during its modification from the 
original form of the Cour-Palais equation.
7.1.5 1992C
According to both Penson and Burchell (2003) and McBride and McDonnell (1999), 
after conducting hypeiwelocity impact tests with impact velocities up to 16 km/sec 
and further verifying such results with “impact plasma to > 100 km s“‘”, McDonnell 
and Sullivan developed the ‘ 1992C’ equation at Kent University. In subsequent work, 
this equation was used as a prediction tool for tether impacts in work such as McBride 
and Taylor (1997) and Penson and Burchell (2003). The ‘1992C’ equation is 
presented in Eq. 7.6.
,0 5 6 , . 0.805
/  \  0.476 /  \
p „Pa<). (2a
V P p e P t  J LA\_ J (7.6)
Where
“  ballistic limit (m) 
dp = impactor diameter (m)
= nomial component of impact velocity (km/sec) 
pp = projectile density (kg/m^ ) 
pj = target density (kg/m^ ) 
p^^ = density of aluminium (kg/m^ )
Pp^  = density of iron (kg/m^ ) 
cr, = yield stress of target (MPa)
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<j^ , = yield stress of aluminium (MPa)
Although not explicitly stated in Penson and Burchell (2003) or McBride and Taylor 
(1997), the 1992C equation both exhibits characteristics of a standard thin-plate 
equation and is applied as such. With regards to its characteristics, the normal 
velocity component is not raised to the 2/3-power as in all other semi-infinite 
hypervelocity impact equations, but is instead raised to the power 0.805. This is 
consistent with both the Fish-Summers and Schmidt-Holsapple equations for thin- 
plates. With regards to its application, the 1992C equation is employed in Penson and 
Burchell (2003) and McBride and Taylor (1997) to model when a tether is fully 
severed. This is in conflict with the failure criterion of Hayashida and Robinson 
(1993), which argues that a tether may have functionally failed even if it is not 
completely severed. Because the basic strength criterion associated with a tether- 
based system is dependent on cross sectional area, it is logical to assume that a 
significant reduction in cross sectional area will render a structural tether component 
unusable. For this reason, the 1992C equation is not considered a relevant equation 
for the purposes of this study, even though it had been previously employed for 
hypervelocity impact work with tether materials.
7.2 Conformance to current common knowledge
The equations presented herein were produced using linear regression techniques 
based on various relationships apparent after an examination of the data. According 
to Yu et al. (1994), both the studies that produced the equations presented herein and 
a number of other various studies conducted between 1958 and 1965, which 
reportedly included no fewer than 1700 data points, all demonstrate similar 
relationships that support certain assumptions about the nature of hypervelocity 
impacts.
7.2.1 Energy and temperature issues
All of the equations presented above that apply to semi-infinite targets support the 
relationship between crater depth and impact energy. In an examination of past 
empirical work presented in Yu et al. (1994), nine equations developed between 1958 
and 1965 and reported to account for over 1700 data points, as well as between 18 and
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45 data points collected and presented in Yu e/ al (1994), are shown to support an 
energy-based explanation that relates crater depth to the normal impact velocity raised 
to the 2/3-power. In addition to a 2/3-power velocity relationship, the data presented 
in Yu et al (1994) further supports a 2/3-power relationship with regards to impactor 
density that is supported by seven of the historic equations.
All of the aforementioned equations characterising crater depth in a semi-infinite 
material employ this 2/3-power to the impact velocity term. This relationship appears 
to be derived from the intuitive concept that impact energy has a direct relationship to 
crater formation. However, none indicate the direct incorporation of both the iso­
deviation law and isotropic expansion concepts as presented in Yu e/ al (1994), nor 
the significant emphasis placed on material strength that Yu et a l (1994) suggests is 
necessary. Combined with indications contained in Yu et a l (1994) that the authors 
feel these relationships only hold for set conditions, there is reason to believe that a 
valuable re-examination of commonly accepted and held assumptions and 
presumptions could produce meaningful results.’^’
7.2.2 An oblique problem
Most concerning when examining traditionally assumed concepts as they are applied 
to the empirical hypervelocity equations presented in the literature is the fact that 
nowhere in Yu e/ al (1994) is there an attempt to reconcile the energy and isotropic- 
based theories with oblique impacts. While it is a common assumption that only the 
normal component of impact velocity is relevant when assessing the effects of a 
hypervelocity impact, there is no indication that the aforementioned equations 
examined datasets that included oblique impacts.
Questions have been raised in works such as Burchell and Grey (2001) and Burchell 
and Whitehom (2003) regarding the validity of such an assumption and the conditions 
under which such an assumption is valid. The concerns regarding this relationship 
raised in Burchell and Whitehom (2003) further support the concept expressed in Yu 
et al (1994) that these relationships may only hold for like materials, further offering 
an indication of why the Cour-Palais equation may contain the 1.5 density ratio limit 
stated in Hayashida and Robinson (1993). If there are doubts that have been raised
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with regards to the normal impact velocity component assumption, it is prudent to re­
examine oblique impact data that may be relevant.
7.3 Relevance of these equations to space tether research
There is no evidence that the equations presented above are acceptable for analysing a 
space tether system. Even though Hayashida and Robinson employed the Fish- 
Summers equation in their 1993 lifetime assessment of the tether material designed 
for the TSS-2 mission, as presented in Hayashida and Robinson (1993), more than 20 
years earlier Frost stated in Frost (1970) that the equation was not appropriate for 
analysing non-metallic targets. Further, considering the complex manner in which 
other equations characterize material properties, it does not seem intuitively 
reasonable that such characteristics could be modelled using a linear interpolation 
based on two data points, as is done in Hayashida and Robinson (1993).
While the Fish-Summers equation, as utilised in the TSS-2 mission analysis, may not 
be ideal for that purpose, it is the only equation presented within whose constituent 
variables can be inputted with the least uncertainty. For example, the Rockwell, 
Cour-Palais, and Modified Cour-Palais all require a Brinnel hardness value. For 
tether materials, obtaining such a value could not be done without significant 
reservations regarding its fundamental validity. Further, considering the strength of 
tether structures and their constituent strands {fibre bundles) is directionally 
dependent, it is not clear that accounting for the material strength would improve the 
accuracy of a penetration prediction in a manner equivalent to cases involving a semi­
infinite material whose strength is not directionally dependent. Additionally, for 
tether systems that employ aramid fibres, Chapter 7 proves that the strain rate directly 
affects the strand break strength, a fact that has a currently unknown and unstudied 
effect on the validity of the strength criterion in an empirical hypervelocity impact 
model.
Further, it is highly likely that a significant portion of the hypervelocity impacts 
occurring with a momentum exchange space tether system will be oblique in nature. 
This is a reasonable assumption, considering the fact that the system is constantly 
rotating relative to the velocity vector of its central facility. Quantitatively, 90% of all
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momentum exchange tether system orientations will produce oblique impacts of 
greater than 9-degrees for a peipendicularly acting debris field. For the genre of 
momentum exchange tether systems, this could produce significant concerns because 
the reservations contained in the literature with regards to the current treatment of 
impact angle could have a significant influence on the lifetime analyses of momentum 
exchange tether systems.
Considering the functional limits of the parameters required for an empirical 
hypervelocity impact equation, as they apply to tether structures, it is clear that most 
traditionally accepted equations are not sufficient for assessing a tether system. 
Further, it is clear that the uncertainty associated with various impact assumptions, 
like the assumption that only the nonnal component of impact velocity must be 
accounted for during hypervelocity impact, may not be sufficient for systems where 
the probability that a non-normal impact will be encountered is much higher. For 
these reasons, it seems prudent to reassess the conventional wisdom associated with 
empirically derived hypervelocity impacts without the constraints of traditional 
theory.
7.4 New answers for old data
This investigation poses a re-examination of publicly available data for hypervelocity 
impacts in which the impact velocity, angle of incidence, and impactor and target 
properties are significantly varied. While it was stated in Yu e/ al. (1994) that prior 
investigations included no fewer than 1700 data points, the avoidance of impact angle 
in the document offers little indication that the data contained a suitable proportion of 
oblique impacts. Further, given the ease with which many authors intertwine 
theoretical causation and the fitting of actual results, this investigation undertakes a 
clean, unbiased investigation to fit an empirical hypervelocity impact equation using 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques to a diverse dataset that includes a 
wide range of impact angles and densities. Both ranges of target density and impact 
obliquity include the angles and densities likely to be associated with a momentum 
exchange tether system, and the proposed equation uses variables that are both 
consistent with cunent empirical equations and directly relevant to space tether 
structures.
135
' i^
7.4.1 Rebuilding the Fish-Summers equation
Because it is traditional that empirical hypervelocity impact equations are derived 
using linear regression techniques, it may be of use to demonstrate that an MCMC 
technique can create an empirical hypervelocity impact equation. To do so, this 
section will present an equation that has been derived using MCMC techniques, 
incorporating data points that were created using the Fish-Summers equation, as 
modified for and presented in Hayashida and Robinson (1993). The new equation 
that is to be presented in this sub-section will be called the Fish-Summers (Rebuild) 
equation. If the difference between the predictions made by the Fish-Summers 
equation and the Fish-Summers (Rebuild) equation are insignificant for identical input 
data, it could be assumed that the two equations are flmctionally identical.
Background information on MCMC methods and techniques is more fully discussed 
in literature such as Gilks et ai (1995). As an overview, MCMC methods are a type 
of Bayesian analysis technique where, through use of observed data and a prior 
distribution for each unknown model parameter (i.e., a quantitative approximation 
that defines each random variable in the model that is employed to represent each 
parameter, a choice that is based only on expert guidance), a posterior distribution can 
be understood through analysis of a Markov chain. A Markov chain is a series of 
points that, starting from set initial conditions and selected based on the most recently 
selected point through use of a simulation technique known as Gibbs sampling, are 
selected directly from the posterior distribution defining the random variable that 
represents each parameter. The posterior distribution characterises the random 
variation within a model parameter to a high level of accuracy, dependent upon both 
the observed data and the prior distribution that is set by the analyst.
In theory, if the parameter being defined by a posterior distribution were to be 
observed an infinite number of times, the posterior would become equivalent to a 
histogram of the observations. This should be true if the model converges, as 
discussed in literature such as Gilks et al (1995), Best et al (1996), and Spiegelhalter 
et al. (2003). As clearly stated in Best et a l (1996) and Spiegelhalter et al (2003), 
while there are a number of analytical routines for mathematically assessing
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convergence in a MCMC model, “it is not possible to say with certainty that the 
sample is representative of the underlying stationary [i.e., the posterior] distribution.” 
When selecting appropriate parameters for each model, this research relied on the 
general convergence assessment technique recommended in Spiegelhalter et al. 
(2004). Such criteria state that, for multiple chains with diverse initial conditions, 
convergence is likely to have occurred when all of the chain histories are observed to 
be overlapping one another. Such a condition, which can be observed through 
examination of Fig. 7.2 through Fig. 7.6, will occur after a burn-in period, as it is 
referred to in accepted literature such as Gilks et al. (1995), Best et al. (1996), and 
Spiegelhalter et al. (2004). Once the Markov chain histories are observed to overlap 
each other such that it is reasonable to assume the chains are likely converging, an 
analyst can assume that all points selected for the Markov chain are being selected 
directly from the posterior distribution. Once observation indicates convergence has 
occurred, Spiegelhalter et al. (2004) recommends continuing the simulation until the 
Monte Carlo error for each parameter is less than 5% of the sample standard 
deviation. If both conditions have been met, Spiegelhalter et al. (2004) indicates that 
it is reasonable to assume a histogram of the points selected for each Markov chain 
will represent the posterior distribution.
The MCMC analysis package used to derive the Fish-Summers (Rebuild) equation is 
WinBUGS, v2.01, which is a Beta version released in November 2004. The specifics 
of this version are discussed in Spiegelhalter et al. (2004), and indications of its 
acceptance for analytical aerospace applications is evident by its use in research 
presented in papers such as Garber and Paté-Comell (2004), Guikema and Paté- 
Cornell (2004), and Guikema and Paté-Comell (2005). Using WinBUGS, the goal of 
this investigation is to determine a normally distributed parameter for crater depth, p, 
which has a mean value equal to the right hand side of Eq 7.7. As with all later 
derivations, the standard deviation of this crater depth will be modelled as one divided 
by the square root of a Gamma function with parameters 0.001 and 0.001. This 
selected standard deviation model was chosen in accordance with the guidance 
offered in Spiegelhalter et al. (2004) regarding non-informative priors (i.e., a prior 
that does not inappropriately bias the results). The Fish-Summers (Rebuild) equation 
is derived using the model presented in Eq. 7.7.
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p  = (7.7)
Where:
p  = crater depth on target (m) 
m = projectile mass (kg)
= projectile density (kg/m^) 
p, = target density (kg/m^)
V,, = normal component of impact velocity (km/sec)
Within this model, it is assumed that the exponential parameters can be represented as 
normally distributed random variables. This assumption of normalcy is modelled by 
making the prior distribution for each exponent a standard normal distribution with a 
standard deviation of 0.5. These prior distributions were chosen in a manner 
consistent with Spiegelhalter et al. (2004) and Gilks et al. (1995) to ensure model 
convergence.
The data used to derive the Fish-Summers (Rebuild) equation was generated using the 
Fish-Summers equation, as modified in Hayashida and Robinson (1993). Each of the 
72 penetration depth values, p, used to derive the Fish-Summers (Rebuild) was 
calculated using a randomly and independently selected set of values representing 
impact velocity, target and impactor densities, particle mass, and a normally 
distributed eiTor. Each randomly selected parameter was generated using the 
relationships presented in Eq. 7.8 through Eq. 7.11. For velocity, each sample was 
taken from a uniform distribution between the values of 2 km/sec and 17 km/sec, as 
identified in Eq. 7.8. The values of density for both the impactor and target were 
uniformly distributed between 2450 kg/m3 and 2950 kg/m3, as identified in Eq. 7.9; 
while not specifically required for the Fish-Summers equation, this range of densities 
ensures the threshold ratio of 1.5 stated as a requirement of Cour-Palais is not violated 
by a sample point. For particle mass, to select a range of sample points that is roughly 
similar to that present in the orbital environment, a logarithmic relationship is
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modelled using a uniform distribution as in Eq. 7.10. Finally, since it is assumed that 
the Fish-Summers equation was created using linear regression techniques with 
normally distributed enor, a standard normal error term is added to each calculation 
of p. Because the literature does not state the eiTor associated with predictions 
calculated with the Fish-Summers equation, this model assumes a standard normal 
error with a standard deviation of 70pm. This value is based on an assumption that no 
error produced by the Fish-Summers equation will be greater than 500pm, or 0.5mm. 
While this assumption is not supported by the literature, considering the average size 
associated with a tether structure, a more significant error would severely decrease the 
utility of any results obtained through use of the Fish-Summers equation. As the 
Fish-Summers equation has been used by practitioners for tether applications, as in 
Hayashida and Robinson (1993), this research assumes that the error associated with 
the equation is not likely to be more significant than that identified in Eq. 7.11.
v = U {2,n) (7.8)
p  = (7(2450,2950) (7.9)
=  J0 i2 [(/(0 ,I)1  ( ^ 1 0 )
cr = #(o,7io-q (7.11)
With the model defined, each chain is started with initial values ranging between zero 
and one. Three Markov chains per parameter are modelled simultaneously through 
20,000 iterations. The analysis of the posterior presented in Table 7.1 and Fig. 7.1 
through Fig. 7.6 disregards the first 4,999 iterations of each chain to accommodate for 
a sufficient burn-in period. The analytical results for the tliree chains are presented in 
Table 7.1; Fig. 7.1 presents an aggregate histogram aeeounting for all three Markov 
chains; and Fig. 7.2 through 7.6 present the histories for each parameter, identifying 
the overlap identified in Spiegelhalter et a l (2004) as an indication of model 
convergence. From examination of Table 7.1, it is clear that the Monte Carlo error is 
less than the 5% threshold recommended in Spiegelhalter et al (2004) to ensure each 
posterior is suitably refined. From these two facts, it is assumed that the results of the 
MCMC analysis are reasonable.
139
Table 7.1 Statistics for the MCMC simulation for the Fish-Summers (Rebuild) 
equation, assuming a burn-in period for each chain of 5000 iterations.
mean sd MC_error val2.5pc median vai97.5pc start sam pie
beta1 0.6645 0.0269 6.07E-04 0.6126 0.6638 0.7192 5000 45003
beta2 -0.04345 0.167 0.006754 -0.3793 -0.04674 0.2893 5000 45003
b etas 0.3529 0.007385 3.71 E-05 0.3388 0.3527 0.3676 5000 45003
beta4 -0.3171 0.1715 0.00694 -0.6579 -0.3135 0.02569 5000 45003
sigm a 0.005504 4.80E-04 3.50E-06 0.004665 0.005472 0.006534 5000 45003
0.5 0.6 0.7
P e ta l sam ple; 45003 Peta2 sam ple; 45003
20.0 3.0 -
15.0 / * \ 2.010.0 /  \
5.0 1.0
0.0 -------- ------- 0.0
- 1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5
0.32 0 .34 0 .36 0.38
60.0
P eta3  sam ple ; 45003
3.0
Peta4 sam ple; 45003
40.0 2.0
20.0 J 1.0 J0.0 -------------  ^ --------- 0.0 ------
- 1.0 -0.5 0.0
1.00E+3
750.0
500.0
250 .0  
0.0
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T------- 1--------r
0.002  0.004 0 .006  0 .008
Figure 7.1 Posterior distributions for each exponent in the Fish-Summers 
(Rebuild) equation.
P eta l
4999 10000 15000
iteration
Figure 7.2 Chain histories for the Beta 1 variable.
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4999 10000 15000
iteration
Figure 7.3 Chain histories for the Beta 2 variable.
b e ta s
4999 10000 15000
iteration
Figure 7.4 Chain histories for the Beta 3 variable.
beta4
4999 10000 15000
iteration
Figure 7.5 Chain histories for the Beta 4 variable.
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4999 10000 15000
iteration
Figure 7.6 Chain histories for the standard deviation associated with the 
calculated penetration depth.
Table 7.1 presents a numerical characterisation o f the posterior for each exponent 
identified in Eq. 7.7. While the mean and standard deviation presented in Table 7.1 is 
based on an assumption that the distribution o f each parameter is normally distributed, 
this assumption o f normalcy may not hold for the posterior, even if  it is assumed for 
the prior, as is done for the Fish-Summers (Rebuild) derivation. While an inspection 
o f the distribution can be made through examination o f Fig. 7.1, an approximation o f  
the skewness o f each parameter can be made within Table 7.1. In the table the first 
column is the mean o f all points selected by the Gibbs sampling method when it 
simulated each Markov chain; the second column is the standard deviation associated 
with this mean, assuming the points making up the Markov chains are normally 
distributed; the third column is the Monte Carlo error for each parameter, which 
decreases proportionally to the square-root o f the number o f simulated samples; and 
the next three columns identify the lower boundary, median, and upper boundary o f  
the 95^ percentile, which can be used to assess the normalcy o f the results. 
Considering the symmetry between the upper and lower boundaries, combined with 
similarity between the mean and median estimates, it is reasonable to assume the 
posteriors are sufficiently normal. Assuming analytical validity, the Fish-Summers 
(Rebuild) equation is expressed as in Eq. 7.12.
P  = ^n P0.665 _-0.0435 _  0.353 ^-0.317m . P. (7.12)
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When comparing against the Fish-Summers equation, as modified and presented in 
Hayashida and Robinson (1993), the velocity and mass terms are identical to within 
0.002. Wliile the density exponents identified in Eq. 7.12 are not in direct agreement 
with those employed by the Fish-Summers equation as presented by Hayashida and 
Robinson (1993), when comparing penetration predictions calculated with both 
equations using more than 10000 randomly sampled points, the average percentage 
difference between the predictions is -0.3% with a standard deviation of 1.4%. Such 
close agreement, which will be further demonstrated later in this work, indicates that 
the technique for creating the Fish-Summers (Rebuild) equation is suitable.
7.4.2 Data set used to derive the Draper (72) equation
This work uses 72 actual data points to reassess the applicability of the 
aforementioned empirical hypervelocity effects equations. The bulk of dataset comes 
from work completed at the University of Kent by researchers such as Burchell, 
Gardner, Grey, and Whitehorn, in works such as Burchell and Grey (2001), Burchell 
Whitehorn (2003), Burchell et al. (1999), Gardner and Burchell (1997), and Grey and 
Burchell (2004), with the remaining data points coming from a study presented in 
Christiansen et al. (1993), which was conducted at the NASA Johnson Space Center. 
The data set was selected to offer impacts of unifomi projectiles onto uniform targets 
that present a wide range of material and target densities, impact velocities, and 
impact angles. Studies of uniform projectiles and targets were chosen so as to limit 
any unknown variability caused by the interaction of internal surfaces. To ensure the 
accuracy of the results are not biased towards a certain type of impact condition, the 
points were qualitatively and quantitatively selected to ensure wide variability. Wliile 
a purely qualitative assessment of the data points implies that the points are widely 
varied, quantitatively assessing the product of each input variable (i.e., velocity, 
projectile density, projectile mass, target density, and impact angle^") shows a 
standard deviation that is more than double the mean. This large standard deviation 
offers a further quantitative measure supporting an opinion that the data set is widely 
diverse.
The first 13 points are taken from Grey and Burchell (2003). These points were 
gathered from a series of tests that fired steel imp actors at targets of ammonia rich ice.
143
While all of the tests were conducted with no impact angle, this data set offers both a 
wide variation in target densities and a signifieant difference between impactor and 
target density. As most tests relating to space systems are conducted to simulate 
aluminium on aluminium impacts, such narrow data restrictions may cause the 
resulting equation to be wholly unusable for tether-based systems. This concept is 
supported by examinations in the literature that further emphasize the importance of 
the impactor and target densities Yu et al. (1994). With an average impactor density 
to target density ratio of 8.31, which is much greater than standard tests with ratios 
closer to 1; and a standard deviation of 22.06 about the mean target density, this first 
set of data points offers a variation in the data set that will heighten the probability 
that the resulting empirical equation will be applicable to space tether systems.
Table 7.2: Data from hypervelocity impact tests using steel impaetors and 
ammonia rich ice targets.
No.
Impact
velocity
(km/sec)
Impactor
density
(kg/m3)
Impactor
mass
(kg)
Target
Density
(kg/m3)
Impact
angle
(deg) p (mm)
1 4 . 9 7700 4.03E-06 933 0 12.910
2 4.51 7700 4 . 03E-06 933 0 11.090
3 4 . 49 7700 4.03E-06 933 0 12.490
4 4 .96 7700 4.03E-06 962 0 10.300
5 4 . 6 7700 4.03E-06 962 0 9.970
6 4 . 9 7700 4.03E-06 900 0 9.900
7 4.83 7700 4.03E-06 918 0 11.600
8 4.79 7700 4.03E-06 885 0 10.800
9 5.05 7700 4.03E-06 901 0 9.400
10 4.87 7700 4.03E-06 930 0 12.600
11 4 . 77 7700 4.03E-06 930 0 7.400
12 4.79 7700 4.03E-06 930 0 12.100
13 4.86 7700 4.03E-06 930 0 9.900
Data points 14 through 31 were taken from Burchell and Grey (2001). These points 
represent oblique hypervelocity impacts onto thick glass targets. By using aluminium 
impaetors and glass targets, the magnitude of the density relationship is consistent 
with traditional space system impact analysis conditions, although inverted. Because 
it does not seem likely that impacting glass with aluminium would produce 
significantly different results than the reverse, the greatest benefit of this data set is
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the range of oblique impacts. By maintaining a constant density relationship while 
offering a wide range of impact angles, this data set offers insight into the sole effect 
of impact angle.
Table 7.3: Data from oblique hyper velocity impaet tests using aluminium  
impaetors onto glass targets.
Mo .
Impact
velocity
(km/sec)
Impactor
density
(kg/m3)
Impactor 
mass (kg)
Target
Density
(kg/mS)
Impact
angle
(deg) p (mm)
14 5 2700 1.41372E-06 2500 0 1. 900
15 4.95 2700 1 . 41372E-Û6 2500 10 2.020
16 5.11 2700 1.41372E-06 2500 20 1 . 900
17 5.12 2700 1. 41372E-06 2500 30 1 . 830
18 5.01 2700 1.41372E-0G 2500 40 1 .850
19 5 2700 1.41372E-0G 2500 45 1. 950
20 5.11 2700 1.41372E-06 2500 45 1 . 690
21 5.18 2700 1.41372E-06 2500 45 1.860
22 4,96 2700 1 . 41372E-06 2500 45 1 . 620
23 4 . 94 2700 1.41372E-06 2500 50 1. 680
24 5.18 2700 1.41372E-06 2500 55 1.580
25 5.08 2700 1 .41372E-0G 2500 60 1.500
26 5.31 2700 1, 41372E-06 2500 65 1.280
27 5.18 2700 1.41372E-06 2500 70 1 .010
28 5.16 2700 1. 41372E-06 2500 70 1.050
29 5.1 2700 1 . 41372E-06 2500 70 1.340
30 5.48 2700 1 . 41372E-06 2500 75 0 . 690
31 5 . 05 2700 1 .41372E-05 2500 80 0 . 350
The final Burchell data set comes from Burchell and Whitehorn (2003). This data 
presents the results of oblique hypervelocity impacts of steel impaetors onto granite. 
Using the data in Burchell and Whitehorn (2003) does not seem to offer a consistent 
means of calculating the target density, so the density of the granite used is assumed 
to be 2691 kg/m\ as per Simetric (2006). With a greater magnitude of density ratio 
than that seen with data points 14-31, the equivalently diverse impact angles are 
thought to contribute to a greater understanding of the relationship between impact 
angle and penetration depth, a characteristic often ignored by even some of the most 
respected papers such as Yu al (1994).
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Table 7.4: Data from oblique hypervelocity impact tests using steel impaetors
onto granite targets.
No.
Impact
velocity
(km/sec)
Impactor
density
(kg/m3)
Impactor 
mass (kg)
Target
Density
(kg/m3)
Impact
angle
(deg) p (mm)
32 1. 08 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 0 2.880
33 2.22 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 0 4 .810
34 3.03 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 0 6.750
35 3.85 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 0 7.890
36 4 . 8 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 0 7.980
37 5.5 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 0 8 .700
38 5.7 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 0 7 . 940
39 5.92 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 0 9.160
40 5.5 7700 3 . 22537E-05 2691 0 1.400
41 5.7 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 0 1. 800
42 5.07 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 18 1.000
43 5.46 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 30 0.700
44 5.43 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 37 1 .400
45 5.31 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 41 1.000
46 5.22 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 45 0.700
47 5,32 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 49 1. 500
48 5.5 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 50 1.500
49 5.36 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 55 0.700
50 5.43 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 60 0.700
51 5.31 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 68 0.700
52 5.47 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 76 0.700
53 5.15 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 80 1.000
54 5.25 7700 3.22537E-05 2691 85 0.700
The final data set was created from the aluminium on aluminium impact tests 
presented in Christiansen et al. (1993). As Christiansen did not present the impact 
results in a table, the data points presented in Table 7.4 were generated using the 
graph of penetration as a function of impact angle presented in Christiansen et al 
(1993). The document makes no distinction as to the impact velocity for each test 
except to state that all impact velocities are between 6.5 and 7.0 km/sec. As it would 
be arbitrary to assume these velocities are distributed according to a specific 
distribution, this examination of the data considers the impact velocities to be 
uniformly distiibuted, and performs its calculations using the midpoint of the range. 
While this uncertainty associated with the impact velocity is not desirable, this data 
set is valuable for its range of impact angles on targets of similar density.
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Table 7.5 Data from hypervelocity Impacts of aluminium impaetors on
aluminium targets.
No.
Impact
velocity
(km/sec)
Impactor
density
(kg/m3)
Impactor 
mass (kg)
Target
Density
(kg/m3)
Impact
angle
(deg) p (mm)
55 6.75 2790 1.46084E-06 2700 0 2 .160
56 6.75 2790 1.46084E-06 2700 0 2 .085
57 6.75 2790 1. 46084E-05 2700 30 1.850
58 6.75 2790 1. 46084E-06 2700 45 1 . 670
59 6.75 2790 1. 46084E-06 2700 45 1 . 650
60 6.75 2790 1. 46084E-06 2700 60 1.065
61 6.75 2790 1.46084E-06 2700 65 0 . 945
62 6.75 2790 1.46084E-0Ô 2700 70 0 . 675
63 6.75 2790 1.46084E-06 2700 72 0 . 580
64 6.75 2790 1.46084E-06 2700 74 0 . 610
65 6.75 2790 1.46084E-06 2700 76 0 .515
66 6.75 2790 1.46084E-06 2700 78 0.335
67 6.75 2790 1.46084E-06 2700 80 0 . 170
68 6.75 2790 1.46084E-06 2700 82 0.240
69 6.75 2790 1.46084E-06 2700 84 0 . 180
70 6.75 2790 1.46084E-06 2700 85 0.255
71 6.75 2790 1 . 46084E-06 2700 86 0 .165
72 6.75 2790 1 . 46084E-06 2700 88 0.130
7.4.3 The Draper (72) equation
The Draper (72) equation takes an identical approach to that of the Fish-Summers 
(Rebuild) equation, raising each input parameter to exponents that will be solved for 
through a MCMC simulation. Unlike the empirical impact equations presented 
above, the Draper (72) equation makes no assumption as to the relationship between 
velocity and the normal component of the impact angle. The prior distribution for 
each exponent, through ps, is represented as a standard normal with standard 
deviation equal to one. The WinBUGS “model” from which the Draper (72) equation 
is derived is presented in Eq. 7.13.
p  -  pf" [cos(0)]^' (7.13)
Where:
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p  = crater depth on target (m)
= projectile mass (kg) 
pp =■ projectile density (kg/m^)
p, = target density (kg/m^)
V = impact velocity (km/sec)
6 -  impact angle (deg)
Each parameter for the Draper (72) equation was modelled with three Markov chains, 
each 40,000 samples in length, with the first 9,999 samples of each chain eliminated 
as a burn-in period. As with the Fish-Summers (Rebuild) equation, the quantitative 
results for each parameter are presented in Table 7.6, the posterior distributions for all 
parameters are presented in Fig. 7.7, and the chain histories for each parameter are 
presented in Fig. 7.8 through Fig. 7.13. Through examination of the Monte Carlo 
error presented in Table 7.6, which is less than 5% of the standard deviation; and the 
histories presented in Fig. 7.8 through Fig. 7.13, which identify significant overlap 
between all of the chains; both criteria identified by Spiegelhalter et a i (2004) are 
met, which indicates that the model converges.
Table 7.6 Results for the Draper (72) equation fitting
m e a n s d MC_error v a l 2 . 5 p c m e d i a n v a l 9 7 . 5 p c S t a r t s a m p l e
b e t a 1 0.04196 0.6611 0.01398 -1.149 -0.00176 1.489 10000 90003
b e t a 2 0.6129 0.3773 0.006765 0.03809 0.5519 1.53 10000 90003
b e t a s 0.07554 0.22 0.004803 -0.4335 0.08951 0.4791 10000 90003
b e t a 4 -1.348 0.3675 0.007763 -2.207 -1.302 -0.7576 10000 90003
b e t a s 0.8211 0.654 0.01352 -0.2015 0.731 2.277 10000 90003
s i g m a 0.005771 5.00E-04 2.62E-06 0.004893 0.005736 0.006851 10000 90003
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Figure 7.7 Posterior distributions for the Draper (72) equation exponents.
b e ta l
9999 20000 30000
iteration
Figure 7.8: Chain histories the Beta 1 variable.
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beta2
9999 20000 30000
iteration
Figure 7.9 Chain histories the Beta 2 variable.
beta3
9999 20000 30000
iteration
Figure 7.10: Chain histories the Beta 3 variable.
beta4
9999 20000 30000
iteration
Figure 7.11: Chain histories the Beta 4 variable.
150
b e ta s
9999 20000 30000
iteration
Figure 7.12: Chain histories the Beta 5 variable.
sigm a
0.008
0.006
0.004
9999 20000 30000
iteration
Figure 7.13: Chain history for the standard deviation associated with the 
calculated penetration depth.
Since all parameters are assumed to converge, the Draper (72) equation is thus 
assumed to be valid as presented in Eq. 7.14.
p  =  ^ 0042^ 0.613^ 0.076 ^ - 1.348 (7.14)
It is immediately evident that the mean estimates for each o f the parameters presented 
in Table 7.6, and identified as it is applied within the Draper (72) equation in Eq. 
7.14, are not identical to comparable parameters identified in any previously 
presented equation. In itself, this fact is neither proof that the equation is incorrect, 
nor is it proof that the commonly accepted theories with regards to empirically 
modelling hypervelocity impacts are not valid.
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7.5 Examining traditional relationships
Nearly every empirical equation produced supports the energy-based theory that there 
exists a direct relationship between penetration depth and the normal component of 
the impact velocity. This theory is implemented in most empirical equations using the 
magnitude of the impact velocity multiplied by the cosine of the impact angle, raised 
to the 2/3-power. While this theory is not refuted by the Draper (72) equation at the 
5% significance level, it is not strongly supported, either. At the same time, the 
Draper (72) equation does not strongly refute the 2/3-relationship with regards to 
impactor and target density supported by Yu et al. (1994) at the 5% significance level, 
while also not offering any strong evidence in its favour.
It is noted in works such as Yu et a i (1994) and Hayashida and Robinson (1991) that 
these 2/3-relationship theories are valid when the materials are similar in density. 
Further, the exponents that characterise the Draper (72) equation indicate that the 
material densities are of much higher importance than the impact velocity or impactor 
size. In tandem, these two observations offer an indication that the approach cun-ently 
taken when performing regression fits directed by energy-based effect theories may 
need revision.
The Draper (72) equation is intended as an engineering model that is more capable 
than traditional empirical equations of producing accurate hypervelocity impact 
affects predictions for tether materials. In doing so, it offers an indication that 
traditional assumptions and theories that are commonly employed when empirically 
modelling the resulting craters after hypervelocity impacts may need to be re­
examined. At the same time, the Draper (72) equation has not offered conclusive 
evidence that such assumptions are incorrect.
It is highly unlikely that the limited variable approach employed in developing the 
Draper (72) equation accounts for all of the mechanisms governing the effect of a 
hypervelocity impact. Additionally, it is likely that the Draper (72) equation may not 
account for enough material characteristics to make its conclusions applicable to 
points outside the range of the examined data set. The limited applicability of the 
Draper (72) equation is not unique, and is a quality that is common with empirical
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models. While the following section compares the predictions of the Draper (72) 
equation to both the actual data; the Fish-Summers equation as modified by 
Hayashida and Robinson; and an equation developed identically to the Fish-Summers 
(Rebuild) and the Draper (72) equations, but using only the data presented in 
Christiansen et al (1993); calibrating the Draper (72) equation using a data set that 
bounds the conditions expected for impacts with space tether components intuitively 
indicates that the Draper (72) equation should be more appropriate for space tether 
system analyses.
The equation produced using only the data from Christiansen et al (1993) was 
developed to compare whether it would exhibit any similarities to the Fish-Summers 
(Rebuild) equation. The Christiansen equation, as it is referred to herein, is as 
follows:
p  = (7.15)
The MCMC calculation predicts the standard deviation about the penetration depth to 
be 11mm. From initial inspection, this equation does not appear to hold any 
similarities to either Fish-Summers equation or the Draper (72) equation. However, at 
the 5% significance level, the differences observed in the Christiansen equation are 
not statistically significant.
7.6 Comparing results
It is reasonable to compare the actual test results to the predictions made by each 
equation in a manner that allows trends to be observed. To do this, the comparative 
analysis will be conducted in groupings defined by the paper from which they were 
borrowed.
7.6.1 Steel impaetors on ammonia rich ice
The error in prediction for each of the Fish-Summers, Christiansen, and Draper (72) 
equations are presented in Fig 7.9 relative to the test number for which the calculation 
was perfomied. The eiTors are in millimetres and found by subtracting the actual 
crater depth from the predicted depth.
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Figure 7.14 Error (mm) for points 1 through 13.
From observation, it is clear that the Draper (72) equation is the most aecurate for all 
of the tests presented in Fig 7.14. However, the Draper (72) equation is the only 
equation calibrated using densities as low, and density ratios as high, as those present 
in the experiments that produced this data set. Also thiough observation, it is difficult 
to recognize any clear trends in the enor. At the same time, there are no clear trends 
in the experimental inputs. While both the impaet velocity and target density 
experienced some random variation between tests, the impact angle remaining at zero 
for all tests, there were no constant changes in these input characteristics that would 
cause a clear trend in the results or the error.
Table 7.7 Average and standard deviation of error for points 1 through 13.
Rish-
Summers
error
Fish-
Summers
(Rebuild)
error
Chr'sen 
error
Average
STD
Draper
error
-8.03865 -8.05721 -10.80457 -0.71165
1.56902 1.57049 1.55566 1.61735
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Table 7.7 offers a summary of the average error and the standard deviation about that 
random error using each of the four equations discussed above. While the Fish- 
Summers (Rebuild) equation is presented in the table, it is not presented in Fig 7.14 
because of its insignificantly small variation from the traditional Fish-Summers 
equation.
7.6.2 Aluminium impaetors onto glass targets
The eiTors presented in Fig 7.10 may be somewhat surprising. While the Fish- 
Summers equation employs the assumption that the normal component of impact 
velocity need be the only impact velocity consideration, the Christiansen equation was 
calibrated using a MCMC approach using data with a vaiying impact angle, and the 
Fish-Summers equation is seen to be the more accurate of the two. From observation, 
it appears true that the Fish-Summers equation is actually more aceurate than the 
Draper (72) equation for all but one impact condition studied throughout this series of 
points, an observation that is supported by the improvement in overall accuracy with 
regards to the Draper (72) equation, as presented using the average error value in 
Table 7.8.
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Figure 7.15 Error (mm) for points 14 through 31.
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This improved accuracy with regards to the Fish-Summers equation relative to the 
Draper (72) equation for this data set may be a result of the fact that the test 
conditions contain a density ratio that is closer to unity. In these situations, it is 
hypothesized in Yu et a l (1994) that the impact energy may dictate crater depth. 
Such a concept does not appear to be unsupported by this data.
Table 7.8 Average and standard deviation of error for points 14 through 31
Fish- 
Rish- Sumners
Summers (Rebuild) Chr’sen Draper
error error error error
Average -0.45569 -0.44173 -1.50554 -0.65756
STD 0.21553 0.21347 0.46891 0.22294
An examination of the theories presented in Yu e/ al (1994) may offer support for 
claiming that the Fish-Summers equation is more appropriate than the Draper (72) 
equation for these impaet conditions. However, those same theories support the idea 
that equations are likely inappropriate for modelling tether impacts when they are 
derived with impact data from tests that only employ impaetors and targets with 
density ratios close to unity. This is because the density ratio for an orbital debris 
impactor striking a tether segment will not be similar to those density ratios at which 
the Fish-Summers equation is most accurate.
7.6.3 Steel impaetors onto granite targets
The results presented in Fig 7.11 may be distressing for any argument supporting the 
employment of any of these empirically derived models. For points on the left-hand 
side of the x-axis (i.e., points 32 through 39), eaeh of the equations becomes less 
eonservative as the impact velocity increases. This trend does not offer strong support 
for the idea that these equations can be applied for hypervelocity impacts where the 
impact velocity is nearer 10 km/sec.
156
0.00600 -
0.00400 -
0.00200 -
0.00000 X--------- ,— -
31° 36-0.00200 - Ro
-0.00400 -
^ X X-0.00600 - Xo
-0.00800 ^ o o o
-0.01000
□ □ □
□ □
 ------------------------------- x - i □ Fish Summers 
o Christiansen 
X Draper (72)
Figure 7.16: Error (mm) for points 32 through 54.
At point 40, though, all of the equations go from being un-conservative to being 
conservative. It is at point 40 that the test conditions drop the impact velocity, and 
they begin to incorporate an impact angle that increases for the remainder of the test 
conditions.
While the Draper (72) equation become more accurate after point 40 than the Fish- 
Summers equation, it is not known whether this accuracy would lessen in a rapid 
manner for higher velocities, as possibly indicated by the earlier tests within this 
group.
Table 7.9: Average and standard deviation of error for points 32 through 54.
Rish-
Summers
error
Fish-
Summers
(Rebuild)
error
Chr'sen 
error
Draper
error
Average
STD
0.92545 
2 . 87321
0.15055
2.88035
-3.11336 
3.16729
-0.93009 
2.78722
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7.6.4 Aluminium impaetors on aluminium targets
For the final section of the data set, again the Fish-Summers equations are more 
aeeurate than the Draper (72) equation. When accounting for the history of the Fish- 
Summers equation, this is not surprising as the impaet eonditions tested by 
Christiansen would likely be similar to those employed by Fish and Summers. While 
offering no explanation, it is interesting to note that all of the equations appear to 
decrease in error with an increase in impact angle.
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Figure 7.17: Error (mm) for points 55 through 72.
As expected, Table 7.10 identifies the Fish-Summers equations as being more 
accurate than both the Christiansen and the Draper (72) equations. Additionally, the 
Christiansen equation is most accurate for this data set, when compared to the other 
data sets. Such a conclusion may seem obvious, considering the general nature of 
empirically derived equations, discussed earlier.
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Table 7.10: Average and standard deviation of error for points 55 through 72.
Rish-
Sximmers
error
Fish-
Summers
(Rebuild)
error
Chr'sen 
error
Average
STD
0.05935
0.22331
0.05718 
0.22577
■0 . 84887 
0.71835
Draper
error
0.30846 
0.35393
When averaging over the whole 72-point data set, it may be intuitively obvious that 
the Draper (72) equation is the most accurate since it was the only equation calibrated 
in a manner that incorporates the entire data set. When examining Table 7.11, it is 
elear that the Draper (72) model has the lowest average error of the examined options, 
even though all equations are un-conservative.
Table 7.11: Average and standard deviation of all errors.
Tot Ave 
Tot STD
Rish-
Summers
error
- 1 . 2 5 4 8 8  
3 . 6 8 2 8 0
Fish-
Summers
(Rebuild)
error
Chr'sen 
error
- 1 . 5 0 2 8 2
3 . 5 5 8 7 3
- 3 . 5 3 3 9 7
4 . 0 3 7 4 3
Draper
error
- 0 . 6 6 7 1 1
1 . 7 1 6 5 6
When examining the average error for the Christiansen equation, it is important to 
note that the data used for calibration contained no variation in impact velocity. For 
this reason, since most of the data points were at a veloeity that is significantly 
different from that used for all the Christiansen ealibration points, the Christiansen 
equation is not expected to be accurate over a wide range of impact conditions. In 
many ways, it should be held out as a note of caution against attempting to apply 
empirically derived equations outside their calibrated remit.
7.6.5 Applicability to tether systems
With that note of caution, it is important to realize that the Draper (72) equation was 
constructed with a data set that should allow the equation to find reasonable 
predictions for tether-based systems. Assuming the density ratio is of concern, as
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argued by Yu et al. (1994), it must be noted that the Draper (72) equation is more 
accurate than the other equations for a wider range of density ratios.
Through obseiwation of Fig 12, this higher level of accuracy at a wider range of 
density ratio can be seen in the plot of all prediction errors over the whole data set. 
Also identified in Fig 12 is the density ratio associated with an orbital debris impact 
on both Twaron and Spectra tethers. If density ratio is the driving concern for impact 
prediction, Fig 12 seems to indicate that the Fish-Summers equations and the Draper 
(72) equation are comparable with regards to accuracy. For density ratios closer to 
unity, the Fish-Summers equations appear to be the more accurate predictors of crater 
depth, while for higher ratios, like those seen with advances that will allow greater 
strength to weight ratios in tether stmctures, the Draper (72) equation is the most 
relevant.
While Fig 12 appears to offer further support for the Fish-Summers equations, 
indicating that the Draper (72) equation may not offer significant analytical accuracy 
for tether systems, this emphasis on the density ratio is not fully supported by the 
exponents derived within the Draper (72) equation. With the more significant 
exponent associated with target density, the ratio of the impactor to target density may 
not be as important as the target density itself. If this is valid, the Draper (72) 
equation is more appropriate for analysing tether target impacts because it is 
calibrated to more accurately analyse target densities more similar to those of the 
likely tether substances. The other equations are not as capable in this area.
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Figure 7.18 Error (mm) as a function of density ratio.
While previous results seems to indicate that crater depth is dependent on the normal 
component of impaet velocity, Fig 7.19 offers further support that such a relationship 
may need to be more closely examined. Through examination of Fig 7.19, it is clear 
that the Draper (72), and its unconventional relationship between impact angle and 
crater depth, is more accurate than either the Fish-Summers equations or the 
Christiansen equation. This effect diminishes at greater angles where the crater depth 
and the cosine of the impact angle approach zero.
161
X x x
EB
L.2
m
□
A) 100
□ Fish-Sum m ers error 
o C hristiansen error 
X D raper (72) error
Impact Angle (deg)
Figure 7.19 Error as a function of impact angle.
7.7 Unexamined effects
While logical given the current literature on empirically modelling hypervelocity 
impacts, the aforementioned work may not be suitably relevant for tether systems 
because it does not consider thermal properties of the material. When examining the 
results contained in the next chapter of this thesis in conjunction with the results 
presented in McBride and Taylor (1997), it is clear that (i) tether fibres in the impact 
location appear to have failed as a result of melting and (ii) the Spectra fibre failures 
examined and presented in McBride and Taylor (1997) appear to sustain greater 
damage from the same impactor when compared against the Twaron results presented 
in Chapter 8. Considering both (i) the isotropic expansion theory discussed in Yu et 
al (1994) and (ii) the fact that the melting point of Spectra is significantly below that 
of Kevlar, there is anecdotal support for an empirical equation governing 
hypervelocity space tether impacts that considers the thermal properties of the tether 
material.
At the same time, given the conclusions of Allen et al (1992), Benhoulo et al (1997), 
and Wang and Xia (1999), it would be reasonable to assume that the significant
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temperature variation produced by the space environment would have a significant 
effect on the validity of any empirical model. As environmental temperature 
variations that affect the tether material were not identified or recorded in the data 
employed by this research for constructing the Draper (72) equation, no eonsideration 
for sueh influences was made. This is a further potential limitation of the Draper (72) 
equation, but not one that is not shared by other equations that are commonly 
accepted by the space analyst community.
7.8 Conclusions
This examination of empirical hyperveloeity impact equations that have previously 
been employed for spacecraft analysis has offered indications that the Draper (72) 
equation may be a more acceptable approximation of crater depth for hypeiwelocity 
impacts involving high strength and light weight tether structures. While too narrow 
in scope and data to conclusively prove any previous theory invalid, this research does 
offer indications that currently held concepts and assumptions used in the empirical 
modelling of hyperveloeity impacts may need to be revisited. However, in line with 
the intent of this investigation, the improved accuracy over a wide range of impact 
conditions like those expected on space tether missions indicates that the Draper (72) 
equation may be a more appropriate choice for risk assessment practitioners 
examining space tether systems.
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Chapter 8
Impactor Dispersion
The observed variation in tether strength as a function of load rate indicates that 
conventional hypervelocity impact modeling assumptions may be inappropriate for 
assessing tether-based space structures. High reliability tether system designs assume 
a single hypervelocity impact causes a single tether failure. Like the assumptions 
employed in hypervelocity impact models, it is reasonable to investigate whether this 
single-impact-single-failure assumption is valid.
8.1 Current assumption
Currently accepted tether-based system analysis like Hoyt and Forward (1998) 
assumes that an impactor that strikes a tether strand will not be capable of striking a 
second tether strand. For single-line thethers, this assumption is obviously true. 
However, for multi-strand tethers arranged in a tubular manner, like those discussed 
in Hoyt and Forward (2000), there is a high likelihood that multiple tether lines may 
be located along the same line of impact. This is illustrated using a span cross-section 
composed of eight independent tethers in Fig 8.1.
Figure 8.1 Theoretical eight-line span Figure 8.2 Theoretical eight-line span 
cross section, identifying the condition cross section, Identifying the condition 
in which a single impactor, if  it in which a single impactor, if  it breaks 
survives an initial impact and remains up after the initial impact, could cause
intact, could strike a second line mulitple failures
Examination of Fig 8.1 demonstrates that it is possible for an impactor, which stays 
intact, to impact another tether line. Even if an impactor stays intact, the probability 
of two failures per impact could be significant enough to require a reanalysis of the
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conclusions presented in Hoyt and Forward (2000). If an impactor breaks up upon 
impact, the products could disperse so as to cause many more than a single failure. If 
a single impact has a significant probability of causing multiple failures, the 
calculations performed in Hoyt and Forward (2000) would be invalid.
The concept that an impactor could form into a debris cloud after impact is not a 
unique concept. This phenomenon is widely observed and discussed relative to 
hypervelocity impacts with thin and semi-infinite plates in many works such as Stilp 
(1997), Gardner and Burchell (1997), Christiansen et al (1993), Christiansen et al 
(1992), Cour-Palais (1985), Frost (1970), Orphal (1999), Orphal and Anderson 
(2001), Schonberg (1989), and Schonberg and Ebrahim (1999). Considering prior 
analysts such as McBride and Taylor (1997), Hayashida and Robinson (1993), and 
Penson and Burchell (2003) assumed that the mechanics associated with a tether 
failure under hypervelocity impact conditions are sufficiently similar to those 
modelled with the thin or semi-infinite plate hypervelocity impact equations used 
within each respective paper, it is logical to assume that this secondary debris cloud 
obseiwed after a thin plate impact is likely to form after impact with a tether structure.
This work examines hypervelocity impacts between glass impactors and Twaron 
targets, the remnants of those impacts being captured by both an aluminium witness 
plate and an aluminium witness plate with a piece of Aerogel affixed to it. By 
examining the witness plates and the Aerogel, this work hopes to determine whether 
(i) impactors that strike a Twaron tether remain intact, fracture, or vaporise; (ii) if the 
impactors either remain intact or break into discernable fragments, will the products 
remain on the initial trajectory, or they scatter; and, (iii) if the products break into 
fragments of significant size, would these products remain capable of causing another 
tether line to fail.
8.2 General set up
Three impact tests were conducted on 21 November 2005 at the hypeiwelocity impact 
testing facility within the University of Kent at Canterbury. All three tests used the 
two-stage light gas gun described in Burchell et al (1998) to fire spherical, glass 
impactors at targets of braided Twaron strands. Targets made solely of braided
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Twaron were chosen because (i) aramid fibres are used in other space tether concepts
and designs such as Hayashida and Robinson (1993) and (ii) the uniform qualities of
the target are assumed to remove uncertainties that would arise at the boundary of two
unlike substances. To analyse how the impactors were affected by the impact, all
tests used aluminium witness plates. For the final test, an irregularly shaped piece of i
Aerogel was affixed to the witness plate.
i
Each set of targets incorporated braided Twaron ropes identical to those that 
underwent the tensile tests discussed earlier. Each Twaron strand employed by the 
target ropes is stated by Teijin Twaron to have a linear density of 1780 dtex and a 
volumetric density of 1440 kg/m^. This relationship between linear and volumetric 
density results in a calculated effective cross sectional diameter per strand of 396p.m.
When loaded into the target clamps,, as shown in Fig. 8.2, the 8-strand targets had an 
average profile diameter of 1.60mm that expanded to 1.65mm at the clamped ends.
The 4-strand targets, loaded as shown in Fig 8.3 and Fig 8.4, had an average profile 
area of 0.87mm that did not significantly broaden at the clamped end. For the first 
test, which used 8-strand targets, the average distance between tether targets was 
2.30mm. For the 4-strand targets, the average distance between target tethers was 
1.75mm for the second test and 1.44mm for the final test. Each target had a 
longitudinal diameter of 60mm exposed within the target region. When loading the 
tether targets into the clamps, the tethers were subjected to an unrecorded pre-load 
that caused all targets to be taut.
The impactors fired at the tether targets were made of a glass with density 2500kg/m^.
The glass impactors had a reported diameter of 254pm with a standard deviation of 
1.5%, or 3.81pm. For the first test, a number of impactors less than 50 were used.
For the second and third tests, the number of impactors used was more than 50.
The aluminium witness plates had a thickness of 1.48mm. The surface of the witness 
plate facing the tether targets was offset from the back of the targets by 110.2mm for 
each of the three tests.
8.3 Probability and number of likely impacts
Based on the size and offset of the targets associated with each test, there is a varying 
probability of impact associated with each impactor. For test one, there was a 47.54% 
chance of hitting a target tether in any manner (i.e., including impacts ranging from a 
slight graze to a direct hit) and a 34.51% chance of a direct hit (i.e., an impact where 
all parts of the impactor strike wholly within the target profile). For the second test, 
these probabilities change to 48.61% and 26.60% for impacts including grazes and 
those impacts that are only direct hits, respectively. For the third test, there is a 
probability of 42.82% for any impact and 23.47% for a direct hit. These probabilities 
are calculated using a simple geometric probability using the aggregate target profile 
area verses the total target containing all targets.
All tests were conducted with tens of impactors loaded into the savo, which is the 
expendable two-stage light gas gun component identified in Burchell et al. (1999) that 
holds the imapctors prior to them being fired at the target. The first test had 
somewhere between 30 and 50 impactors loaded into the savo, the second and third 
tests were conducted with significantly more than 50 impactors initially loaded into 
the gun. As per Burchell et al (1999), the two-stage gas gun operates such that only 
around 6% of all impactors loaded into the gun reach the target. With this percentage, 
each test may see approximately 12 impactors reaching the target area.
For each test, there is more than a 50% chance that an impactor will result in a “clean 
miss,” such that it strikes the witness plate without contacting any of the Twaron 
targets. Based on the Fish-Summers equation, a glass impactor similar to those used 
in these tests travelling around 5 km/sec, as were all impactors used in these tests, 
should cause a 0.35mm deep crater in a semi-infinite aluminium plate. As the impact 
tests produced craters in both the first and second witness plates similar in size to that 
predicted by the Fish-Summers equation, it is suspected that these two craters were 
caused by a glass impactor missing all of the tether targets and impacting directly with 
the aluminium witness plate.
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8.4 Test 1
Test 1 was conducted with 10 tether targets spanning across the target area, each 
tether target composed of 8 tether strands braided without pre-loading or pre-twisting.
All tethers were secured within the target area, using an unmeasured preload, such 
that all targets were taught. For this first test, the impactors travelled towards the |
target at a speed of 5.02km/sec.
For the first test, two indirect hits were observed in the target tethers and one 
suspected clean miss was observed in the witness plate. If three impactors reached 
the target area intact, this represents between 6% and 10% of all impactors initially 
loaded into the gun, in agreement with the previous calculations based on data 
supplied by Burchell (2001). Both impacts are identified in Fig 8.3 using various 
levels of magnification.
1.63mm 1.63mm
3033mm
M H
F
Figure 8.3: Aggregate picture of targets used in first test and close-up impages of 
the two identified impact locations.
The left-hand set o f pictures presented in Fig 8.3 clearly shows the damage area. As 
each impactor diameter is approximately one-sixth the width o f each target, it appears 
from examination o f Fig 8.3 that the impactor glanced off the target. The second 
impact location also appears to result from a glancing impact, although it appears the 
impact is more significant judging by the relative number o f severed fibres.
Examination o f the witness plate identified two main regions containing small impact 
sites. These regions are identified in Fig 8.4. Between these two main regions is 
what appears to be a clean miss.
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Figure 8.4: Test one with tether impacts marked with X, the location of the 
observed crater on the witness plate identified with a red dot, and the 
approximate boundary of small cratering marked with a red line.
The upper region o f small craters identified on the witness plate o f Test 1 seems to be 
located in the general proximity o f the two identified impact locations. Contained 
within an ellipse that is approximately 15 mm by 10 mm along the major and minor
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axes, respectively. If the craters within this upper region can be attributed to the 
impactors that struck at the identified impaet locations, the debris dispersion appears 
to be contained within a 9-degree cone.
While it would be convenient to attribute this upper region to debris clouds formed by 
the two identified impacts, such a conclusion does not explain why the centre of the 
region is offset from the impact locations. Nor does such a conclusion explain the 
lower region, which appears to be independent, while the craters within are visually 
similar to those within the upper region. It is possible, though, that the upper region 
could be formed by the debris travelling away from the identified impacts, which the 
lower region is not, without causing an intellectual inconsistency.
As identified in Burchell (1998), not all impactors that begin the test in the savo reach 
the target at the end of the two-stage light gas gun. While only 6% of all loaded 
impactors are expected to reach the target intact, it is not unusual for glass impactors 
to break up in flight. If one of more impactors break up in flight, it is likely the debris 
formed by such an impact would remain close to the longitudinal axis of the gun. 
This assumption that the products would remain close to the flight axis is based on the 
logic that all impactors that stray significantly from the impact axis will not reach the 
target because of the restriction ring discussed in Burchell (1998).
8.5 Test 2
Test 2 was conducted with 16 tether targets spanning across the target area, each 
tether target composed of 4 tether strands braided without pre-loading or pre-twisting. 
For the second test, significantly more than 50 glass impactors were loaded into the 
savo. The impactors travelled towards the target at a speed of 4.97km/sec.
For the second test, there were three observed hits, one of which being direct, and one 
suspected clean miss. This number of impacts indicates that nearly 8% of all 
impactors initially loaded into the light gas gun reached the target area.
There are two areas identified in Fig 8.5, within which the three tether impacts were 
observed. In the pictures along the top of Fig 8.5, the direct impact is identified and
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shown using a range o f magnifications. In the pictures along the left-hand side, two 
impacts are identified. In the pictures along the left hand side, the two impacts are 
located on the two left-most targets. The most obvious impact shows a large number 
o f fractured fibres, and is the focus o f the bottom-left picture. The second picture o f 
this left-hand set identifies the third impact to the below and left o f this main impact 
(to assist in identifying this third impact, it may be o f benefit to examine Fig 8.6, 
which identifies each impact with a blue ‘x ’). While both o f these impacts appear to 
be indirect impacts, the smallest appears to be an extremely minor glancing blow.
0.86mm
65.2mm
Figure 8.5: Aggregate images of second test rig after impacts, with close up 
images identifying the three impact locations. From left to right, impact 1 is 
contained on the far left tether in the leftmost close-up picture. In the same 
picture, impact 2 is shown in two further close-up images directly below the first. 
Impact 3 is identified in a side-on image, and then in a profile image with the 
target’s longitudinal axis running horizontally, with further close-ups of the 
impact location and the severed tether ends.
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Examination of the direct impact may be of interest from a modeling perspective. 
The Draper (72) equation predicts that a glass impactor that directly strikes a Twaron 
line as defined within should penetrate 889pm into the material. Since each strand 
has a calculated diameter of 396pm, it would seem logical to assume a direct impact 
would sever multiple tether strands. However, the damage appears contained within a 
single strand. This is likely due to boundary effects that are neither currently 
understood, nor for which enough background research has cuiTently been performed. 
It is not fully understood, nor is this single data point sufficient for drawing any 
significant assumptions, but the fact that the damage is contained within a single 
strand could indicate that each strand can be treated as a single material for the 
purposes of hypervelocity impact modeling. Between strands, however, this single 
data point indicates that the failure affects may not allow for modeling the whole line 
as a single semi-infinite material, a conclusion that would be in conflict with the 
failure analysis research of Hayashida and Robinson (1993). While not conclusive, 
such data further supports the idea that the Draper (72) equation is suitably 
conservative for a tether-based system reliability analysis.
As with the first test, an aluminium witness plate was used to identify the debris 
travelling away from the target tethers. Identical to Test 8.1, it appears that a single 
impactor reached the witness plate intact without striking any tethers. While Fig 8.3 
used circular boundaries to identify two distinct regions, Fig 8.6 identifies the location 
of each significant secondary crater. Increasing the contrast on an image of the 
witness plate identified these locations. This technique was possible for this witness 
plate because its surface was more finely finished than the other two plates. However, 
it is clear that not every secondary impact crater is identified using this technique. 
Because some of the secondaiy impacts are so small, many could be easily confused 
with surface abrasions when employing this contrast technique. To avoid erroneous 
results, any surface damage that could possibly be assumed as surface damage is not 
identified in Fig 8.6.
Examining the identified secondary craters relative to the regions identified in Fig 8.3 
offers an indication that the number of points censored from Fig 8.6 may have 
resulted in an overly conservative estimation of the secondary debris affects. If it is
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assumed that the secondary impacts identified can be attributed to the central tether 
impact, Fig 8.6 does not contradict the 9-degree dispersion concept proposed as a 
result o f Test 8.1.
10mm 20
Figure 8.6: Superposition of the impacted tether strands and the locations of 
craters found on the witness plate associated with the second test. The blue X 
marks indicate the three identified impacts observed in the target tethers.
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8.6 Test 3
Identical to Test 2, Test 3 was conducted with 16 tether targets spanning across the 
target area. The impactors travelled towards the target at a speed of 5.07km/sec. In 
addition to the aluminium witness plate, an irregular piece of Aerogel was attached 
near the target centre to capture any secondary debris. The location of this Aerogel 
piece is identified using the green trapezoid in Fig 8.8.
For Test 3, two impacts were identified on the tether targets, an indication that two 
impactors arrived at the target tethers intact. These two impacts indicate that 4% of 
the initial impactors reached the target. While on the low side, this percentage is still 
consistent with the calculations perfoimed as a result of the information presented in 
Burchell (1998).
The Aerogel used for Test 3 was irregular in shape because it was a piece of scrap 
remaining from previous work. The profile of the Aerogel piece was wholly 
contained within a trapezoidal area where the left and right sides were both at right 
angles to the top, being of dimensions 26.88mm, 24mm, and 33.44mm, respectively. 
The average depth of the Aerogel was just over 25mm. The Aerogel was reported to 
have an approximate density of 99kg/m^.
Figure 8.7 identifies the two tether impacts, again with varying levels of 
magnification. While the left-hand images appear similar to previous partial impacts, 
the right-hand side pictures appear unsymmetrical with regards to the number of 
fibres severed on the top half of the impact verses the lower half of the impact. This 
is a purely visual phenomenon, as the impact occuiTed on a section of the target where 
the braiding was causing the strand to rotate away from view. Examination of the 
specimen itself revealed that the facture was symmetric in the number of fibres 
severed, which is both logical and expected.
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0.87 mm 0.87mm
Figure 8.7: Aggregate image of the target tethers associated with test three and 
close-up images of the tethers at each of the two observed impact locations.
Figure 8.8 presents both where the tether impacts occurred, using a blue ‘x ’ for each; 
where each o f three significant debris piece was captured within the Aerogel, using a 
yellow ‘x ’; and an area that mostly encompasses the locations o f the 13 smaller 
fragments found in the Aerogel. The fragments found in the Aerogel, identified from 
left to right with the yellow ‘x ’ marks, are presented in Fig 8.9, Fig 8.10, and Fig 8.11, 
respectively. Figure 8.12 identifies one o f the 13 small impactors that were located 
within the yellow circle marked on Fig 8.8.
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Figure 8.8: Impacts with tether observed after the third test marked with blue X, 
the location of surface craters on the witness plate bounded by a red line, 
significant impacts in the Aerogel marked with yellow X, and surface impacts 
into the Aerogel bounded by a yellow Une.
As discussed above, impactors are decelerated and captured within Aerogel, leaving a 
track from the point where it entered the Aerogel to the location where it came to rest. 
For an Aerogel target with a density o f 99kg/m^, as is the sample attached to the
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aluminium witness plate during the third test, the track an impactor makes within the 
Aerogel at velocities consistent with those used for these tests is empirically found by 
Burchell (2005) to be 100 times the diameter of the impactor. The three major tracks 
presented in Fig 8.9, Fig 8.10, and Fig 8.11, all had lengths of lengths 3.1mm, s
5.09mm, and 4.5mm, respectively. Figure 8.12 shows one of the approximately 13 'Iminor tracks, all of which had track lengths between 1mm and 1.67mm.
1Î
In Fig 8.9 through Fig 8.12, a scale is placed against the image that identifies the 
fragment diameter. For these four fragments, the diameter to track length ratio is 
consistent with the 1:100 ratio observed at similar velocities by Burchell (2005). This
consistency appears to support a theory that very little velocity is lost between the |
■original impactor and any fragments that are travelling away from the impact location.
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0.1mm
O.lmm
Figure 8.10: Track of length 5.09mm 
Figure 8.9: Track of length 3.1mm, and impactor identified as being on
impactor located at end of the track ©rder of 0.05mm in diameter,
identified as being on the order of 
0.03mm.
0.1mm
O.lmm
Figure 8.12: Example of one of 13 
small surface impact tracks, with an 
impactor identified on the order of 
0.02mm in diameter.
Figure 8.11: Track of length 4.5mm 
with impactor identified as being on 
the order of 0.05mm in diameter.
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The location of these fragments in the Aerogel and on the witness plate offers a 
further indication that all dispersion is contained well within a 9-degree cone. With 
regards to the impact that did not occur over the Aerogel target, the dispersion appears 
to be tighter still, considering a debris patch was not observed on the far left side of 
the Aerogel specimen.
With regards to the size and velocity of the debris travelling away from the impact, 
while the 1:100 diameter to track length relationship appears to support a theory that 
the debris has not slowed down significantly upon formation, the size of each 
captured debris piece raises questions as to where the bulk of each impactor went. 
When looking at the three major fragments captured in the Aerogel, and adding the 
volume of 13 smaller fragments assuming a diameter of 15 pm each, the total volume 
captured is calculated to be less than 2% of the original impactor mass.
8.7 Conclusions
This series of tests offers data points that contribute to the general knowledge of how 
semi-infinite aluminium plates and tethers react when being impacted at 
hypervelocities. Additionally, this series of tests offers the first known public 
examination of how the resulting debris associated with a hypervelocity tether impact 
forms and propagates. Due to the small number of tests and observed impacts, these 
tests cannot prove or disprove any theory when used in isolation. However, the 
observations one can make from these tests do offer possible trends that could be 
confirmed by further replicating these tests with some further modifications.
8.7.1 Tether impacts
The damage associated with each tether resulting form a hypervelocity impact does 
not disprove the Fish-Summers equation nor the Draper (72) equation proposed 
within. For the single direct impact observed throughout these tests, the Fish- 
Summers equation predicts that an intact impactor would fracture approximately 
0.39mm of the target tether, while the Draper (72) equation predicts a depth of 
penetration on the order of 0.89mm. As each tether strand is calculated to have an
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effective tether diameter of 0.396mm, and only one tether strand was fractured, there 
is no evidence contained in this impact that disproves the applicability of the Fish- 
Summers equation. At the same time, the Fish-Summers equation as it is employed 
was not calibrated for densities as low as the Twaron targets, so sueh agreement may 
be the result of random chance. It seems more logical that the boundary conditions in 
existence between tether strands is not fully understood, a conclusion amved at after 
an examination of the predictions obtained using the Draper (72) equation.
8.7.2 Impactor fracture
There is no evidence that an impactor remains intact after an impact with a tether 
target. This lack of evidence comes from the fact that no crater present on any 
witness plate that could correspond to an intact impactor impact was located behind a 
target tether. Further, the only surface damage or fragments contained within the 
Aerogel that were within a reasonable distance from the impact location were 
significantly smaller than an intact impactor. While there were only 13 obseiwed 
surface impacts and three other significantly sized impacts contained in the Aerogel, 
the aggregate mass of these impactors is still not equal to one intact impactor. 
Therefore, if these all came from the same impactor that fractured after striking the 
tether, the impactor must fracture into no fewer than 20 fragments of varying size.
8.7.3 Fragment velocity
There is no indication that any of the fragments striking the Aerogel have 
significantly reduced in velocity following the impact. Based on the size of the 
observed impactors contained within the Aerogel and the track caused by each, all 
seem to conform to the track length verses impactor diameter relationship observed by 
Burchell for an Aerogel of specified density.
8.7.4 Fragment dispersion
There is no conclusive proof to link any fragment cratering or captured fragments to 
any specific impact location. If it can be assumed that the fragment craterings at a 
given location on the witness plate or within the Aerogel can be associated with the 
nearest tether impact, this would result in an approximate limit on any fragment 
dispersion being 9°.
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8.8 Recommendations and future work
The results of these experimentation lead to two major recommendations for future 
testing of tether materials and for analytieal work on space tether systems.
8.8.1 Testing improvements
More testing must be conducted to verify that the results presented herein are 
repeatable. This testing should also include techniques, such as foil covers that can 
more clearly report on the location of arriving and departing impactors, that can offer 
more evidence of which resulting impaets can be attributed to which impactors. The 
current inability to directly verify how many impactors are reaching the targets, and 
which debris products can be attributed to which initial impactor, is a significant 
limitation to the current work.
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8.8.2 Analytical assumptions
Current space tether analyses assume that a single impact will only cause a single 
failure. While not conclusive, this work has offered an indication that such a 
relationship may not be exclusively valid. For this reason, in addition to an analysis 
employing the one-impact-one-failure assumption, a secondary analysis should be 
preformed that accounts for possible debris dispersion. As this secondary analysis 
should be conservative enough to parameterise the tme failure scenario, this work 
recommends employing an assumption that each impactor breaks into a lethal debris 
cloud that disperses at an angle of 9-degrees.
Chapter 9 
TetherLife Analysis Program
With an understanding of the physical properties associated with aramid fibres such as 
Twaron, an empirical equation for calculating the product of impacts with such fibres, 
and insight into the likely secondary effects of such impact, a predictive assessment of 
the susceptibility of a tether-based system to orbital debris and micrometeorite 
impacts can be made. To do so, a program called TetherLife was created to support 
this research.
9.0 General approach
TetherLife is a Monte Carlo discrete element approach, which breaks down each large 
tether system into small components on the order of one meter in length, and 
randomly selects a large number of elements for analysis. As discussed in literature 
such as Liou et al. (2002), on-orbit lifetime analysis tools are only valid for 
constracting long-teiTU average effect calculations on objects that are uniformly 
susceptible to a specific environment over the analysis period. By breaking down the 
entire span of the examined tether system into small elements, TetherLife is able to 
analyse each discrete element in a valid manner. After sampling a significant number 
of elements at a significant number of times throughout the defined mission, an 
average failure rate per discrete element is found. With this average failure rate, and 
knowing how these discrete elements interact with each other when forming each 
tether span, TetherLife then computes the failure rate for the entire span.
Over the lifetime of a mission, a momentum exchange tether system will go through 
many operational states and will be subjected to a wide range of environments. By 
defining specific system and mission parameters, TetherLife uses these specifications 
to determine how likely it is that the system being analyzed would be in a specific 
state. For example, because it is assumed that the system facility travels in a 
Keplerian manner, TetherLife can determine what percentage of the system’s time on 
orbit is spent between two angles that are 10 degrees on either side of perigee. Using
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similar calculations, TetherLife can randomly select randomly generated system states 
that comply with the system and mission definition.
After TetherLife has selected a suitable system state, it then randomly selects a 
discrete element on that system, and determines what environment that element is 
currently facing or has previously faced. For example, for a tether system that retracts 
after use, the system tips will be exposed to the space environment for more time than 
tethers close to the system facility. For this reason, discrete elements of the tether 
near the tip will be more significantly degraded by atomic oxygen as the mission 
progresses. Consequently, and because the tip is travelling faster than points on the 
sub-span nearer the system facility, the same size piece of debris at some point in the 
mission is more likely to cause a failure at the tip than at other locations on the sub­
span, where it would not have likely caused a facture at any location some time earlier 
in the mission.
After selecting the suitable mission state and generating a reasonable history for each 
discrete element, TetherLife then generates a current environment for that element 
based on probabilistic models of the space environment. By calculating what 
environment the examined discrete element is likely facing given the system state, 
location, and event time, TetherLife is able to calculate whether an impact is likely to 
occur, and whether that impact would result in a failure. By examining a number of 
these randomly generated scenarios, the analysis package predicts an average 
probability of failure for the system as a whole over the course of the entire mission.
The overall flow of the TetherLife program is presented in Fig 9.1. Each element 
listed on the top-level flow chart will be discussed below.
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Figure 9.1 Overview of the how the probability of failure is computed for each 
sub-span by TetherLife.
TetherLife is a research tool designed in support of this analysis, currently in version 
1,2. As with any other research tool designed to be similar in scope and fidelity to a 
commonly accepted engineering model, TetherLife accepts minor losses in fidelity for 
significant gains in efficiency. For example, when assessing the probability of failure 
due to a hypervelocity impact, TetherLife employs the Draper (72) equation for semi­
indiscrete targets instead of employing a costly hydrocode analysis. Such an 
approach is well supported by the literature in works such as Frost (1969), Cour- 
Palais (1970), and Hayashida and Robinson (1993), and offers suitable first-order 
analysis results.
9.1 Setting up a TetherLife analysis
To begin a TetherLife analysis, the user must define the system he or she wishes to be 
analyzed, and the mission parameters within which the tether system will operate. 
The variables required for setting up a TetherLife analysis are discussed below.
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9.1.1 System description
TetherLife is capable of performing analyses on both a passive momentum exchange 
tether system, which uses the force imbalances associated with long objects on 
elliptical orbits to produce angular rotation in the system; and an MMET system, 
which uses a motor in the system facility to cause its two tether spans to counter­
rotate. Illustrative examples of each system are presented in Fig 9.2.
Span
Sub-Span
Span
Figure 9.2: Example o f a M MET system (left) and a passive momentum  
exchange tether system. The sp a n  and su b -sp a n  are identifîed, as applicable. 
Span graphics are based on the Hoytether graphics obtained from the Tethers 
Unlimited website (http://www.tethers.com/Hoytether.html).
If TetherLife is employed to assess a MMET system, it is assumed that all four sub­
spans are of equal length and one span is twice the sub-span length identified by the 
user. For passive systems, the length identified by the user is the total span, and it is 
assumed that the spin axis, about which the system rotates, is at the midpoint of the 
system. For some situations (i.e., when a passive system employs large 
counterweights where the spin axis is significantly shifted to one end of the system), 
this assumption that the spin axis is at the midpoint of a passive system could cause a 
significant shift in the distribution of impact velocities, thus altering the local
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environment observed by the modeled system. However, it is assumed that any 
conservatism in the local environment that would be obseived at one end of the 
modeled system, resulting from a decrease in the average impact velocity, would be 
sufficiently countered by the corresponding loss of conseivatism at the other end.
After defining what type of system is to be analyzed (i.e., a MMET or a passive 
system), the general parameters of the system must be set. Such parameters include 
the characteristic length of the system, Z, which corresponds to a sub-span for a 
MMET and a span for a passive system; the tether material density {p) and break 
strength (%), which determine the maximum operational angular velocity that can be 
achieved by the system; the operational angular velocity, which is the rotational 
velocity about the system spin axis (i.e., the system facility for a MMET, and the 
midpoint of a passive system) at the time the payload is released; the reaction 
efficiency of the tether material, rjR, which determines how quickly the tether material 
wears away when exposed to the atomic oxygen environment, thus decreasing the 
diameter of each tether strand; and the diameter of primary lines (i.e., lines that are 
designed to bear the forces required by the mission under normal operation) and 
secondary lines (i.e., lines that are designed to each partly substitute for a single 
primary lines in the event that the primary line fails).
Within each span, there are likely to be multiple tether lines. How these lines are 
organized has a direct affect on how the system reacts to a failure in one line if it 
happens to be impaeted by an object on orbit. In Fig 9.3, three different tether line 
orientations are presented. On the far left, a span is made of one tether line. For this 
system, the probability that the system would fail is equal to the probability that this 
single line fails. Considering the length of such tethers and the density of the debris 
environment, such a configuration is likely to fail very soon after it is introduced to 
the orbital environment.
The second orientation presented in Fig 9.3, center, represents a span composed of 
three tether lines, each identically capable of bearing the load required by the mission. 
While, similar to the first orientation presented on the far left, a failure anywhere on 
each line will cause the whole line to fail. However, unlike the first example, a failure
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of one line will not cause a failure of the system. Assuming each line is capable of 
independently bearing all the loads required by the mission, all three tethers must fail 
before the system fails. If there is a 20% chance that the first orientation will fail over 
the course of a day, there is only a 0.8% chance that the second orientation will fail 
over the course of that same day. While a tremendous increase in reliability, such a 
technique for increasing reliability does require significant gains in system weight. If 
the mission requirements cannot afford the weight increases required to support 
reliability gains using such a design method, system designers must begin looking 
towards cross-strapping techniques.
Many systems work because a group of sub-systems are all working in series to 
perform a certain task. This is very similar to the far left illustration in Fig 9.3. So 
long as the single tether line is unbroken, the system is operational. The center 
picture then increases the reliability of the system by increasing the number of lines. 
However, the far right illustration in Fig 9.3 is an example of cross-strapping using a 
Hoytether design. This design allows for multiple breaks in a single primary strand, 
something that was impossible in the two other un-strapped examples.
Figure 9.3: A system span composed of one primary line (left), multiple primary 
lines (center), and primary and secondary lines arranged in a Hoytether 
configuration.
The Hoytether works like any other cross-strapped mechanical system; when a 
component fails, its task is allocated to its surrounding components. By interlinking
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primary strands with secondary lines, the Hoytether has essentially divided each 
primary line into a series of sub-lines, each sub-line independent of the sub-line either 
following or proceeding. When a sub-line fails, the load that was carried by that 
component is distributed to its surrounding components. This is illustrated in Fig 9.4.
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Figure 9.4: The force previously supported by the now broken primary tether is 
distributed along the surrounding, dark black secondary lines. Span graphics 
are based on the Hoytether graphics obtained from the Tethers Unlimited 
website (http ://www.tethers.com/Hoytether.html).
TetherLife allows the analyst to assess a system using any combination of the three 
different tether line orientations presented in Fig 9.3. If the analysis is assessing spans 
that use either of the un-strapped configurations, the user must define the number of 
primary lines required, the number of redundant primary lines, and the diameter of 
each primary line, dp. If the analyst is using spans that incorporate a Hoytether 
method of cross-strapping, the user must define the number of primary lines, the 
number of redundant primary lines, the number of secondary lines associated with 
each primary line, and the diameters of both the primary and secondary lines, dp and 
ds, respectively.
9.1.2 M ission and analysis definition
After defining the system, the user must define the mission that will be analyzed. 
Such mission analysis parameters include the start and end dates of the mission, To 
and T], respectively; the orbital parameters for the tether system being analyzed, such
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as eccentricity, e, height at perigee, hp, and orbital inclination, a,„c; the operational
angular velocity, the orbital angle horn system perigee at release, Or\ the ratio $between the time the system is on to the time it is off, ton\ the ratio of the time the
190
;
system is at its operational angular velocity to the total time it is operating, top, and the 
time step used by the analysis, iSi. After defining these model parameters, the user 
defines the number of randomly generated states he or she wishes to be included in 
the analysis, as well as a threshold tenu that defines the accuracy of any iterative 
calculations (i.e., if the user defines 0.001 as the threshold, iterative calculations will 
be completed when the difference between iterations is less than that value).
With the mission and analysis parameters, TetherLife generates an array of discrete 
steps along the orbit. Throughout the analysis, this aiTay will be used to select the 
orbital location of the system. For smaller increments of time, the array will contain J
more points since locations on the orbit are generated based on the time it takes the 
system centre to travel between the orbital locations. If an orbital position is chosen 
from this array using a uniform distribution of array locations, the orbital location of 
the system will always be a valid random location based on the distribution of 
possible orbital positions throughout the mission.
9.2 Generating a data point
To achieve its goal of generating a number of acceptable random event scenarios,
TetherLife loops through a selection and assessment process. In selecting an event, 
the following flow is maintained.
9.2.1 Event time and solar state
The first step TetherLife takes when generating a random event scenario is to select 
when the event happened. Every sample is modeled to occur within the start and end 
date of the mission. As inputted by the user, TetherLife selects a moment in time that 
represents the time each randomly generated event would occur at from a uniform 
distribution identified as follow:
f { t )  = U {T „ T ,) (9.1)
To achieve this, TetherLife uses the following to generate the time T/ using the 
Microsoft Visual Basic C++ 8 (Beta2) compiler, where all variables are long unsigned 
doubles:
_ m n d ( ^
' RAND MAX ^
As is with any computer number generator, the random numbers generated are only 
pseudorandom numbers. To ensure, as much as reasonably possible, that the numbers 
are random relative to each other within the program and relative to each other on 
various runs, the rand() function is re-seeded to the user’s computer clock time at the 
beginning of every TetherLife analysis.
All numbers generated using a uniform distribution in TetherLife will be generated 
using the method described above. While the numbers are theoretically 
pseudorandom, considering the technique’s wide use in solutions using commonly 
accepted engineering analysis software such as MatLab, this techniques is assumed to 
offer sufficiently random values for the purposes of an analysis performed by 
TetherLife.
As described in more detail when discussing the environmental models, TetherLife 
cannot sample an instantaneous moment in time, but must sample a discrete time 
increment. While terms such as “moment” or “instant” are often used in this study to 
refer to the time at which a selected impact condition is assessed, the model of the 
impact condition is really happening over a time span defined as follows:
t> T ,r^t< T . + At (9.3)
For the puiposes of selecting appropriate values from the distributions, etc., 
TetherLife calculations are made under the assumption that At is appropriately small 
such that the values obtained at the time 71 can be assumed valid over the entire time 
step At.
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With the event time, the level of solar activity can then be found. Solar activity is a 
driving element of the environment, and occurs in 11-year cycles. It is accounted for 
in the literature as an F  10.7 valve, which con*esponds to a 13-month smoothed solar 
flux. Based on a quantitative analysis of the available data for solar cycles 20 and 23, 
TetherLife models the solar cycle using the following formula:
S(F10.7)= 27.061|7). exp 5.3
5
+ 70 (9.4)
Where Tc is used to place the current time into its appropriate location relative to 
solar cycle 23, and is found as follows:
=1996 + 11 int T;. -1996 1 1 (9.5)
This use of a fitted curve for solar cycle 23, and even the use of solar cycle 23, is a 
significant approximation. However, relative to its later use in the orbital debris 
model, a variation of 20% in this model near the beginning and tail end of the solar 
cycle has only a 0.2% to 0.3% affect on the orbital debris flux value. At the peak of 
the cycle, this effect can increase to between an 11% to 20% change in the orbital 
debris flux approximation. However, considering the uncertainties associated with 
the orbital debris environment, the uncertainty associated with using this model based 
on solar cycle 20 and 23 is assumed insignificant.
9.2.2 System state
After finding the time of the randomly generated analysis point, TetherLife constructs 
a likely system state for that time. The foundation of this generated system state, as 
alluded to earlier, is the random selection of the system location on its orbit. This is 
done because all momentum exchange tether systems are designed to operate in a 
manner that is coupled with the orbital dynamics of their orbit. For a passive 
momentum exchange tether system, the system could begin to tumble, thus producing 
the angular velocity that allows the system to impart significant tangential velocities
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to a payload located at the system tip, when there is an imbalance in the local 
velocities and forces of the system relative to the gravity gradient, with which the 
system was originally oriented while hanging on orbit. Such an imbalance arises 
when the system, while travelling on a highly elliptical orbit, approaches perigee. For 
this reason, if TetherLife randomly selects an orbital position that is close to perigee 
for a passive momentum exchange tether system, TetherLife will assume that is 
highly likely the angular velocity of the system is close to its operational angular 
velocity. However, TetherLife does not use the orbital dynamics of the system to 
calculate what that operational angular velocity is at any moment in time. TetherLife 
assumes that the angular velocity inputted by the user is appropriate for the system, 
and makes very general, normally distributed assumptions as to the angular velocity 
relative to the proximity of the central facility to the perigee of its orbit.
These assumptions are made because, while work is ongoing in this area, there is no 
publicly available data that would allow TetherLife to make assumptions that better 
apply for all systems. For this reason, especially for passive momentum exchange 
tether systems, mission planners intent on using the package for a specific mission 
would require specific changes to be made to the model. Such changes would include 
either modifying the distributions used within TetherLife, or allowing for non­
standard distributions be created within the model using suitable orbital dynamic 
models.
Unlike a passive momentum exchange tether system, a MMET does not rely on 
imbalances in the orbital dynamics of the system to produce the operational angular 
velocity in the system spans. Because a MMET relies on a motor in its system facility 
to produce angular velocities in its counter-rotating spans, it can make use of the 
orbital benefits afforded a system launching at apogee. While both a MMET and 
passive momentum exchange tether system have the same limiting operational 
capabilities as a result of their material, the MMET is potentially capable of delivering 
its maximum velocity increment to a payload at a much higher altitude than a passive 
system, thus making the system more effective from the standpoint of direct payload 
transfer. Consequently, TetherLife assumes a MMET will be at its operational 
angular velocity at apogee, and makes a similar approximation for generating an
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variable is as follows;
a . expd^;, - ( 9 j ) - l  (9.6)
With this standard deviation, a standard normal random variable is generated using 
two uniformly distributed variables x\ and X2 , both generated identically to the 
uniformly random selection of time within the mission, as follows;
T] = cos(2^r, y-21og(x2) (9.7)
From this generation of y\, the angular velocity at F, is the operational angular 
velocity multiplied by one less the product of y\ and cTco. While it is tme that this use 
of the exponential function is relatively arbitraiy with regards to generating the 
standard deviation, it is a logical choice in a situation where no better data is currently 
available in the public domain. For an MMET system, verifying such an 
approximation would require a further study of the angular acceleration and 
deceleration associated with various motor sizes and types, work that is currently 
ongoing at the University of Glasgow. For a passive system, there are a number of 
orbital dynamic and operational considerations that must be further explored for each 
mission, including how one stabilizes a passive system after use, relative to the 
gravity gradient. Without such studies, the use of the exponential as it is in this 
approximation of standard deviation is consistent with available data.
Once TetherLife has selected a location and an angular velocity, it then selects an 
appropriate span length. For MMET systems, the operational model incorporated into
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angular velocity for the system relative to apogee as it does for a passive system at I
perigee.
S
'fRegardless of the system, after selecting the location of that system using the orbital %position array as discussed above, the angular velocity is generated as a normally 
distributed random variable with a standard deviation based on the orbital location, 6^/, 
relative to the system release point, Or. The standard deviation of the normal random
TetherLife and being explored at the University of Glasgow for its dynamical and ‘:.:Loperational advantages assumes that the system receives its payloads when the tether |
sub-spans are retracted into the system facility. As full retraction of the sub-spans 
means the moment of inertia is at a minimum, it is assumed that the facility will spin- 
up to its full operational angular velocity at this time. Based on the power required to 
angularly accelerate the system in a retracted verses an extended orientation, spinning 
up to the operational angular veloeity before retracting the tether sub-spans is the 
most efficient use of energy. It is at this point of maximum angular velocity that the 
sub-spans would be released. As the sub-spans will increase the moment of inertia for 
the system, more power will be required by the system facility as the moment of 
inertia increases just to maintain the same angular velocity. By finding the most 
efficient power usage profile, the release rate of the sub-spans can be calculated. In 
addition to power considerations, especially for aramid fibers, there may be a loading 
rate that is optimal for the tether material. All of these factors must be taken into 
consideration with each system to determine the distribution of lengths a MMET 
system will see throughout the course of its mission.
As such knowledge of system power consumption and how to harness the benefits of 
the strain-rate dependency exhibited by the tether material is unknown at this time,
TetherLife uses four main assumptions when randomly generating the state of the 
sub-spans:
1. When the system is at its operational angular velocity, the sub-spans will 
either be at full length, or will be approaching their full length,
2. When the system facility is stopped, the sub-spans will either be fully retracted
or will be retracting,
3. When the angular velocity of the system facility is changing, the sub-spans
will either be fully retracted or at full length, and
4. The sub-spans will release and retract in an identical, smooth, and continuous 
manner.
With the first three assumptions, a selection criterion of state can be created. As 
shown in Fig 9.5, once the angular velocity is known, the four assumptions above
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require the span length to be restricted to a specific state. For example, if the angular 
velocity is not at either its maximum or minimum, there is assumed to be a 50% 
chance that the span is either fully extended or fully retracted as per the identical 
nature of extension and retraction made in the fourth assumption. For situations 
where the angular velocity is either at its maximum or at its minimum, TetherLife 
needs a probability distribution for determining the likely state of the tether spans.
System
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Changing State
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Figure 9.5: Various states of angular velocity and span length as defined by 
TetherLife.
However, since there is currently no publicly available work with the orbital 
dynamics of a MMET system that can be studied to find an appropriate distribution 
function, TetherLife employs the arctangent function to achieve a malleable 
distribution that provides random values in accordance with the requirements of the 
fourth assumption. To generate these distributions, TetherLife employs the ton and top 
ratios cited earlier in this work, as well as the tot and tcoi terms that must also be 
inputted by the user.
If it can be assumed that the total time that the system exists is represented by unity, 
the portion of its lifetime that the system spends carrying out a mission, verses the
L . .time it is just sitting on orbit waiting for the next mission to begin, is equal to
L.. +1
For example, if ton equals 0.5, that means that 33% of the system lifetime is spent
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performing for and shutting down from a mission, while 67% of its lifetime is spent 
idly on orbit.
As illustrated by Fig 9.5, within that time that the system is operating, a certain 
percentage of that time will be spent such that that the system is operating at its 
operational angular velocity. This percentage of that operational time spent when the 
system is operating at its maximum operational angular velocity is Zp- Relative to the 
total lifetime of the system, the portion of the entire system life that the system is
operating at is maximum operational angular velocity is then . v. For example,
\Kn + IJ
if that same system that operates 33% of its time also operates at its operational 
angular velocity such that top a equals 0.5, these ratios would be combined to find that, 
out of the entire life of the system, 16.5% of that time is spent at its maximum 
operational angular velocity. Understanding these ratios allows the analyst to adjust 
the rate at which the system accelerates up to its operational angular velocity and the 
rate at which the system is used on orbit.
To understand the state of the tether spans at the instant, Z/, one must also eonsider 
the toL and toL terms. The toi term states what percentage of the time that the system is 
operating at its maximum operational angular velocity is done with the sub-spans at 
full extension. For efficient systems where the payload is released very soon after the 
system is ready to launch, this Zl term will be very small. The larger this number 
gets, the more inefficient the system is likely to be relative to an optimal launch. 
Here, an optimal launch is one where the system spins up, reaches its full operational 
angular acceleration and the sub-spans are fully out exactly at the release point, 
releases its payload, and near instantly begins to shut down after the mission. As 
achieving this state seems intuitively rare, it is reasonable to assume that an actual 
MMET system will have a relatively significant Zi value. The tcoi term is the ratio 
between how long the system takes to accelerate and decelerate to and from its 
operational angular velocity and how long the system takes to extend or retract the 
sub-spans to and from their full length. As it is assumed that the system takes an 
equivalent time to both accelerate or decelerate and extend and retract, these two
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arctan([20y,.]-10) +  ■ (9.8)
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terms are the final requirements for solving all of the time relationships identified in 
Fig 9.5.
„ IWhen the sub-spans are either expanding or retracting, the sub-span length at the i ’
. . . ainstant is found using the arctangent function. As previously discussed, there is 5
currently no information available with regards to how an operational MMET system 
would accelerate or decelerate, accounting both for efficient motor operation in the 
facility and the orbital dynamic equations governing the system. By using the |
arctangent fonction, a random variable that is uniformly distributed between zero and 
unity, yi, can be used to select random lengths that transition smoothly from zero to L 
as follows;
The use of arctangent and the use of the constants 20 and 10 was an arbitrary selection §
made on qualitative grounds. The use of arctangent offered results that appear 
intuitively logical, meaning the system will take more time during the beginning and 
the end of each process than it will once the process is underway. This is why 
arctangent was chosen over a linear relationship between time and extension.
However, arctangent produces results that are not so unique to a specific assumption 
of how the orbital dynamics and motor performance will interact that it would 
produce egregiously erroneous results. Further, the use of the constants 20 and 10 
were chosen to minimize the discontinuity in the function at the extremities. By using 
these constants, the arctangent function generates random length variables between 
3% and 97% of the total length. While it would be ideal to have these values contain 
the whole range of span lengths, a qualitative assessment of the results indicates that 
such a minor discrepancy is not outside the scope of an engineering model.
For passive systems, it is assumed that the system is at its full span length for all 
points throughout the analysis. For this reason, users wishing to assess a passive 
system only need define the Z„ and top ratios. It must be noted that these ratios are 
dependent on the system and mission description defined above. TetherLife does not
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detect errors in user inputs that would cause the system and mission definitions for a 
passive system to be invalid. The results produced by TetherLife for a passive 
momentum exehange tether system are highly dependent on the inputs being 
consistent with an assessment of the orbital dynamics driving the system.
The final system state parameter that must be generated by TetherLife is the span 
orientation, (p. The span orientation is the angle between the longitudinal axis of the 
sub-span on which the discrete element will be chosen and the gravity gradient. By 
knowing this angle, TetherLife can locate a discrete element, discussed in the 
following section, relative to the center of the Earth. By doing this, it can then assess 
the orbital environment at that location. As it is assumed the angular velocity of a 
MMET span is not significantly affected by the force of gravity, the span orientation 
is modeled as a uniformly distributed random variable between zero and In, with the 
value for each instant chosen accordingly.
9.2.3 Discrete element location
TetherLife models each tether line as a series of segments. Each of these segments 
defines one of the discrete elements analyzed by this model. For a span that 
incorporates a Hoytether formation, every joint is the start and end point of a segment. 
The user must define the length of each primary and secondary segment, Lp and Ls, 
respectively. For analyses of independent lines, each line is modeled as a series of 
segments that are one meter in length each.
TetherLife assumes every strand is equally accessible to the debris environment. This 
assumption is based on the significantly large spacing between tether strands, when 
considered in conjunction with the uncertainty of debris trajectories approaching the 
system. As such, this assumption allows the analysis to investigate a segment solely 
from the perspective of its distance from the system facility. TetherLife selects an 
element by selecting a random value between zero and unity, and multiplying that 
value by Z,-, which is the length of the sub-span, for a MMET system, or full span, for 
a passive system, and locates that point relative to the overall length Z.
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It is very important that the point be randomly selected using Z,- yet analyzes it relative 
to its location on Z. This is because only the tether segments currently exposed to the 
environment at that instant are susceptible to the environment at that instant, but the 
segments closer to the span tips are susceptible to the environment for a longer period 
of time each mission than those located near the system facility. As discussed later, it 
is this time of exposure that dictates the amount of degradation seen on the tether f
surface, effectively reducing the tether diameter more quickly for segments that are 
closer to the span tips.
With the segment location selected, and the distance from the system spin axis to that 
location known, the local velocity of that segment relative to the system facility can 
be calculated as the cross product of the system angular velocity at that instant and the 
radius from the system spin axis to that location. This local velocity, in conjunction 
with the diameter of the segment after accounting for atomic oxygen degradation, is 
vital in the later probability of failure due to debris and micrometeorite impact.
When calculating the likely orbital debris and micrometeorite environment, the most 
important aspect of the discrete element location is its altitude, or height above the 
surface of the Earth, 1% This is found by adding Z,. cos(^ zi) to the height of the system
facility. Because the spans of the proposed tether systems are so large, this change in 
height can be significant from an analysis perspective. The ability of TetherLife to 
account for both the variation of environment and loeal velocity across the system is 
what makes the results less uncertain than conventional analysis approaches.
9.2.4 Orbital debris environment
TetherLife characterizes the orbital debris environment, as it does the micrometeorite 
environment, using equations presented by Tribble, originally in Tribble (1995) and 
again in Tribble (2004). The Tribble equations calculate the average planar flux per 
year {Fqd) for orbital debris of a particular diameter. This equation for this flux is as 
follows:
Foo = )*(/>,, )[Z )g, (7^ . )+  Z  k ,  (r, )] (9.9)
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These equations are calibrated to be accurate through 2011, the gi and g2 terms being 
growth terms with the variables q and p  within those functions being 0.05 and 0.02, 
respectively. There is a further inclination dependence, characterized in the equation 
as The values for this inclination term as it is used in TetherLife are
presented in (Tribble 1995).
While these equations do produce specific flux values, it must be understood that the 
orbital debris environment is “not well defined or understood, and the number of 
small (<1 em) [orbital debris] above 700 km is virtually unknown” (Tribble 1995). 
This uncertainty is a product of both the limitations inherent in the equipment used to 
observe the orbital debris environment and the relative lack of exhaustive studies
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aimed at characterizing the environment. However, the use of predictive models that 
calculate the debris flux at a certain location on orbit is common.
The latest NASA model characterizing the near earth orbit debris environment is 
ORDEM2000. ORDEM2000 uses a discrete element model of the debris 
environment to generate either average flux values for a spacecraft traveling along a 
specific orbit or the number of particles an observatory would see passing in front of 
it if located at a specific location. The ORDEM2000 model also incorporates NASA 
breakup and drag models, which predict how the environment will grow over a 
significant amount of time. Veiy similar to ORDEM2000, the ESA Master99 model 
incorporates the same level of functionality as ORDEM2000 and takes the same 
analytical approach. When directly compared, the results from both programs do not 
substantially differ in most cases.
The ORDEM version prior to 2000 was ORDEM96. While ORDEM2000 took a 
discrete element approach, ORDEM96 used a series of equations for calculating the 
probability that both a spacecraft on its designated trajectory and a series of debris 
bands on specific inclinations would be located within the same volume of space. 
When compared in Liou et a l (2001), the approach taken and results presented by 
ORDEM96 do not seem inconsistent with research done after 1996 and prior to 2000 
since the model outputs differ quite minimally compared against ORDEM2000 results 
for identical missions.
Both the ORDEM96 and ORDEM2000 cite the same uncertainties with the orbital 
debris environment that are cited by Tribble (1995). As a result of the inherent 
uncertainty associated with the system being modeled, and the relative complexity of 
incorporating either the ORDEM96 or ORDEM2000 packages into the TetherLife 
model, it was assumed that the uncertainty associated with the Tribble model was no 
more significant than the uncertainty inherent in either ORDEM model. Support for 
the Tribble model as a valid engineering model was further bolstered when the same 
equations were re-released, after both ORDEM models were available, in Tribble 
(2004) with no substantial changes.
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9.2.5 M icrometeorite environment
Micrometeorite flux as a function of mass is observed to be constant at a significant 
distance from the Earth. Equation 9.17 represents this background flux, as it is 
characterized within Tribble (1995).
=3.156io’ [.4-‘“ *+ S  + c ]  (9.17)
Where:
.4 = 15 + 2.2io^n™  (9.18)
B = 1.310-’ +10" ml„ +10” (9-19)
C = 1.3,o-‘’ (m„„+10‘ m J ,„ f'’ (9.20)
This background flux does not stay constant for locations closer to the surface of the 
Earth. Of the three main factors that affect the micrometeorite flux at a particular 
point close to the Earth, the first is the gravitational focusing effect. The gravitational 
forces of Earth attract micrometeorites so as to cause them to change course towards
the Earth. This effect diminishes as the distance from the Earth increases. Therefore,
the closer a point is towards the surface of the Earth, the higher the micrometeorite 
flux. This effect is defined by using the following equation. This gravitational 
focusing teim is multiplied to the background flux to estimate the flux associated with 
a point at the height, in kilometers, incorporated into the gravitational focusing term.
+100
The next factor affecting micrometeorite flux at a point close to the surface of the 
Earth is the planetary shielding factor. Because it is assumed that the background
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micrometeorite environment is effectively directionless, the closer a point to the 
surface of the Earth, the less likely background micrometeorites will be approaching 
the system from the direction of the Earth. This decrease in micrometeorite density is 
called the Earth shielding factor, and is presented mathematically as follows. To 
apply the shielding factor, it is multiplied to the product of the background flux and 
the gravitational focusing factor.
'I
.f:
A 1 +  c o s ( t; )shield (9.22)
77 = arcsin^V+TOO^+ lj j (9.23)
The final factor affecting the local micrometeorite flux for points near the surface of 
the earth is the spacecraft direction factor. Depending on which direction the discrete 
element is facing, the micrometeorite flux is significantly affected. Because of their 
orientation, locations on a spacecraft that either face the Earth or are opposite the 
direction the spacecraft is traveling will see the debris flux, which is found as the 
product of the background flux and all previously discussed factors, reduced by a 
factor of 10. For locations facing ail other directions, the local micrometeorite flux 
must be multiplied by the following directional factor:
F,dir
F 8 + 3^ 1- Bj + iooYy F-n+h i )
4
(9.24)
9.2.6 Atomic oxygen environment
Atomic oxygen is, functionally, an abrasive that removes exposed surfaces of an 
object in space. This change in thickness of an exposed surface as a function of time 
is directly related to the atomic oxygen flux during exposure and the reaction 
efficiency of the material. This is discussed and expressed mathematically within 
Tribble (1995) using an equation that is presented in this section as Eq. 9.25.
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The atomic oxygen flux is found in the same manner as the debris flux for the orbital 
debris models by multiplying the atomic oxygen number density by the velocity of the 
system as it travels through that density of particles. TetherLife finds the number 
density for a particular altitude using an approximation of the US Standard 
Atmosphere 1976 presented in Tribble (1995). This approximation is as follows:
_ . - 9 . 9 9 i o ’" / 7 . + 2 .010"*^ A. < 200km 
P a o - ~ \  ,, (9.26)-1.25io‘^ A +L25io*^ h: > 200km
As TetherLife is not a deterministic model, it is not possible to deterministically track 
the atomic oxygen flux for eveiy line segment. Consequently, the atomic oxygen flux 
for every exposed location on the system over the course of the mission is assured to 
be similar to the atomic oxygen flux observed at the system facility. For high-altitude 
systems with long spans, this approximation would be a conservative estimate of the 
atomic oxygen affect, while for systems at significantly lower altitudes this 
assumption would underestimate the affect. For example, if the altitude of the system 
facility were 800 km above the surface of the earth, the tip of a 200 km long tether 
would experience an increase or decrease of 100%. However, this decrease would 
result in an atomic oxygen number density of zero, while the increase would only 
have a change in surface thickness of 7.610'^ cm/sec if the tether span were coated 
with a material similar in reaction efficiency to Kapton. Considering the change in 
degradation is so small, and considering a span tip will only be subjected to such a 
large variation in altimde for less than 0.5% of all the time the system is at full 
extension (which, the time the system is at full extension itself, should be a relatively 
short amount of time is the mission is optimised to be operating in an efficient 
manner), this assumption that the atomic oxygen flux for all locations on the system is 
sufficiently equivalent to the flux at the system facility is assumed to be a suitable 
approximation for an engineering model.
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To find the average atomic oxygen flux experienced by the system, this calculation 
must take into account the orbital parameters for non-circular orbits. As the atomic 
oxygen flux is the product of the atomic oxygen number density and the velocity of 
the system at that the time the system encountered that density, TetherLife examines 
the orbital velocity of the system facility at all of the locations contained within the 
orbital array discussed earlier and calculates the product of that velocity and the 
numeric density at that location. Taking the average of these calculations allows 
TetherLife to arrive at an average atomic oxygen flux for all points on the orbit, given 
the previous assumption that all locations experience a significantly similar flux to 
that of the system facility.
While these equations and assumptions allow TetherLife to assess the atomic oxygen 
flux associated with a specific location at any point throughout the mission, they do 
not account for the fact that not every location will be exposed to the atomic oxygen 
environment for the entirety of the system lifetime nor the entirety of the mission. To 
account for this, TetherLife uses the state equations for sub-span length discussed 
above to determine, based on the location of the line segment being analyzed relative 
to the sub-span tips, what percentage of the mission that location has been exposed to 
the environment. This calculation calls the various operational ratios discussed above 
and the arctangent assumption previously used. With this exposure factor, the time of 
exposure for each randomly generated point at some time F/ within the planned 
mission can be assessed based on the mission parameters inputted by the analyst.
These calculations for incorporating the degrading affect of atomic oxygen require a 
number of assumptions. It is believed that these assumptions are suitable for an 
engineering model for a number of reasons. First, it must be noted that the effect of 
atomic oxygen degradation on these tether elements is very small. Considering the 
number density of atomic oxygen at 800 km altitude, it would take 10 years of 
constant exposure before a tether line is compromised. As discussed, no tether strand 
will be constantly exposed to the environment over the mission lifetime. Since the 
system is extending and releasing, and it is not anticipated that the system will 
transition from one mission immediately to the next, the majority of segments will
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only be exposed to the atomic oxygen environment for a small percentage of the 
system lifetime.
Further, TetherLife has minimized computational complexity by taking a Monte Carlo 
analytical approach that relies on the selection of independent, random variables. 
Because atomic oxygen degradation is the only significantly time dependent factor 
being considered, increasing the fidelity of the atomic oxygen analysis would be 
computationally costly. Considering the fact that the atomic oxygen affect is so 
small, increasing the analytical fidelity of TetherLife would have significant cost 
implications for little added benefit. For this reason, it is assumed that the treatment 
of atomic oxygen employed by TetherLife is suitable for the purposes of an 
engineering model.
9.2.7 Impact prediction
TetherLife assumes that a momentum exchange tether system will fail as a result of 
hypervelocity impact. As previously mentioned, TetherLife calculates this probability 
of failure by randomly selecting a sizable number of moments in time and 
determining whether it is likely a fatal impact would occur given the states and 
conditions associated with that random moment. By making these random moments 
so short in duration, and the impact locations so small relative to the analytical tools 
employed, TetherLife assumes that one instant is capable of modeling one, 
independent debris piece and its likelihood of impacting one, independent line 
segment. By keeping each time step so small and each line segment so short, every 
impact prediction generated by TetherLife should have a probability of occurrence 
that is much less than unity. By having a probability of occurrence that is much less 
than unity, it is assumed that TetherLife need only account for the case of one impact 
per segment per instant. Therefore, after selecting the state of the system and the 
location of the segment that is to be analysed, TetherLife randomly generates a single 
orbital debris piece and one micrometeorite to examine the likelihood that each will 
impact the randomly generated line segment in its randomly generated location and 
state.
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After a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the literature, it became clear that 
the probability that an orbital debris piece or a micrometeorite would be less than or 
equal to a certain value at all altitudes could be represented by a single function for 
each. This single function for each would effectively be a cumulative histogram, and 
considered a pseudo-CDF for the purposes of this investigation. The data presented in 
the literature of debris flux verses debris diameter, for a range of altitudes, is recreated 
in Fig 9.6. As one can qualitatively deduct through observation, the distribution of 
flux as a function of diameter is consistent across the altitudes.
h
o.oooor
Debris Diameter (cm)
------------ 300 km
— - - — 700 km 
............... -500 km
Figure 9.6: Re-creation of the flux as a function of orbital debris diameter data 
for various altitudes, as presented in Liou e f  al, (2001).
When creating a pseudo-CDF of particle diameter using the data for each of the three 
altitudes identified in Fig 9,6, the standard deviation about the average value was less 
than or equal to 0.1% of the average value. Such a minimal variation is assumed a 
suitable trade-off in fidelity for the purposes of the increased efficiency that a single 
pseudo-CDF would provide the TetherLife program in its current version. For future 
versions of TetherLife, it is assumed that these will take a discrete element approach 
to the debris environment identical to the ORDEM2000 approach, thus rendering this 
issue of variability about the average irrelevant in future versions.
The reason a debris diameter pseudo-CDF had to be approximated for this work and 
has not come up before is of interesting note. For a conventional orbital risk 
assessment, the system being examined often has a known and constant susceptibility
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to particles of a specific size. For this reason, the analyst will often take this threshold 
size and compute the flux observed by the vehicle when accounting for all debris 
elements of an equivalent or larger size. For a momentum exehange tether system, 
the system is not constantly or uniformly susceptible to a debris element of a 
particular size. At one time for one location, the characteristics of an impact that 
would result in failure may vary significantly from that at another time and location. 
For example, if identical impactors approaching the system in an identical manner 
were to strike both (i) near the tip of a span or sub-span and (ii) near the system 
facility, the impactor striking nearer the span tip would be more likely to cause failure 
because the local impact velocity is significantly greater. As a result, the Monte Carlo 
approach taken by TetherLife requires the failure analysis to account for not just the 
threshold debris size and the assumed approach rate of the system facility, but must 
randomly generate all aspects of the impact to include local velocity and tether 
diameter as a function of time. For this reason, a pseudo-CDF of each the orbital 
debris and micrometeorite environments must be constructed for use in TetherLife, 
where they were not previously required.
Based on the altitude dependent flux verses impactor diameter graphs available in the 
literature, the pseudo-CDF for the orbital debris and micrometeorite environments 
used in TetherLife are presented in Fig 9.7 and Fig. 9.8, respectively. As a point of 
caution, when obseiwing the pseudo-CDF for orbital debris diameter and making 
visual comparisons between that and the data presented in Fig 9.6, it is important to 
note that the y-axis in Fig 9.6 is logarithmic, while the y-axis for both the orbital 
debris and micrometeorite pseudo-CDF in Fig. 9.7 and Fig. 9.8 is uniform.
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Figure 9.7 Pseudo-CDF for orbital 
debris diameter at all altitudes.
M ic r o m e te o r ite  M ass (g)
Figure 9.8 Pseudo-CDF for 
micrometeorite mass at all altitudes.
While the orbital debris pseudo-CDF was generated using data presented in Fig 9.6, 
which had already been generally smoothed with assumptions of a logarithmic 
relationship between debris size and flux, the micrometeorite pseudo-CDF was 
generated using the composite function originally presented in Kessler (1996) and 
again in Tribble (1995). Because it is a composite function, the resulting pseudo-CDF 
also contains a number of discontinuities. As the pseudo-CDF is used solely for the 
purpose of extracting random values of micrometeorite mass that an aggregated 
histogram of the selected values is representative of the environment, it is assumed 
that these discontinuities do not produce an error in the generated random variables 
that is more significant than that inherent in the process by which the originating 
functions were generated or that inherent in the procurement of the data set.
To select the randomly generated orbital debris and micrometeorite impactors, 
TetherLife uses two uniformly distributed random variables and the respective 
pseudo-CDF, as done previously for other system state parameters. After TetherLife 
generates a random time, system state, analysis location, and impactor sizes, it is able 
to calculate the probability that each of those impactors would strike and cause a 
failure of that tether component. With all of the variables for the impact set, 
TetherLife calculates the probability that a failure would occur using historically 
accepted failure criteria.
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To offer the user a greater understanding of the risk posed to the system by the orbital 
environment, the probability that the system will be impacted at any instant is 
calculated and presented separate of the probability that the impact would cause a 
failure. By doing so, the probability of failure at any instant is mathematically 
presented as follows:
Pr(fail) ^ Pr(impact)Pr(fail|impact) (9.27)
9.2.7.1 Probability of impact
The TetherLife probability of impact calculation employs the well-supported concept 
of geometric probability, based on projections into an impact plane. At any instant, it 
is assumed that there is an impact plane perpendicular to system velocity vector. At 
that instant, the projection into the impact plane of the analysed segment constitutes 
the casualty area.
The probability of impact is equal to the casualty area multiplied by the debris density 
associated with the debris size that has been previously selected. This is presented in 
terms of debris flux and casualty area, and equated in to standard geometric 
probability, as follows:
Pr(impact) -  = N (9.28)
Where:
Pr(impact) = probability of impact 
<E> = impactor flux ( 1 /m ^  )
= projection of the suseptible item 
into the impact plane (m^ )
^deb ^ number of impactors in the impact plane 
d^eb ~ ^rea of the impact plane (m^ )
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As mentioned earlier, if either the impactor flux or casualty area is too large, the 
product would violate the laws of probability theory. This is the reason TetherLife 
assesses Hoytether configurations on a segment level, and artificially divides tether 
strands that run the length of the span into one metre long segments.
To calculate the impactor flux at an impact plane, this is found as either the orbital 
debris or micrometeorite flux, after all required modifications are accounted for, 
calculated using Eq. 9.9 and Eq. 9.17, respectively, multiplied by the analysis time 
step. A/. While the user defined A/ is of a discrete length and not instantaneous, as 
implied with the use of a the term ‘impact plane,’ there is no significant loss in 
accuracy if it can be assumed that the expected change in conditions associated with 
the element and the local environment is insignificant over that time step.
I
The main conceptual alternative that is held out to the impact plane approach is that of 
swept volume. The concept of assuming the probability of impact is directly related to 
the number of debris particles contained within a volume swept over a time step by 
the object profile relative to its velocity vector is presented in Gittins et al. (2003). As |
proposed, Gittins et al. (2003) states that the probability of tether failure could be 
computed as follows:
P  = pAvt (9.29)
Where
P ~ collision and sever probabilities 
p  ~ debris density
A = tether cross sectional area 7
V = relative velocity 7
t^ = time interval
The equation and discussion presented in Gittins et al. (2003) does not specify the 
units associated with each parameter, although the equation is dimensionally correct if
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SI units are assumed. However, it is clear that the debris density is defined as the 
volumetric density of debris that is capable of severing the tether being analysed. It is 
unclear from where this data set detailing volumetric impactor density as a function of 
position originates. For small time intervals where the volumetric debris density is 
uniform throughout the swept volume and the system velocity is defined by the 
dynamics of a Keplerian orbit, the following relationship is valid;
p\’t = <D (9.30)
The swept volume approach presented in Gittins et al. (2003) is widely employed for 
space launch aircraft impact safety analyses when the debris cloud is known and the 
aircraft size and velocity are known, and both are case specific. For orbital 
applications, it has been previously demonstrated that equations defining the planar 
impactor flux, O, for locations in space are widely accepted. For this reason, the 
swept volume approach of Gittins et al. (2003) presents no real benefit over the planar 
method.
Using the impact plane approach, TetherLife computes the probability of impact at 
each location. After aggregating these results, an average probability of impact at any 
instance can be computed with a normally distributed approximation of the standard 
deviation about the calculated mean.
9.2.7.2 Impact outcome
With the probability of impact computed in the manner identified above, the 
conditional probability of failure for the randomly generated analysis point must be 
computed. This conditional probability is found by examining each randomly 
generated set of impact conditions, assessing whether a failure would occur given 
those impact conditions, and aggregate the result of every analysis point to find a 
mean probability of failure conditional on an impact and the standard deviation 
associated with that mean, assuming normalcy in the data set.
It is assumed by this research that all impacts occurring on obit and relevant to a space 
tether lifetime analysis are hypervelocity impacts. As accepted from the conclusions
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of Hayashida and Robinson (1993) presented earlier in this work, a tether can fail 
without severing. If the tether segment is not capable of holding its designed load, it 
is assumed that the tether will be considered in a state of failure. It is further assumed 
that this state of failure occurs when the penetration depth equals the maximum 
allowable wile retaining the definitional validity of a semi-indiscrete plate, which is 
25% of the target thickness.
From an earlier discussion of the empirically derived hypervelocity impact equations 
currently accepted as valid for the purposes of space system analysis, it was 
concluded that an equation which is calibrated over densities more relevant to a space 
tether member may be more appropriate for the kind of analyses performed by 
TetherLife. For this reason, TetherLife adopts the Draper (72) equation for the 
assessing the depth of a crater crated by a hypervelocity impact. For convenience, the 
Draper (72) equation is re-stated as Eq. 9.31.
p  = ^0.042^0.6,3  ^0.076^ -, 348 (9.31)
The Draper (72) equation is adopted into TetherLife using the following inequality 
derived using the stated assumption of failure:
With di being equal to the tether diameter at the time of impact, when this inequality 
is valid, it is assumed the tether is in a state of failure. After assessing this 
relationship for a significant number of randomly generated samples, the average is 
assumed to be the average probability of failure for a tether segment, assuming an 
impact has occurred.
9.3 Analysing the results
The probability of failure for any time segment is assumed constant over the entire 
mission.^"’ Because of this, the probability of failure at any instant is considered 
constant over the entire mission. From reliability engineering, we know that the
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probability that a component fails some time after t but before / + A/is equal to the 
component’s failure rate multiplied by the time step, A/. This is expressed 
mathematically as follows;
= f { t < /  + Af | t > / }  (9.33)
A = (9.34)
215
iAs previously noted, the failure rate for each component is a constant failure rate, by 
design. Therefore, it does not vary as a function of time, and is found and presented 
as follows:
From the exponential distribution, which is used for continuously operating systems '4
with a constant failure rate, the component’s PDF is as follows:
f { t )  = X e “ (9.35)
This leads, though integration, to the following CDF for the component:
F { t ) = \ - e ^  (9.36)
From the previous CDF, the reliability of the system may be written as follows:
R{t) = (9.37)
As the mean time to failure (MTTF), a common metric in reliability analysis, is
defined as follows:
M n F  = - ^ t ^ d t  = -tR{tX,-<r^R{t)dt (9.38)
M TTF I" R{t)dt (9.39)
MTTF = -  (9.40)X
For assessing the probability of failure of the system, and therefore the MTTF for the 
system using this inverse relationship for systems with a constant failure rate, 
TetherLife must account for the tether segment configuration employed by each span. 
TetherLife has the ability to account for both un-strapped systems and Hoytether 
configured systems.
9.3.1 Un-strapped systems
By design, each primary line segment on an un-strapped line is mutually exclusive to 
all others on that line. Therefore, the probability that a primary line will fail is equal 
to the probability that each segment will fail, multiplied by the number of segments. 
The failure rate for each line is expressed as follows;
Tr = AfpTp (9.41)
Where:
Tp = Failure rate for a primary 
segment
#p -Number of primary segments 
Xj = Failure rate for a primary line
With the failure rate per primaiy line established, the failure rate of an un-strapped 
span is then found by modelling it as a simple, k out of n system using the binomial 
distribution, as follows:
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1 (  N, (9.42)
9.3.2 Hoytether systems
Unlike an un-strapped span with redundant primary lines, a Hoytether is designed to 
allow for multiple breaks in multiple primary lines without system failure. As 
claimed in Hoyt and Forward (1998), a Hoytether is constructed o f layers, each layer 
arranged in series to construct a span. While this failure criteria is identical to that 
used for assessing the system failure rate o f an un-strapped system using line 
segments, the design o f each Hoytether layer is what makes it superior to an un­
strapped system.
Each Hoytether layer is composed o f sections. The relationship between a section and 
a layer are identified in Fig 9.9 and Fig 9.10. As can be seen in Fig 9.9, this section 
example contains one primary tether segment, and two secondary segments. 
Depending on the relative size o f these primary and secondary lines, there are a 
number o f ways in which a segment could fail.
I  1 / \
\ / 1 \ / m \
Figure 9.9 Hoytether section, identified by Figure 9.10 Hoytether layer, identified by 
the highlighting box, with four redundant the highlighting box, with seven primary 
segments per primary segment. lines.
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Pr(fail, Span) = Pr(fail, L) (9.43)
Where:
Pr(fail, Span) probability that a span 
or sub-span will fail 
= number of layers
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For a Hoytether configuration where each secondary line has half of the cross |
sectional area associated with a primary line, a failure in the primary line would ;i;require both secondary lines to be operational such that the load carried by the 
primary line is both absorbed by the secondary lines and each layer maintains its |
independence. If the cross sectional area of each secondary line is less than that
where, in conjunction with the other operational secondary lines, it is capable of r
supporting the load previously held by a primary line, the layer would not be
independent of its successive layers.
If the Hoytether system is designed such that each layer is independent, if there is a 
failure in the primaiy line within one layer, the same primary line in the adjoining 
layer will be unaffected. As identified in Hoyt and Forward (1998), there are :
configurations where this independence is not valid. TetherLife assumes this layer 
independence is maintained when performing its calculations. Further the concept of 
this independence, or even the validity of the independent configuration proposed in 
Hoyt and Forward (1998) assumes there is no significant loss of strength at the nodes 
where primary and seeondary lines connect. While this assumption is suspect as a 
result of the transverse weakness observed in the type of fibres that would likely be 
considered for space tether applications, such an assumption is accepted for the 
purposes of this work.
■Assuming layer independence is valid as a result of system design, the probability 
failure for a span is equal to the mutually exclusive probability of failure associated 
with each layer. This is presented mathematically as follows:
Pr(fail,L) = probability that a layer 
will fail
When assessing the probability of failure associated with a layer, the number of 
redundant primary tether lines becomes important. As with the un-strapped span, 
failure in the span occurs when the number of primaiy lines that fail is greater than 
those that are redundant. When cairied forward to the Hoytether design, failure in a 
layer occurs when the number of failed sections contained within that layer is greater 
than the number of redundant primary lines. This is expressed as follows:
Pr(fail,L)= f j  Pr(fail,SjS, c L
x=\
Nn p+l
n ^ s . ^ L ) (9.44)
Where:
Pr(fail,L)-probability that a layer 
will fail
Pr(fail,S,j|S,j cz l ) = probability that
the section will fail, conditional on 
the section being contained within 
the layer
Pr(S^ cL )-probability  that the 
section is contained within the layer 
p ^  number of redundant primary
lines contained within each layer
Similar to failures in a layer, where the threshold number of section failures must be 
associated with the same layer, the failure of a section requires the primary segment 
and all redundant lines plus one to fail within the same segment. Therefore, the 
probability that a segment will fail is equal to the probability that a primary will fail 
multiplied by the probability that each of the required secondary tethers will fail. This 
is expressed mathematically as follows:
I
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Pr(fail,S)= Pr(fail,P) p[Pr(fail,HjH_, c  s'
,V = l
Vu ll+l
r i M H . c s ) (9.45)
Where:
Pr(fail, S) = probability that a section 
will fail
Pr(fail,P) = probability that a primary
line segment will fail
Pr(fail, H |H c  s) = probability that
Hoytether secondaiy line will fail, 
conditional on the x‘*^ Hoytether 
secondary line being within the section 
Pr(H ^ . c: S) = probability that the x‘’^
Hoytether secondary line will be 
within the section
= number of redundant
Hoytether secondary lines associated 
with each primary line
As a note, while the Hoytether is passively viewed as having only two secondary lines 
per tether, this work does not assume that is an exclusive design. For example, if the 
Hoytether is thought of as not just being a tube where primary lines are contained 
along the surface, but as a cluster of primary lines, it is feasible that some primary 
lines could have many more than just two secondary lines associated with each 
primary segment. Because TetherLife computes the probability of failure associated 
with each segment, it is capable of offering data from which such a configuration 
could be solved. However, it does not directly address this unconventional Hoytether 
design.
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As discussed, TetherLife is only concerned with a passive Hoytether design where 
each primary has two secondary lines, for which the secondary line design criteria 
ensures independence between the layers. Using the failure rate for a primary and 
Hoytether secondary segment, À? and Àu, respectively, the following equations can be 
represented using the analytical inputs required by TetherLife:
Tg -Tp/luA/ (9.46)
X. j _ rAt + ly
Vl-(Vr.p+i)]
'^Span -  -^ L ^ L
(9.47)
(9.48)
One problem with the calculations presented above is the fact that the tether segments 
at the span tip will be exposed more frequently than those near the system centre. 
This was the same problem experienced when looking at an atomic oxygen 
degradation methodology, and it has been treated in an identical manner here. While 
it is true that this calculation will be conservative at the system centre and un­
conservative at the span tips, it is assumed that this imbalance in fidelity is not great 
enough to counter the increase in efficiency of the model. As previously discussed, 
considering the uncertainty associated with the debris environment, which drives the 
failure rates being used in these calculations, combined with the uncertainty 
associated with the MMET deployment and retraction profile, this imbalance in 
conservatism relative to the span length is considered acceptable for this initial 
version of TetherLife.
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Chapter 10 
LSM Mission Analysis
In the previous chapter, the methodology behind the TetherLife analysis program was 
explained. This section discussed the results obtained after employing TetherLife,
V1.2, for an analysis of the MMET systems proposed by the LSM mission.
10.0 Defining the operational characteristics
While the orbital dynamics of the LSM mission are clearly defined in Cartmell et al. '(2004), there is some variability within the requirements of the mission and the 
planned operation of an MMET. It is clear that both systems are at full extension at |
handover. Because there is significant uncertainty in the orbital insertion capability of 
a Delta II, this analysis assumes the rendezvous between the conventional first stage -Ifand the initial MMET occurs when the MMET spans are retracted. Because the LSM
To implement these requirements, the analysis made the time ratio assumptions 
presented in Table 10.1.
Table 10.1 Time ratios employed for the LSM mission analysis
LEO MMET EEC MMET
tou 2 10
top 0.5 0.001
toL 0.05 0.9
twL 1 1
These ratios identified in Table 10.1 can be identified as inputs into the analysis by 
examining the screen-shots presented in Fig 10.1 and Fig 10.2.
mission assumes the upper tether is fully extended for the duration of the mission, the 
parameters for the elliptical Earth orbit (EEC) MMET system are selected to reflect *|
this operational constraint. |
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Figure 10.1: Edited screenshot of TetherLife, vl.2, identifying the inputs used in 
assessing the LEO system of the LSM mission.
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Figure 10.2: Edited screenshot of TetherLife, vl.2, identifying the inputs used in 
assessing the EEO system of the LSM mission.
In terms o f the state chart presented in Fig 9.5, the percentage o f time the system 
spends in each o f the identified states can be computed using these parameters. The 
results o f such a computation are presented in Table 10.2.
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Table 10.2 Total percentage of mission time spent in a particular state, as defined 
by Fig 9.5
Percentage of total Percentage of Total
LEO Mission EEO Mission
System
Operating
Operational
State 1.67% 0.08%
Changing State 31.67% 90.92%
System Idle Rest State 33% 9%
It is important to note three main things when examining the percentages present in 
Table 10.2: (i) the rest state accounts for the time between missions; (ii) if the system 
is changing state, it is either not operating at its operational angular velocity, not fully 
extended, or a combination of the two so long as the system is not fully retracted nor 
stopped; and (iii) the different percentage in rest time does not require the LEO 
mission to take longer than the EEO mission.
As stated in Chapter 9, the ratios are developed as a guide for how quickly the system 
changes state. They do not directly dictate the amount of time a process takes. For 
example, for the LEO mission, it is known that 1.67% of the time associated with 
each mission is spent in an operational state. Using the graphs of B.W. Augenstein, 
which are reproduced in Thomson (1986), the 20-degrees bounding apogee takes 
approximately 11 minutes to traverse. If this 20-degrees is an acceptable distance 
through which the LEO system is in an operational state, such that it is ready to 
release the payload, 1.67% of each mission takes 11 minutes. Therefore, the 
parameters here would assume a mission occurs approximately every 11 hours, or 
roughly twice a day. At this rate, the MMET system would be conducting 60 
missions a month. Depending on the start-up costs and the system reliability, this rate 
may pose a financially feasible option when compared against an equivalent 
conventional launch system.
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However, it is important for the analyst to understand that the mission length, orbital 
parameters, the timing ratios, and the release tolerances are all interlinked because of 
the inter-coupling within the orbital dynamics. By setting 20-degrees as an acceptable 
tolerance for LEO release, the selected parameters for the EEO mission determine the 
release parameters that are acceptable for that orbit. If the LEO system is only 
operating at its maximum angular velocity for 10-degrees on either side of apogee, the 
EEO system would only have 30 seconds to receive and release its payload. 
Considering the angular velocity of the system, 294 seconds is required to execute this 
activity. Understanding this, for the time relationships identified, there would need to 
be around 100 hours between missions, which only allows seven per month. For 
many scenarios, this may not be acceptable.
The significantly greater percentage of mission time attributed to a changing state, 
with regards to the EEO mission, is due to the very small top parameter. By having 
the system on for such a significant percentage of the time, and so much of that time 
at the operational angular velocity ready for release, these parameters make the 
required timing associated with the EEO system more precise. However, it also 
allows the EEO system to accelerate and decelerate at a much slower pace, likely 
resulting in an energy savings, which could prolong mission life.
As all of these elements are interconnected, the flatter acceleration and deceleration 
profiles associated with the EEO mission mean it will sit idle on orbit for less time. 
However, as before, the start and end of each mission will coincide. Considering 
these current parameters, the LEO system would sit idle on orbit for over a day 
between missions, while the EEO would sit idle for less than one-third of that time.
When thinking of the system being idle, this is not necessarily a bad thing. When 
idle, the system is fully retracted and is not able to fail as a result of debris impacts. 
This is not true with the EEO system as it is modelled here. For areas of greater 
debris density, such as LEO, it would be better to spin-up more quickly if the 
probability that a strike results in a failure is very high. For areas of lesser debris 
density, taking a more energy efficient spin-up and spin-down approach may be 
reasonable as the risk of failure would be less.
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10.1 Analysis results
With a 10 second time increment, At, and 100 000 samples, the system failure rates 
are presented in Fig 10.3 through 10.8 for a range of system configurations and failure 
assumptions. Each system assumes a primary strand is made of the eight-strand 
braided Twaron examined in Chapter 6, and the secondary strands are made of the 
four-strand Twaron to ensure layer independence.
10.1.1 One-impact-one-failure
When examining the system from a one-impact-one-failure perspective, Table 10.3 
presents the lifetime and maximum payload available to various span configurations. 
Table 10.4 presents equivalent information for the EEO MMET system.
Considering the payload sizing and safety factor considerations discussed in Chapter 
3 regarding research currently being conducted at the University of Glasgow, the 
configurations presented in Table 10.3 are capable of accommodating a payload 
masse plus safety factor totalling either 2.5 tonnes or 3 tonnes. The maximum 
payload mass is computed by evenly dividing the mass among the primary lines.
Table 10.3: Results o f a TetherLife, v l.2 , analysis for the LEO system proposed 
in the LSM Earth to moon mission. :
N Primary
N Redundant Primary 
N Secondaiy per Primary
8
0
0
8
0
2
9
1
2
10
2
2
10
0
0
10
0
2
11
1
2
12
2
2
MTTF (hours) 2.7E-05 1.9E+00 1.2E+06 1.2E+12 3.8E-05 1.9E+00 1.2E+06 1.2E+12
MTTF (years) 3.0E-09 2.2E-04 1.4E+02 1.4E+08 4.4E-09 2.2E-04 1.3E+02 1.3E+08
Max Payload (kg) 2,643 2,643 2,643 2,643 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303
Sub span mass (kg) 2,213 5,533 6,916 8,299 2,766 6,916 8,299 9,683
Dual-span mass (kg) 8,853 22,132 27,665 33,198 11,066 27,665 33,198 38,731
When examining the MTTF for the LEO system, it is clear that the minimum 
configuration for ensuring a reasonable lifetime for each payload mass is a Hoytether
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with one redundant primary line. For the 2.5 tonne payload, the Hoytether with no 
redundant line increases the MTTF by over 7,000,000% of that predicted for the un­
strapped system, while the Hoytether with one redundant primary line increases the 3
MTTF by a further 63,000,000%. For the LEO system, these gains in reliability come 
at mass increases of 149% and 25%, respectively. By adding a redundant primary 
line for the Hoytether span, the MTTF increases from two hours to 140 years.
Table 10.4: Results of a TetherLife, v l.2 , analysis for the EEO system proposed 
in the LSM Earth to moon mission.
N Primaiy
N Redundant Primary 
N Secondary per Primary
16
0
0
16
0
2
17
1
2
18
2
2
19
0
0
19
0
2
20
1
2
21
2
2
MTTF (hours) 5.0E-04 1.7E+00 3.2E+05 9.8E+10 l.lE -03 1.7E+00 3.2E+05 9.5E+10
MTTF (years) 5.7E-08 1.9E-04 3.7E+01 l.lE +07 1.3E-07 1.9E-04 3.6E+01 l.lE + 07
Max Payload (kg) 2,537 2,537 2,537 2,537 3,012 3,012 3,012 3,012
Sub span mass (kg) 1,660 4,150 4,668 5,187 1,971 4,928 5,446 5,965
Dual-span mass (kg) 6,640 16,599 18,674 20,749 7,884 19,711 21,786 23,861
Similar results are observed with the EEO system. While a Hoytether with no 
redundant lines is only able to deliver an untenable MTTF of just less than two hours, 
adding a single redundant primary line increases the MTTF so it is just above 35 
years. These significant increases in reliability are achieved for the EEO system with 
increases in mass that are less than 15%.
If it is assumed that one impact causes only one failure, the Hoytether demonstrates a 
significant superiority over an un-strapped system.
10.1.2 Lethal dispersion
As concluded based on the results of Chapter 8, it may not be sufficient to assume a 
single impact causes only a single failure. If the conclusions of Chapter 8 are 
implemented, such that a 9-degree lethal dispersion occurs upon impact, this work 
implements this by assuming a single impact is capable of causing a section behind
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the impact to faii. When this is done, while the Hoytether is still superior, its 
superiority decreases immediately and significantly.
Table 10.5 presents the same configurations from 10.3 for the LEO system. By 
examination, while the MTTF increases by 900% when two redundant primary lines 
are added to a mission designed for 2.5 tonne payloads, the mass increase is 271% 
and the MTTF is still only on the order of seconds. '^'"
Table 10.5 Results of a TetherLife, v l.2 , analysis for the LEO system proposed in 
the LSM Earth to moon mission, assuming an impact of either a primary or 
secondary tether causes secondary impacts with sufficient size and dispersion to 
cause a section failure.
N Primary 8 8 9 10 10 10 11 12
N Redundant Primary 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 2
N Secondary per Primary 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 2
MTTF (hours) 1.9E-05 1.9E-05 5.2E-05 1.9E-04 1.8E-05 1.8E-05 4.0E-05 1.2E-04
MTTF (years) 2.2E-09 2.2E-09 5.9E-09 2.2E-08 2.1E-09 2.1E-09 4.6E-09 1.4E-08
Max Payload (kg) 2,643 2,643 2,643 2,643 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303
Sub span mass (kg) 2,213 5,533 6,916 8,299 2,766 6,916 8,299 9,683
Dual-span mass (kg) 8,853 22,132 27,665 33,198 11,066 27,665 33,198 38,731
With significant levels of redundancy, the MTTF is again increased to acceptable 
levels, as identified in Table 10.6.
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Table 10.6: Results of a TetherLife, v l.2 , analysis for the LEO system proposed 
in the LSM Earth to moon mission, assuming an impact of either a primary or 
secondary tether causes secondary impacts with sufficient size and dispersion to 
cause a section failure.
N Primary
N Redundant Primary 
N Secondary per Primary
8
0
0
8
0
2
21
13
2
22
14
2
10
0
0
10
0
2
24
14
2
25
15
2
MTTF (hours) 1.9E-05 1.9E-05 1.7E+05 1.4E+06 1.8E-05 1.8E-05 2.IE+05 1.7E+06
MTTF (years) 2.2E-09 2.2E-09 1.9E+01 1.6E+02 2.1E-09 2.1E-09 2.4E+01 1.9E+02
Max Payload (kg) 2,643 2,643 2,643 2,643 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303
Sub span mass (kg) 2,213 5,533 23,515 24,898 2,766 6,916 26,281 27,665
Dual-span mass (kg) 8,853 22,132 94,060 99,593 11,066 27,665 105,126 110,659
I
For the EEO system, the MTTF is identified, again, for the initially examined 
orientations in Table 10.7, and for those with more significant redundancy in Table 
10.8 .
Table 10,7: Results of a TetherLife, v l.2 , analysis for the EEO system proposed 
in the LSM Earth to moon mission, assuming an impact of either a primary or 
secondary tether causes secondary impacts with sufficient size and disperstion to 
cause a section failure.
N Primary 16 16 17 18 19 19 20 21
N Redundant Primary 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 2
N Secondary per Primary 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 2
MTTF (hours) 5.2E-05 5.2E-05 7.0E-05 1.3E-04 5.8E-05 5.8E-05 6.6E-05 l.lE -0 4
MTTF (years) 6.0E-09 6.0E-09 8.0E-09 1.5E-08 6.6E-09 6.6E-09 7.5E-09 1.2E-08
Max Payload (kg) 2,537 2,537 2,537 2,537 3,012 3,012 3,012 3,012
Sub span mass (kg) 1,660 4,150 4,668 5,187 1,971 4,928 5,446 5,965
Dual-span mass (kg) 6,640 16,599 18,674 20,749 7,884 19,711 21,786 23,861
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Table 10.8: Results of a TetherLife, v l.2 , analysis for the EEO system proposed 
in the LSM Earth to moon mission, assuming an impact of either a primary or 
secondary tether causes secondary impacts with sufficient size and dispersion to 
cause a section failure.
N Primary
N Redundant Primary 
N Secondary per Primary
16
0
0
16
0
2
32
16
2
33
17
2
19
0
0
19
0
2
36
17
2
37
18
2
MTTF (hours) 5.2E-05 5.2E-05 l.lE +05 6.9E+05 5.8E-05 5.8E-05 1 .OE+05 6.0E+05
MTTF (years) 6.0E-09 6.0E-09 1.3E+01 7.8E+01 6.6E-09 6.6E-09 1.2E+01 6.9E+01
Max Payload (kg) 2,537 2,537 2,537 2,537 3,012 3,012 3,012 3,012
Sub span mass (kg) 1,660 4,150 12,449 12,968 1,971 4,928 13,746 14,265
Dual-span mass (kg) 6,640 16,599 49,796 51,871 7,884 19,711 54,984 57,058
10.1.3 Reliability over time
The reliability as a function of time is presented in Fig 10.3 and Fig 10.4 for the span 
configurations identified when employed for the LEO and EEO missions, 
respectively, in which the payload mass is a maximum of 2.5 tonnes.
-0-2 — ■ — *21-13-2 •22-14-2
•Hr4
I•H
1000000 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 1 100lE-13 0 . 1lE-10
Years
Figure 10.3 Reliability over time for three LEO systems, assuming lethal debris dispersion occurs
The curves progress to the right with increasing MMET, as expected. What may not 
be expected, though, is how soon the reliability of each system drops below the 99.7% 
reliability level. For the LEO systems, the reliability drops below this value at a mere 
fraction of a minute, 18 days, and 6 months, respectively. For the EEO mission, the 
identified configurations drop below this reliability level at a fraction of a minute, 10 
days, and 3 months, respectively.
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Figure 10.4 Reliability over time for three EEO systems, assuming lethal debris dispersion occurs
While the MTTF for these missions is significant, it must also be appreciated that the 
variance of the MTTF for the uniform failure rate case is equal to the MTTF squared. 
As a result, even with a mean time to failure on the order of a few hundred years, the 
probability of success for each mission may force the system to pose a higher risk 
than its conventional alternative.
When examining the values obtained using TetherLife, vl.2, to assess a Hoytether 
similar to that presented in Hoyt and Forward (1998), the results do agree. While 
agreement does not verify the techniques presented in Hoyt and Forward (1998), it 
does offer an indication that the calculations performed by TetherLife, vl.2, are in 
agreement with the current literature.
10.2 LSM mission: lifetime risk
Assuming each system will be designed to last on the order of 30 years, and 
considering the parameters of the LSM mission and the time relationships identified 
result in a mission-to-mission time of 102 hours, the following probability of failure 
for the first mission is generated for each system. This calculation assumes the 
payload mass is no more than 2.5 tonnes, and considers the probability of failure on 
the mission to be equal to the failure rate multiplied by the duration of the mission. 
Further analyses in the next Chapter will take a higher fidelity approach to a similar 
analysis.
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Table 10.9 Values currently calculated for the LSM mission risk assessment.
Conventional MMET-based
CLV
c M M ET,\
cM M E T ,2
P / M
Pf , H]
P f , T \
P f , H l
P f , T 2
$254M
0.003000
$70M
0.003000
0.003000
0.000072
0.003000
0.000147
Without accounting for the recumng cost of the MMET systems, the risk of a 
conventional system is calculated to be 0.762, while the risk of an MMET-based 
system is 0.643. While the MMET-based system appears to have the lower risk, 
thereby making it the more reasonable choice within the framework presented in this 
thesis, the lifetime costs are yet to be calculated.
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Chapter 11
Feasibility assessment
1
With the system reliabilities known for both of the MMET systems employed in the 
LSM mission, and for the conventional systems, a choice between two reasonable 
options can be made based on the total system risk. Depending on the capital cost 
associated with initially deploying each MMET, an acceptable failure rate for a 
known number of missions can be determined.
11.0 The full choice
As previously stated, this thesis presents two reasonable launch system options, and 
selects the option with the least risk. We recall from Chapter 2 that there are two 
components to risk: (i) the probability of system failure and (ii) the magnitude of the 
effect resulting from that failure. This thesis focuses on the financial risk of a launch 
system. The financial risk posed by a launch system on any launch, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, is equal to the cost of the launch system for each launch, , multiplied by 
the probability that the system will fail on that launch, Pf^i- After examining the
financial risk posed by various launch system options, the option with the least risk is 
the reasonable choice, so long as all options are reasonable options. I
As previously discussed, a reasonable option is one where probability of failure is not 
so large that it is inconsistent with other options available within the market. By 
examination of the tme probability of success midpoint estimates presented in Draper 
et al. (2004), in conjunction with the concept of acceptable risk within the commercial 
market as discussed in documents such as DOT (2001), it is assumed in this research 
that a reasonable option a reliability of no less than 90%.
As previously identified in Chapter 10, the reliability associated with an MMET 
operation decreases as a function of time. Because this decrease in reliability results 
from broken tether segments, this decrease does not produce a time-dependent effect 
on the other sources of failure. For example, the probability of failure associated with 
each handover is not dependent on how many MMET sub-strands are broken.
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Therefore, the probability of failure associated with the entire MMET-based 
unconventional launch system must be assessed when examining it as a reasonable 
option, and not just the failure rate of the MMET components.
11.1 Recouping mission cost
The first component examined for risk calculation purposes is the cost per mission.
For each mission that employs an MMET-based unconventional launch system, there 
is a cost associate with the conventional launch vehicle and all 
MMET systems that are required to complete the mission. While a conventional I
launch system is a recurring cost for each launch, a large investment in each MMET 
system must be made to deploy the system before any missions can begin, after which 
all monies received as a result of operations are paid against this initial investment. fi
The cost of deploying an MMET system would include costs such as the materials 
and labour required to build the system, the cost of boosting the system into orbit, and 
the cost of making the system usable after it has been placed on orbit. This significant 
capital investment in each MMET would be paid back in the form of a mission fee, 
charged to the customer, at the onset of each mission. If the cost of deploying an 
MMET is known, as well as the number of missions that the system can complete 
before its probability of failure per mission falls below acceptable levels, one could 
determine the minimum cost per mission that must be charged to both recoup the 
deployment costs and make a suitable return on investment.
If a launch service provider is interested in deploying an MMET-based 
unconventional launch system, this research assumes the MMET systems required 
will be a capital asset in which the provider must invest. As stated, the capital cost of 
deploying an MMET would be recouped through a mission price charged for each use 
of the system, . When determining what this cost would be, it is assumed that
price stickiness exists, based on the observations presented in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Therefore, the price charged should be assumed equivalent for each MMET mission.
Since the price the supplier will charge the customer for each mission is assumed 
constant over the lifetime of the system, this price will be modelled herein as aimuity 
payments against the present value of the capital invested plus a suitable return, Q  ,
_ L _ Z .
in the presence of a suitable discount rate per mission, . Employing the standard
equation for calculating the payments associated with an annuity as presented in 
works such as Brealey and Myers (2003), Eq. 11.4 rearranges the basic equation such 
that the price that the provider must charge per mission, , for an MMET whose 
capital plus return is identified as Cq , is the subject of the equation.
^  _  ^ 0  d^isc
1 -
+ d^isc y
(11.1)
Given an opportunity cost of capital based on the returns cited in quarterly reports 
such as Boeing ( 1999), it is assumed in this research that a mission discount rate for 
application in Eq. 11.4 should be based on an annualised discount rate of 7%.
If both the cost of deployment and the discount rate are known, an analyst must still
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work to determine the number of missions each MMET can complete. f
Approximations of this number can be calculated using reliability estimates developed 
in accordance with Chapter 10.
11.2 Probability of failure and its effect on the reasonable system
While Chapter 10 provides a methodology for determining both the failure rate and 
the MTTF for an MMET system, a launch service customer will not be interested in 
how the MMET system operates in isolation. As discussed previously, an MMET- 
based unconventional launch system must be capable of attaining a suitable reliability 
in its entirety relative to its conventional competition. This section discusses how 
such an assessment is conducted.
11.2.1 Uniform failure model
Systems that are susceptible to random failures are often modelled with a uniform 
failure rate. While the probability that such a system will fail over any set time period 
of time, A t , is equal at any point in time, the probability that the system will fail
before a time, t, is calculated through use of the CDF of the exponential distribution, 
identified in Eq. 11.2.
F{t) = \-e-^~' (11.2)
Within Eq. 11.2, the uniform failure rate is represented by . If the failure rate for a
system is known, and that system is known to be operating over a constant time, the 
probability that the system will fail during that time can be calculated with Eq. 11.2. 
If taken from system deployment, one can calculate when system reliability falls 
below an acceptable level. For the MMET-based unconventional launch system 
concept required for the LSM mission, however, this uniform failure rate may not be 
appropriate.
11.2.2 Failure allocation across the LSM mission
As with most engineering systems, an MMET-based unconventional launch system is 
not operating at a uniform failure rate across the whole mission. Identical to the 
highly contentious issue of failure allocation as it applied to conventional launch 
vehicles, as discussed in DOT (2002), the various events associated with an MMET- 
based unconventional launch system produce spikes in the failure rate over time. For 
example, while Chapter 10 assumes both the conventional launch and the handoff 
have the same probability of failure on each mission, the handoff operation is likely to 
take more than an hour, while the conventional launch will take no less than a few 
hours. If the failure rate within each operation is assumed uniform, the failure rate for 
the handoff operation can be many times greater than that of the conventional launch 
vehicle. Figure 11.1 identifies the probability of failure associated with each 
operation over the time the operation is occurring.
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Figure 11.1 The probability of failure (upper) for each component of the MMET- 
based unconventional launch system required for the LSM mission, as identified 
(lower).
Given the probability o f failure for each operation, the time over which each operation 
is acting, and Eq. 11.2, the failure rate for each element can be calculated, a not to 
scale representation o f which is identified in the upper portion o f Fig. 11.2. Equation
11.2 must be employed in this situation because it is not appropriate to assume that 
the time increment is infinitesimally small, unlike in Chapter 10. Considering all 
failure modes are assumed to be independent, the lower portion o f  Fig. 11.3 identifies 
the probability o f failure associated with the system as a function o f time.
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Figure 11.2 The magnitude of failure rate for each component in the MMËT- 
based unconventional launch system proposed for the LSM mission (upper), and 
the system failure rate as a function of time (lower).
While it is clear that the failure rate for the MMET system is not uniform as a 
function o f time, and is cyclical in nature, it is also important to note that 
understanding where within the mission that failure occurs is not as vital to the final 
risk calculation as it is to understanding whether the mission succeeds or fails. For 
this reason, this research will model operation o f the MMET-based unconventional 
launch system required for the LSM mission not as a continuously operating system, 
but as a series o f identical and finite events separated by a non-trivial time that is 
equal to the length o f each mission.
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11.2.3 System reliability
In accordance with standard texts such as Lewis (1996), reliability is the “the 
probability that a system survives for some specified period of time.” With this 
understanding of reliability, and removing the assumption that the MMET-based 
unconventional launch system required for the LSM mission can be modelled as a 
system with a uniform failure rate, the probability that the LSM mission will survive 
to complete the n mission is calculated using Eq. 11.3.
R{p) — (l -  [(l — Pf^iv “  PfMl X^  ~ P f , M M E T \  X^  “  P f , H 2  X^  "  jP f M M E T l  )D  (   ^  ^'^)
From Eq. 11.3, if the probability of failure for each MMET system is known, the 
number of missions, N, which can be completed before violating the acceptable 
system reliability level, can be readily found. For MMET systems with a known 
MTTF, the probability of success for any mission of length, L,, can be found using 
Eq. 11.4.
P f , M ME T
11.2.4 Calculating the number of missions per M MET
As per the assumptions presented in Chapter 9, the failure rate estimates for each 
MMET system examined within this research are uniform across an entire mission, 
and all missions mn co n se cu t i v e l y F o r  an MMET-based unconventional launch 
system that employs only one MMET, the number of missions that can be completed 
before the system ceases to be a reasonable launch option is defines by the single 
MMET system and represented by a solitary value, N. Since the price per mission 
developed for this research is based on the cost of capital plus the required remrn, 
there is no penalty to using each system until the end of its useful life, and then 
replacing it. For systems that employ a single MMET system, this useful lifetime of 
the MMET system is equal to the useful lifetime of the entire unconventional system. 
For MMET-based unconventional launch systems like those required for the LSM 
mission, which employ multiple MMET systems that may have varying MTTF
240
estimate, replacing both systems at the same time may not be making best use of the 
asset.
As identified in Chapter 10, the cost of deploying a system is related to its MTTF as a 
result of the system mass. In an effort to increase a systems MTTF, the system mass 
must increase. This increase in mass results in a need for the deploying systems to be 
larger. Consequently, a trade-off must be made and understood where the cost of 
increasing the MTTF for a system is weighed against the number of missions the 
system is capable of completing. If the number of missions that can be completed is 
not large enough, relative to the cost of deployment, such that the cost required per 
mission to recoup the capital investment associated with deploying the MMET makes 
the system risk too high, the system concept will no longer be financially feasible.
The minimum MTTF required for each MMET system can be related to the minimum 
system reliability, expressed previously in tenus of the maximum allowable 
probability that the system will not fail prior to the time and the number of missions, 
TV, that can be completed in that time. For each MMET system, knowing what level 
of reliability at the end of its useful life would be sufficient for ensuring the 
restrictions developed in accordance with Eq. 11.3 are not violated, the minimum 
MTTF required to achieve the required number of missions, TV, sufficient for 
producing a suitable return on investment relative to the required risk level can be 
calculated using Eq, 11.5.
Deriving Eq. 11.5 requires the reorganisation of Eq. 11.2 so as to make the minimum 
MTTF the subject, in terms of the reliability after the completion of TV mission, R {n). 
Using this equation, an acceptable minimum boundaiy can be found iteratively for the 
MMET system if it is to be a reasonable choice. For example, if the system operates 
every 11 hours, and requires 100 missions to recoup the deployment costs, the MTTF 
would need to be greater than 1.2 years.
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11.3 Mission risk
To be a financially feasible option, assuming it is a reasonable choice as determined 
through the above relationships and work, the risk posed by an MMET-based 
unconventional system must be less than that of its conventional alternative. For an 
MMET-based unconventional launch system like that required for completing the 
LSM mission proposed within this research, calculating this risk is more complex 
than examining just the employed MMET system in isolation. For the LSM mission, 
two MMET systems are required, identified as systems MMETl and MMET2 for the 
LEO and EEO orbits, respectively.
As all failure probabilities and prices are uniform, the risk is identical for every 
mission, and is calculated using Eq. 11.6. In Eq. 11.6, all of the parameters employed 
are as previously discussed, the subscript MMETl and MMETl identifying parameters 
that are specific to the LEO and EEO MMET systems, respectively, for purposes of 
assessing the LSM mission.
Risk =
^LV +
“  P f M M E T \  ■“  P f , H 2  
(l -  Pf^MMETl )
\  r
QQ,MMET\ ‘^disc
1
0 + d^isc
+ ^0,MMET2^^disc
(i+ ^disc y
(11.4)
11.4 Optimising system design for the LSM mission
With a target risk for a reasonable conventional alternative, Eq. 11.2 and Eq. 11.4 
must be considered simultaneously in an iterative optimisation process. The process 
must be iterative because, as previously discussed, there is a direct relationship 
between the MTTF of each MMET system as its mass. Considering how this 
relationship effects the initial capital required and the cost per mission, the following 
subsection provides an initial assessment of the risk associated with the LSM mission.
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11.4.1 Initial assessment
From the results presented in Chapter 10, in conjunction with the approximation 
above of a minimum MTTF of 1.2 years, the LEO system required for the LSM 
mission would require a Hoytether span with a 24-14-2 configuration, assuming lethal 
dispersion. Such a system has a sub-span mass greater than 26 tonnes. With a sub­
span mass of 26 tonnes, the system mass would be no less 105 tonnes, without the 
central facility. Wade (2006) states that the Delta IV Heavy, currently the largest 
heavy-lift vehicle operated by a US manufacturer, has a capability of 25,800 kg to a 
185 km orbit. Based on the energy of this orbit, the Delta IV Heavy should be able to 
deliver 21.2 tonnes to the LEO orbit proposed in the LSM mission, and 6.5 tonnes to 
the EEO orbit. These values to not indicate that a MMET with this level of reliability 
given an assumption that a hypervelocity impact is likely to produce lethal debris 
would be able to be placed onto an orbit suitable for completing the LSM mission. 
By excluding this assumption that a lethal debris cloud is generated after an initial 
impact, the decrease in system size could allow for smaller vehicles to be employed 
during initial installation.
Examining the next smallest launch vehicles, in tenus of payload capacity, the Ariane 
5G is capable of lifting 13.6 tonnes to the LEO orbit or 4.1 tonnes to the EEO orbit, 
according to an energy calculation based on data provided by Wade (2006). The 
Ariane 5G list price is stated as $180 million in 2005 US Dollars.^'" The next size 
after the Ariane 5G is that of the Delta IV Medium, Atlas V, and Zenit 3SL. Each of 
these could lift approximately 9.6 tonnes and 2.9 tonnes to the LEO and EEO orbits, 
respectively. While the price of Delta IV and Atlas V is stated at $138 million each, 
the Zenit 3SL is stated at $90 million. With the 11-1-2 configuration for the LEO 
MMET sub-span mass equal to 8.3 tonnes, and the 20-1-2 configuration of the EEO 
MMET sub-span mass equal to 5.4 tonnes, each system would require multiple 
launches to place it onto orbit.
Out of those options presented, only the Delta IV Heavy is capable of launching the 
EEO MMET system onto its orbit. If this research assumes that the central facility is 
approximately 20% of the system mass, deployment of the EEO system required by 
the LSM mission would cost $1.3 billion. Using equivalent logic, combined with the
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Zenit 3SL being chosen as the lowest cost option with suitable capability, deployment 
of the LEO MMET system would cost $450 million. As neither price includes the 
manufacture of the system, deploying the hardware necessaiy to can-y out the LSM 
mission, alone, would cost over $1.7 billion.
the total cost per mission would be around $71.4.
With this cost per mission and the previously calculated probability of failure, the risk 
per mission for the LSM mission, employing the 11-1-2 and 20-1-2 configuration 
spans for the LEO and EEO MMET systems, respectively, would be 0.669. As 
previously discussed in section 10.2, the risk associated with completing the LSM 
mission using conventional means is 0.762. Considering these risk values, the LSM 
mission could be feasibly completed, as proposed by Caitmell et al (2004).
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Given the probabilities of failure assumed for the conventional vehicle, each
handover, and the failure rate for the 11-1-2 and 20-1-2 configured MMET systems, 
the probability of failure for the system would be 0.937%. With this estimate, the 
system would be a feasible launch option. Further, with the calculated MTTF values 
for each MMET system and a mission time of 102 hours, the LEO and EEO systems 
would be able to complete 11,764 missions and 3,137 missions while retaining a 
probability of failure less than 9% during the time span required to complete those 
missions.
Taking the number of missions for each system, plus a discount rate per mission of 
0.082% based on the annualised 7% discount rate stated earlier, the cost per mission 
for the LEO and EEO MMET systems for the LSM mission would be $0.37 million 
and $1.15 million, respectively. Added to the $70 million per mission required for the
conventional launch system used to boost each payload up to the LEO MMET system,
Chapter 12 
Conclusions and Future Work
The analyses provided by this work support the use of the MMET for commercial 
applications. However, the scope of such a determination must be assessed and 
understood in the context of future work.
12.0 Analytical limitations
The analysis perfoimed and described in this thesis is limited. Many of the 
limitations involve uncertainty with regards to the data available, whether that data be 
financial, physical, or operational in nature.
12.0.1 Financial data
As discussed, financial data on the price a supplier charges a customer is a closely 
guarded secret. This is guarded because the small number of participants in the 
market makes such knowledge competitively damaging. Consequently, the data that 
is publicly available is likely to be somewhat unreliable. Considering the recent 
commercial space lift market crash, with no current prediction for a turnaround in the 
near future, it is likely that the costs associated with commercial launches both are, 
and will continue to be, even lower than publicly presented or projected. This 
decrease in costs would affect the risk calculations, with the expected change in 
predictions being uncertain.
12.0.2 Operational data
This analysis does not take into account operational factors that may affect the risk 
assessed for each system. While such risks could be accounted for in the values 
produced, thus retaining the small number of final inputs into the analysis, they are 
not considered in this thesis. This is because doing so would be unrealistic from a 
data assurance point of view, and the impact relative to model fidelity is assumed to 
be minimal, if not insignificant. Further, as discussed with regards to the handover 
between tethers, the kind of equipment to be used is currently unknown and would 
certainly depend on the orbital dynamics of the system. When the system motion has
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been determined to a high level of certainty, including accounting for the motor 
characteristics and power supply reliability and performance, the operational impact 
on system performance may be found to be minimal. However, considering such 
issues are currently unknown without the completion of accompanying work at the 
University of Glasgow, this research is unable to make a more accurate approximation 
of operational uncertainty than that proposed here.
12.0.3 Environmental data
The orbital debris and micrometeorite data that is currently available is known to have 
a high level of intrinsic uncertainty. This is understood and widely accepted by 
experts in the field, as noted by Liou et a l (2001). Like similar analyses performed 
prior to this one, the environmental data available in the public domain is assumed to 
be suitable. It is outside the scope or capability of the current research efforts at the 
University of Glasgow to improve on such models, which is why such an undertaking 
was neither considered, nor initiated, for this thesis.
12.0.4 Material data
As identified in this thesis, the public knowledge on how aramid fibres would react 
under hypervelocity impact conditions is anecdotal, at best. While it was not possible 
to perform enough tests to reach concrete conclusions, the material and impact testing 
performed in support of this researeh offered an indication that the current 
assumptions may not be fully supported through experimentation. Further, while the 
dataset used for calibrating the Draper (72) equation may not fully account for the 
characteristics important to an aramid rope, it is clear that previous work was neither 
calibrated for the type of densities that would be expected for a tether impact, nor did 
it address non-planar target surfaces. While an increase in data could lead to 
improvements in the equations and assumptions used by TetherLife for characterising 
hypervelocity impacts with tether structures, it is likely that the techniques employed 
within this work offer an incremental improvement in the field, when considering the 
small amount of publicly available data on the topic.
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12.0.5 Time dependence
While texts such as Lewis (1994) support the use of a uniform failure rate as it was 
used in the TetherLife program, the conservatism of the Monte Carlo approach cannot 
be assessed without further work into deterministic models of the system. As this 
work was being conducted in tandem with the orbital dynamic modelling necessary 
for building such models, a comparison may be made in the near future. However, 
without such a model, the time dependence on failure rate could only be assumed.
12.0.6 Environmental focus
TetherLife only focuses on impact failures resulting from the orbital debris and 
micrometeorite environment. No work was performed with regards to the plasma 
environment and its effect on the tethers, nor was any work undertaken regarding the 
general space environment and its effect on any general components required for |
system operation. The scope of such an examination is extraordinary, especially in 
such early stages of the work when orbital dynamic assessments are not fully 
completed. While the data present and employed for this analysis has a high degree |
of inherent uncertainty, the approach and uncertainty associated with the results of the 
TetherLife program are consistent with commonly accepted models.
12.1 Other concerns
In addition to the limitations of the analysis, there are a number of other concerns 
regarding the conclusions that could be drawn based on the results of the analysis 
conducted and presented in support of this research. The two most significant 
concerns about the MMET system and the analysis performed here are the following:
12.1.1 Number of missions
The number of missions proposed by this analysis is unreasonable for the foreseeable 
future. With only five commercial launches performed under DOT license in 2005, it 
seems unlikely that the necessity for 85 missions per year to the moon will emerge in 
the near future. However, this concern is one of speculation based on current uses for 
space. If the use of space and the moon changes significantly, it is likely that the 
launch requirements for supporting such activities could also change.
vVj  /Vs
12.1.2 Tether separation
Examination of Boeing (2002) indicates that the maximum payload size that could be 
contained within a Delta IV fairing is 9m in length with a diameter of 5m. While such 
a volume indicates that each span could fit within the fairing, it also indicated that the 
maximum distance between counter-rotating spans would be less than 18 metres. For 
200 km span, this distance is 0.009% of the span length. This separation would mean 
that, if a perturbation of 1:10,000 of a degree exists in each span, there is a significant 
likelihood that the tethers would collide and cause a failure. While this study does not 
rely on an analysis of the system orbital dynamics, such a perturbation seems 
intuitively likely. Unfortunately, this failure mode is inherent in the system design, 
and cannot be designed out without significantly decreasing the span lengths, which 
would require resulting increases in the operational angular velocity.
12.2 Recommended future work
As discussed, future risk assessment work on the MMET must make use of the orbital 
dynamics specific to each vehicle. While the assumptions made in this work are 
reasonable, based on the quality and quantity of available data, this model must be 
proved against a deterministic equivalent. Once the orbital dynamics are more fully 
finalised for analysing an operational system, future risk work would be capable of 
examining the components required to operate the system. Within such research, an 
examination of the required ground systems and likely safety concerns associated 
with frequent system operation could be undertaken.
With so little currently defined about the MMET system in its operational form, much 
of the work that must be completed before a further risk assessment can be carried out 
is in system definition. Only upon completion of such work can a more complete risk 
assessment be conducted.
12.3 Concluding remarks
This work offers an indication that the MMET could be a suitable unconventional 
launch system component for commercial applications. While this analysis of the 
current system concept indicates there are many issues that must be investigated 
before the system can be deployed, issues that are both minor and intrinsic, this top-
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level analysis proves that further work is necessary and important. While this thesis is 
only a starting point from which future risk analyses may continue, its conclusions are 
appropriate in the context of the information available.
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Endnotes
Chapter 1
11.
A COLA is generally performed for only the initial full orbit of a satellite, 
after which the orbital perturbations during its useful life are not assumed 
significant enough such that the satellite becomes a hazard to objects 
known at that time, or those that will be placed in accordance with a valid 
COLA analysis. However, for on-orbit launch systems like momentum 
exchange tethers that rely on orbital dynamic mechanisms to operate, these 
systems will experience significant travel from any initial orbit. While it is 
public knowledge that the uncertainty associated with large, tether-based 
objects has caused the delay or cancellation of ESA missions out of 
concern for other systems already on orbit, neither this research nor that of 
Patera (2002) addresses the kinds of operationally focused calculations 
that would be required to prove an operating MMET would avoid all other 
objects. It is assumed herein that a COLA-type analysis would be 
completed for each operation performed on orbit, an analysis that would 
ensure the launch operation would avoid all other assets of value on orbit, 
and, after each orbit, the system would return to a rest state and orbit that 
is known to pose limited risk to other assets of value that are on orbit at the 
time. As consistent with cuixent government oversight for commercial 
operations, implemented because United Nations treaties hold a nation 
responsible for the actions of its citizen with regards to space operations, it 
is assumed that the operator will take responsibility for this task of 
ensuring a collision will not occur. As previously stated, though, how the 
operator does this is not diseussed in this thesis.
Primary failures, in this context, refer to failures such as debris impacts or 
handover failures that are the direct result of the environmental or 
operational factors investigated by this thesis. This use of the word 
primaiy should not be confused with later discussions of primary and 
secondary lines within a Hoytether configuration. In this context, issues 
such as electronic component reliability or unanticipated COTS failures 
are secondaiy failures from the perspective of the unconventional launch
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system concept discussed within this research, and are not discussed. 
These are left out of the analysis due to the cuiTent lack of system 
definition, which would make valid component selection unrealistic, 
iit. This work is only concerned with the transport of a single payload form 
the surface of the earth to the moon. The analysis was scoped in this way 
as a result of the significant uncertainty surrounding the orbital dynamics 
of the non-symmetric handover scenario. If the effeet of a non-symmetric 
payload release is relatively insignificant, it may be possible to transfer 
two payloads per mission. However, as this is unproven, the second 
“payload” that is required to balance the MMET system is ignored, with 
the assumption that it could be a dummy payload that is discarded when 
the payload of interest is transfened to the second MMET system.
Chapter 2
iv. The use of the product rule for calculating the probability of failure is only
valid when no one component is so significant that is dominates the others. 
The product rule is assumed acceptable within this research because, by 
design, the MMET is only considered a reasonable system so long as its 
reliability does not fall below a stated threshold. This ensures that the 
system success rate will not fall to such a significantly low level that it will 
then dominate the failure calculation for the entire unconventional system.
V. This research is only concerned with the financial risk associated with the
operation of an MMET-based unconventional launch system in which all 
components are already installed on their proper obit. This research does 
not account for the probability of failure associated with installing the 
required MMET systems, a factor that would affect the total capital 
investment required to get the system up and running. While a slight 
oversight, so long as the reliability of the systems employed for sueh a task 
is suitably high, this will not have a significant affect on the end 
calculations or results relative to the inherent uncertainty associated with 
the research as a whole.
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Chapter 4
vi. As will be clarified through information presented later within section 4.2, 
and the worked example presented in section 4.2.2, the shape and size 
constants are found using an iterative solution technique that uses the 
obseiwed vehicle flight history as the input data. Prior to performing an 
analysis, nothing is known about the shape and size parameters, and 
cannot be determined without the solving of equations 4.5 and 4.5.
vii. The issues associated with selecting an appropriate reference date are 
neither fully explored nor understood through the limited examination 
performed in support of this research. In many cases, an analyst’s opinion 
of an appropriate result may dominate his or her definition of “appropriate 
reference date,” a scenario that would have an equivalent affect even if a 
quantitative metric were to have been presented in support of this researeh. 
As noted within section 4.2.2, the reference date does have a significant 
impact on the results of the calculation and, while it is clear that results 
obtained using two different reference dates cannot be compared, it is 
highly likely that the logic behind choosing one reference date over 
another cannot be suitably determined using solely numerical means.
viii. The Julian date system employed within this research is equivalent to that 
employed for Microsoft-based software packages, where the date having a 
serial value of 1 is equal to 1 Januaiy 1900.
ix. Flight histories were developed using the “Orbital Launch Vehicle 
Alphabetical Index,” Encyclopedia Astronautica [online database], URL: 
http://W W W .astronautix.com/lvs/orbindex.htm [cited 7 December 2003], 
which were verified against Isakowitz (1999), Chang (1996), and Chang 
(2000) for all applicable flights.
Chapter 6
X. The author would like to thank Nicolas LeClanche of Culzean Fabrics in
Kilmarnock, Scotland, for his company’s support and supply of the 
Twaron samples tested for this work.
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Chapter 7
xi. It must be noted that the work of Shanbing, Y, Gengchen, S., and 
Quingming, T., “Experimental laws of cratering for hypeiwelocity impacts 
of spherical projectiles into thick targets,” International Journal o f Impact 
Engineering, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp 67-77, was consulted through the course 
of this reserach, and it is unclear why a reference to this work and its 
results was omitted from the original text of this thesis.
xii. Any impact angle equal to zero for the purposes of this single calculation 
was represented as lE-5, so as to avoid the product of dissimilar datasets 
being equivalent.
Chapter 9
xiii. This assumption that the failure rate is constant over the entire mission is 
sufficient so long as the rest time between missions is not significant. 
When the number of missions is on the order of that examined for the 
purposes of this research, it is assumed that the difference between the 
number of failures observed while the system is operating verses the 
number of failures observed while the system is at rest is not so significant 
that the operational phase dominates the rate of observed failures. 
Assuming this condition is met, which would likely be best verified using 
a deterministic model, the requirements outlined in Lewis (1996) for when 
the uniform failure rate is applicable would then be met. If the rest time is 
significant relative to the probability of time that the system is operating, 
which would occur if the number of missions per unit time is significantly 
reduced, this use of the uniform failure rate assumption would not be valid.
Chapter 10
xiv. Examining the results presented in Table 10.5 when compared to those 
present in Table 10.3, the MTTF values presented may not seem 
intuitively logical. As seen in Table 10.5, the MTTF for the 8-0-0 is less 
than it is when lethal dispersion is ignored, the results of such calculations 
presented in Table 10.3. This reduction in the MTTF may not seem
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logical since a secondary impact requires an initial impact. If the MTTF is 
interpreted in a deterministic manner as the time of first impact, it is not 
logical for the values calculated for the 8-0-0 tether configuration 
presented in Table 10.5 to differ with those presented in Table 10.3. 
However, as the MTTF is an average value, the higher number of early 
failures associated with the calculations performed under the assumption 
that a lethal cloud would form shifts the mean approximation of the failure 
distribution, thereby reducing the MTTF estimate. While the histograms 
of the failure times are not examined for this research, this decreasing 
MTTF value could indicate that the distribution associated with the MTTF 
approximation is significantly skew, causing the normalcy approximation 
employed by the MTTF calculation to be insufficient for a high fidelity 
analysis in an equivalent manner to how it is employed by TetherLife, 
vl.2.
Chapter 11
XV. This analysis does not independently examine the probability that the 
system will be capable of carrying out the next mission. Ensuring an asset 
that is on orbit has not become unusable between missions, or between the 
specific times when the system is required, is of vital importance to the 
space industry, most notably with regards to the Shuttle tiles. Whether 
employing fibre optics or other methods for assessing the system state 
while on orbit, either actively or passively, knowing the system state 
before an operation occurs will likely be required by any end customer. 
This research assumes such an analysis is not necessary as a result of the 
reliability threshold limit imposed on the system, but this may not be 
sufficient in an operational environment.
xvi. All prices in this Chapter or used in this thesis for comparative purposes 
are listed in 2005 US Dollars, and, when necessary, converted with the US 
Department of Commerce Price Producer Index, as previously discussed.
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